diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c | 246 |
1 files changed, 123 insertions, 123 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c b/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c index ca206abd..4b87983a 100644 --- a/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c +++ b/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c @@ -33,12 +33,12 @@ typedef struct { EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx; HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; - /* mac_key is the portion of the key used for the MAC. It is retained - * separately for the constant-time CBC code. */ + // mac_key is the portion of the key used for the MAC. It is retained + // separately for the constant-time CBC code. uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; uint8_t mac_key_len; - /* implicit_iv is one iff this is a pre-TLS-1.1 CBC cipher without an explicit - * IV. */ + // implicit_iv is one iff this is a pre-TLS-1.1 CBC cipher without an explicit + // IV. char implicit_iv; } AEAD_TLS_CTX; @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ static size_t aead_tls_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const size_t in_len, } const size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); - /* An overflow of |in_len + hmac_len| doesn't affect the result mod - * |block_size|, provided that |block_size| is a smaller power of two. */ + // An overflow of |in_len + hmac_len| doesn't affect the result mod + // |block_size|, provided that |block_size| is a smaller power of two. assert(block_size != 0 && (block_size & (block_size - 1)) == 0); const size_t pad_len = block_size - (in_len + hmac_len) % block_size; return hmac_len + pad_len; @@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; if (!tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) { - /* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */ + // Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return 0; } if (in_len > INT_MAX) { - /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */ + // EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } @@ -155,14 +155,14 @@ static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, return 0; } - /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the - * length for legacy ciphers. */ + // To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the + // length for legacy ciphers. uint8_t ad_extra[2]; ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8); ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff); - /* Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done - * in-place. */ + // Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done + // in-place. uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned mac_len; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || @@ -173,14 +173,14 @@ static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, return 0; } - /* Configure the explicit IV. */ + // Configure the explicit IV. if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && !tls_ctx->implicit_iv && !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) { return 0; } - /* Encrypt the input. */ + // Encrypt the input. int len; if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) { return 0; @@ -188,9 +188,9 @@ static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); - /* Feed the MAC into the cipher in two steps. First complete the final partial - * block from encrypting the input and split the result between |out| and - * |out_tag|. Then feed the rest. */ + // Feed the MAC into the cipher in two steps. First complete the final partial + // block from encrypting the input and split the result between |out| and + // |out_tag|. Then feed the rest. const size_t early_mac_len = (block_size - (in_len % block_size) % block_size); @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, assert(block_size <= 256); assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE); - /* Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. */ + // Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. uint8_t padding[256]; unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size); OPENSSL_memset(padding, padding_len - 1, padding_len); @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out_tag + tag_len, &len)) { return 0; } - assert(len == 0); /* Padding is explicit. */ + assert(len == 0); // Padding is explicit. assert(tag_len == aead_tls_tag_len(ctx, in_len, extra_in_len)); *out_tag_len = tag_len; @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) { - /* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */ + // Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return 0; } @@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, } if (max_out_len < in_len) { - /* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it - * will always be removed on return. */ + // This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it + // will always be removed on return. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } @@ -274,19 +274,19 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, } if (in_len > INT_MAX) { - /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */ + // EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } - /* Configure the explicit IV. */ + // Configure the explicit IV. if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && !tls_ctx->implicit_iv && !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) { return 0; } - /* Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding. */ + // Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding. size_t total = 0; int len; if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) { @@ -299,8 +299,8 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, total += len; assert(total == in_len); - /* Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to - * |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. */ + // Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to + // |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. size_t data_plus_mac_len; crypto_word_t padding_ok; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { @@ -308,32 +308,32 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, &padding_ok, &data_plus_mac_len, out, total, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx), HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx))) { - /* Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time. */ + // Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } } else { padding_ok = CONSTTIME_TRUE_W; data_plus_mac_len = total; - /* |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has - * already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. */ + // |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has + // already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); } size_t data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); - /* At this point, if the padding is valid, the first |data_plus_mac_len| bytes - * after |out| are the plaintext and MAC. Otherwise, |data_plus_mac_len| is - * still large enough to extract a MAC, but it will be irrelevant. */ + // At this point, if the padding is valid, the first |data_plus_mac_len| bytes + // after |out| are the plaintext and MAC. Otherwise, |data_plus_mac_len| is + // still large enough to extract a MAC, but it will be irrelevant. - /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the - * length for legacy ciphers. */ + // To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the + // length for legacy ciphers. uint8_t ad_fixed[13]; OPENSSL_memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11); ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8); ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff); ad_len += 2; - /* Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record. */ + // Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record. uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t mac_len; uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -351,8 +351,8 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, record_mac = record_mac_tmp; EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(record_mac, mac_len, out, data_plus_mac_len, total); } else { - /* We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers - * implemented. */ + // We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers + // implemented. assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE); unsigned mac_len_u; @@ -368,10 +368,10 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, record_mac = &out[data_len]; } - /* Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be - * safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a - * different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See - * EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding. */ + // Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be + // safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a + // different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See + // EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding. crypto_word_t good = constant_time_eq_int(CRYPTO_memcmp(record_mac, mac, mac_len), 0); good &= padding_ok; @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, return 0; } - /* End of timing-sensitive code. */ + // End of timing-sensitive code. *out_len = data_len; return 1; @@ -474,172 +474,172 @@ static int aead_null_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, } static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128) */ - 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ - 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, // key len (SHA1 + AES128) + 16, // nonce len (IV) + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128 + IV) */ - 0, /* nonce len */ - 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16 + 16, // key len (SHA1 + AES128 + IV) + 0, // nonce len + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + aead_tls_get_iv, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = { - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA256 + AES128) */ - 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ - 16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */ - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, // key len (SHA256 + AES128) + 16, // nonce len (IV) + 16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA256) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256) */ - 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ - 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, // key len (SHA1 + AES256) + 16, // nonce len (IV) + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256 + IV) */ - 0, /* nonce len */ - 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32 + 16, // key len (SHA1 + AES256 + IV) + 0, // nonce len + 16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + aead_tls_get_iv, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = { - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA256 + AES256) */ - 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ - 16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */ - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, // key len (SHA256 + AES256) + 16, // nonce len (IV) + 16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA256) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = { - SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA384 + AES256) */ - 16, /* nonce len (IV) */ - 16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA384) */ - SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, // key len (SHA384 + AES256) + 16, // nonce len (IV) + 16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA384) + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES) */ - 8, /* nonce len (IV) */ - 8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24, // key len (SHA1 + 3DES) + 8, // nonce len (IV) + 8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24 + 8, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES + IV) */ - 0, /* nonce len */ - 8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24 + 8, // key len (SHA1 + 3DES + IV) + 0, // nonce len + 8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (padding + SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + aead_tls_get_iv, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_null_sha1_tls = { - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* key len */ - 0, /* nonce len */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (SHA1) */ - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ - 0, /* seal_scatter_supports_extra_in */ + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // key len + 0, // nonce len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // overhead (SHA1) + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, // max tag length + 0, // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in - NULL, /* init */ + NULL, // init aead_null_sha1_tls_init, aead_tls_cleanup, aead_tls_open, aead_tls_seal_scatter, - NULL, /* open_gather */ - NULL, /* get_iv */ + NULL, // open_gather + NULL, // get_iv aead_tls_tag_len, }; |