diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c | 568 |
1 files changed, 568 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c b/lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8232df9 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c @@ -0,0 +1,568 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <bl_common.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <context_mgmt.h> +#include <interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <platform.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <pubsub_events.h> +#include <smcc_helpers.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <utils.h> + + +/******************************************************************************* + * Context management library initialisation routine. This library is used by + * runtime services to share pointers to 'cpu_context' structures for the secure + * and non-secure states. Management of the structures and their associated + * memory is not done by the context management library e.g. the PSCI service + * manages the cpu context used for entry from and exit to the non-secure state. + * The Secure payload dispatcher service manages the context(s) corresponding to + * the secure state. It also uses this library to get access to the non-secure + * state cpu context pointers. + * Lastly, this library provides the api to make SP_EL3 point to the cpu context + * which will used for programming an entry into a lower EL. The same context + * will used to save state upon exception entry from that EL. + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_init(void) +{ + /* + * The context management library has only global data to intialize, but + * that will be done when the BSS is zeroed out + */ +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * The following function initializes the cpu_context 'ctx' for + * first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as specified by the + * entry_point_info structure. + * + * The security state to initialize is determined by the SECURE attribute + * of the entry_point_info. The function returns a pointer to the initialized + * context and sets this as the next context to return to. + * + * The EE and ST attributes are used to configure the endianess and secure + * timer availability for the new execution context. + * + * To prepare the register state for entry call cm_prepare_el3_exit() and + * el3_exit(). For Secure-EL1 cm_prepare_el3_exit() is equivalent to + * cm_e1_sysreg_context_restore(). + ******************************************************************************/ +static void cm_init_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep) +{ + unsigned int security_state; + uint32_t scr_el3, pmcr_el0; + el3_state_t *state; + gp_regs_t *gp_regs; + unsigned long sctlr_elx; + + assert(ctx); + + security_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr); + + /* Clear any residual register values from the context */ + zeromem(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + + /* + * SCR_EL3 was initialised during reset sequence in macro + * el3_arch_init_common. This code modifies the SCR_EL3 fields that + * affect the next EL. + * + * The following fields are initially set to zero and then updated to + * the required value depending on the state of the SPSR_EL3 and the + * Security state and entrypoint attributes of the next EL. + */ + scr_el3 = read_scr(); + scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_NS_BIT | SCR_RW_BIT | SCR_FIQ_BIT | SCR_IRQ_BIT | + SCR_ST_BIT | SCR_HCE_BIT); + /* + * SCR_NS: Set the security state of the next EL. + */ + if (security_state != SECURE) + scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT; + /* + * SCR_EL3.RW: Set the execution state, AArch32 or AArch64, for next + * Exception level as specified by SPSR. + */ + if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) + scr_el3 |= SCR_RW_BIT; + /* + * SCR_EL3.ST: Traps Secure EL1 accesses to the Counter-timer Physical + * Secure timer registers to EL3, from AArch64 state only, if specified + * by the entrypoint attributes. + */ + if (EP_GET_ST(ep->h.attr)) + scr_el3 |= SCR_ST_BIT; + +#ifndef HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST + /* + * SCR_EL3.EA: Do not route External Abort and SError Interrupt External + * to EL3 when executing at a lower EL. When executing at EL3, External + * Aborts are taken to EL3. + */ + scr_el3 &= ~SCR_EA_BIT; +#endif + +#ifdef IMAGE_BL31 + /* + * SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ rounting as + * indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31. + */ + scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(security_state); +#endif + + /* + * SCR_EL3.HCE: Enable HVC instructions if next execution state is + * AArch64 and next EL is EL2, or if next execution state is AArch32 and + * next mode is Hyp. + */ + if ((GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64 + && GET_EL(ep->spsr) == MODE_EL2) + || (GET_RW(ep->spsr) != MODE_RW_64 + && GET_M32(ep->spsr) == MODE32_hyp)) { + scr_el3 |= SCR_HCE_BIT; + } + + /* + * Initialise SCTLR_EL1 to the reset value corresponding to the target + * execution state setting all fields rather than relying of the hw. + * Some fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values and these are + * set to zero. + * + * SCTLR.EE: Endianness is taken from the entrypoint attributes. + * + * SCTLR.M, SCTLR.C and SCTLR.I: These fields must be zero (as + * required by PSCI specification) + */ + sctlr_elx = EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0; + if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) + sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1; + else { + /* + * If the target execution state is AArch32 then the following + * fields need to be set. + * + * SCTRL_EL1.nTWE: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFE + * instructions are not trapped to EL1. + * + * SCTLR_EL1.nTWI: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFI + * instructions are not trapped to EL1. + * + * SCTLR_EL1.CP15BEN: Set to one to enable EL0 execution of the + * CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions. + */ + sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT + | SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT; + } + + /* + * Store the initialised SCTLR_EL1 value in the cpu_context - SCTLR_EL2 + * and other EL2 registers are set up by cm_preapre_ns_entry() as they + * are not part of the stored cpu_context. + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_elx); + + if (security_state == SECURE) { + /* + * Initialise PMCR_EL0 for secure context only, setting all + * fields rather than relying on hw. Some fields are + * architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * PMCR_EL0.LC: Set to one so that cycle counter overflow, that + * is recorded in PMOVSCLR_EL0[31], occurs on the increment + * that changes PMCCNTR_EL0[63] from 1 to 0. + * + * PMCR_EL0.DP: Set to one so that the cycle counter, + * PMCCNTR_EL0 does not count when event counting is prohibited. + * + * PMCR_EL0.X: Set to zero to disable export of events. + * + * PMCR_EL0.D: Set to zero so that, when enabled, PMCCNTR_EL0 + * counts on every clock cycle. + */ + pmcr_el0 = ((PMCR_EL0_RESET_VAL | PMCR_EL0_LC_BIT + | PMCR_EL0_DP_BIT) + & ~(PMCR_EL0_X_BIT | PMCR_EL0_D_BIT)); + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_PMCR_EL0, pmcr_el0); + } + + /* Populate EL3 state so that we've the right context before doing ERET */ + state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, ep->pc); + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, ep->spsr); + + /* + * Store the X0-X7 value from the entrypoint into the context + * Use memcpy as we are in control of the layout of the structures + */ + gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(ctx); + memcpy(gp_regs, (void *)&ep->args, sizeof(aapcs64_params_t)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * The following function initializes the cpu_context for a CPU specified by + * its `cpu_idx` for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as + * specified by the entry_point_info structure. + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_init_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx, + const entry_point_info_t *ep) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + ctx = cm_get_context_by_index(cpu_idx, GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr)); + cm_init_context_common(ctx, ep); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * The following function initializes the cpu_context for the current CPU + * for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as specified by the + * entry_point_info structure. + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_init_my_context(const entry_point_info_t *ep) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + ctx = cm_get_context(GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr)); + cm_init_context_common(ctx, ep); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Prepare the CPU system registers for first entry into secure or normal world + * + * If execution is requested to EL2 or hyp mode, SCTLR_EL2 is initialized + * If execution is requested to non-secure EL1 or svc mode, and the CPU supports + * EL2 then EL2 is disabled by configuring all necessary EL2 registers. + * For all entries, the EL1 registers are initialized from the cpu_context + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state) +{ + uint32_t sctlr_elx, scr_el3, mdcr_el2; + cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + + assert(ctx); + + if (security_state == NON_SECURE) { + scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR_EL3); + if (scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) { + /* Use SCTLR_EL1.EE value to initialise sctlr_el2 */ + sctlr_elx = read_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), + CTX_SCTLR_EL1); + sctlr_elx &= SCTLR_EE_BIT; + sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL2_RES1; + write_sctlr_el2(sctlr_elx); + } else if (EL_IMPLEMENTED(2)) { + /* + * EL2 present but unused, need to disable safely. + * SCTLR_EL2 can be ignored in this case. + * + * Initialise all fields in HCR_EL2, except HCR_EL2.RW, + * to zero so that Non-secure operations do not trap to + * EL2. + * + * HCR_EL2.RW: Set this field to match SCR_EL3.RW + */ + write_hcr_el2((scr_el3 & SCR_RW_BIT) ? HCR_RW_BIT : 0); + + /* + * Initialise CPTR_EL2 setting all fields rather than + * relying on the hw. All fields have architecturally + * UNKNOWN reset values. + * + * CPTR_EL2.TCPAC: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1 + * accesses to the CPACR_EL1 or CPACR from both + * Execution states do not trap to EL2. + * + * CPTR_EL2.TTA: Set to zero so that Non-secure System + * register accesses to the trace registers from both + * Execution states do not trap to EL2. + * + * CPTR_EL2.TFP: Set to zero so that Non-secure accesses + * to SIMD and floating-point functionality from both + * Execution states do not trap to EL2. + */ + write_cptr_el2(CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & + ~(CPTR_EL2_TCPAC_BIT | CPTR_EL2_TTA_BIT + | CPTR_EL2_TFP_BIT)); + + /* + * Initiliase CNTHCTL_EL2. All fields are + * architecturally UNKNOWN on reset and are set to zero + * except for field(s) listed below. + * + * CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCEN: Set to one to disable traps to + * Hyp mode of Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the + * physical timer registers. + * + * CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCTEN: Set to one to disable traps to + * Hyp mode of Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the + * physical counter registers. + */ + write_cnthctl_el2(CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL | + EL1PCEN_BIT | EL1PCTEN_BIT); + + /* + * Initialise CNTVOFF_EL2 to zero as it resets to an + * architecturally UNKNOWN value. + */ + write_cntvoff_el2(0); + + /* + * Set VPIDR_EL2 and VMPIDR_EL2 to match MIDR_EL1 and + * MPIDR_EL1 respectively. + */ + write_vpidr_el2(read_midr_el1()); + write_vmpidr_el2(read_mpidr_el1()); + + /* + * Initialise VTTBR_EL2. All fields are architecturally + * UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * VTTBR_EL2.VMID: Set to zero. Even though EL1&0 stage + * 2 address translation is disabled, cache maintenance + * operations depend on the VMID. + * + * VTTBR_EL2.BADDR: Set to zero as EL1&0 stage 2 address + * translation is disabled. + */ + write_vttbr_el2(VTTBR_RESET_VAL & + ~((VTTBR_VMID_MASK << VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT) + | (VTTBR_BADDR_MASK << VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT))); + + /* + * Initialise MDCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than + * relying on hw. Some fields are architecturally + * UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TPMS (ARM v8.2): Do not trap statistical + * profiling controls to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.E2PB (ARM v8.2): SPE enabled in non-secure + * state. Accesses to profiling buffer controls at + * non-secure EL1 are not trapped to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TDRA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and + * EL1 System register accesses to the Debug ROM + * registers are not trapped to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TDOSA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1 + * System register accesses to the powerdown debug + * registers are not trapped to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TDA: Set to zero so that System register + * accesses to the debug registers do not trap to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TDE: Set to zero so that debug exceptions + * are not routed to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.HPME: Set to zero to disable EL2 Performance + * Monitors. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TPM: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and + * EL1 accesses to all Performance Monitors registers + * are not trapped to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.TPMCR: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 + * and EL1 accesses to the PMCR_EL0 or PMCR are not + * trapped to EL2. + * + * MDCR_EL2.HPMN: Set to value of PMCR_EL0.N which is the + * architecturally-defined reset value. + */ + mdcr_el2 = ((MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL | + ((read_pmcr_el0() & PMCR_EL0_N_BITS) + >> PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT)) & + ~(MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT + | MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT + | MDCR_EL2_HPME_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TPM_BIT + | MDCR_EL2_TPMCR_BIT)); + +#if ENABLE_SPE_FOR_LOWER_ELS + uint64_t id_aa64dfr0_el1; + + /* Detect if SPE is implemented */ + id_aa64dfr0_el1 = read_id_aa64dfr0_el1() >> + ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_SHIFT; + if ((id_aa64dfr0_el1 & ID_AA64DFR0_PMS_MASK) == 1) { + /* + * Make sure traps to EL2 are not generated if + * EL2 is implemented but not used. + */ + mdcr_el2 &= ~MDCR_EL2_TPMS; + mdcr_el2 |= MDCR_EL2_E2PB(MDCR_EL2_E2PB_EL1); + } +#endif + + write_mdcr_el2(mdcr_el2); + + /* + * Initialise HSTR_EL2. All fields are architecturally + * UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * HSTR_EL2.T<n>: Set all these fields to zero so that + * Non-secure EL0 or EL1 accesses to System registers + * do not trap to EL2. + */ + write_hstr_el2(HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(HSTR_EL2_T_MASK)); + /* + * Initialise CNTHP_CTL_EL2. All fields are + * architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. + * + * CNTHP_CTL_EL2:ENABLE: Set to zero to disable the EL2 + * physical timer and prevent timer interrupts. + */ + write_cnthp_ctl_el2(CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL & + ~(CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT)); + } + } + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(security_state); + cm_set_next_eret_context(security_state); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * The next four functions are used by runtime services to save and restore + * EL1 context on the 'cpu_context' structure for the specified security + * state. + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + el1_sysregs_context_save(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx)); + el1_sysregs_context_save_post_ops(); + +#if IMAGE_BL31 + if (security_state == SECURE) + PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_secure_world); + else + PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_normal_world); +#endif +} + +void cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + el1_sysregs_context_restore(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx)); + +#if IMAGE_BL31 + if (security_state == SECURE) + PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_secure_world); + else + PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_normal_world); +#endif +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function populates ELR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the + * given security state with the given entrypoint + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_set_elr_el3(uint32_t security_state, uintptr_t entrypoint) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + el3_state_t *state; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */ + state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function populates ELR_EL3 and SPSR_EL3 members of 'cpu_context' + * pertaining to the given security state + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(uint32_t security_state, + uintptr_t entrypoint, uint32_t spsr) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + el3_state_t *state; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */ + state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint); + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, spsr); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function updates a single bit in the SCR_EL3 member of the 'cpu_context' + * pertaining to the given security state using the value and bit position + * specified in the parameters. It preserves all other bits. + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_write_scr_el3_bit(uint32_t security_state, + uint32_t bit_pos, + uint32_t value) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + el3_state_t *state; + uint32_t scr_el3; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + /* Ensure that the bit position is a valid one */ + assert((1 << bit_pos) & SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK); + + /* Ensure that the 'value' is only a bit wide */ + assert(value <= 1); + + /* + * Get the SCR_EL3 value from the cpu context, clear the desired bit + * and set it to its new value. + */ + state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); + scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); + scr_el3 &= ~(1 << bit_pos); + scr_el3 |= value << bit_pos; + write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function retrieves SCR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the + * given security state. + ******************************************************************************/ +uint32_t cm_get_scr_el3(uint32_t security_state) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + el3_state_t *state; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */ + state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); + return read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function is used to program the context that's used for exception + * return. This initializes the SP_EL3 to a pointer to a 'cpu_context' set for + * the required security state + ******************************************************************************/ +void cm_set_next_eret_context(uint32_t security_state) +{ + cpu_context_t *ctx; + + ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); + assert(ctx); + + cm_set_next_context(ctx); +} |