diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c | 38 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c b/src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c index 8aa40cf8..64e7605b 100644 --- a/src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c +++ b/src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int bn_rand_with_additional_data(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, goto err; } - /* Make a random number and set the top and bottom bits. */ + // Make a random number and set the top and bottom bits. RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(buf, bytes, additional_data); if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY) { @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int bn_rand_with_additional_data(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, buf[0] &= ~mask; - /* Set the bottom bit if requested, */ + // Set the bottom bit if requested, if (bottom == BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD) { buf[bytes - 1] |= 1; } @@ -212,28 +212,28 @@ static int bn_rand_range_with_additional_data( return 0; } - /* This function is used to implement steps 4 through 7 of FIPS 186-4 - * appendices B.4.2 and B.5.2. When called in those contexts, |max_exclusive| - * is n and |min_inclusive| is one. */ + // This function is used to implement steps 4 through 7 of FIPS 186-4 + // appendices B.4.2 and B.5.2. When called in those contexts, |max_exclusive| + // is n and |min_inclusive| is one. unsigned count = 100; - unsigned n = BN_num_bits(max_exclusive); /* n > 0 */ + unsigned n = BN_num_bits(max_exclusive); // n > 0 do { if (!--count) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } - if (/* steps 4 and 5 */ + if (// steps 4 and 5 !bn_rand_with_additional_data(r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, additional_data) || - /* step 7 */ + // step 7 !BN_add_word(r, min_inclusive)) { return 0; } - /* Step 6. This loops if |r| >= |max_exclusive|. This is identical to - * checking |r| > |max_exclusive| - 1 or |r| - 1 > |max_exclusive| - 2, the - * formulation stated in FIPS 186-4. */ + // Step 6. This loops if |r| >= |max_exclusive|. This is identical to + // checking |r| > |max_exclusive| - 1 or |r| - 1 > |max_exclusive| - 2, the + // formulation stated in FIPS 186-4. } while (BN_cmp(r, max_exclusive) >= 0); return 1; @@ -256,22 +256,22 @@ int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx) { - /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid furthur exposing its - * length. */ + // We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid furthur exposing its + // length. uint8_t private_bytes[96]; size_t todo = sizeof(priv->d[0]) * priv->top; if (todo > sizeof(private_bytes)) { - /* No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key - * this large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid - * leaking the length of the private key. */ + // No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key + // this large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid + // leaking the length of the private key. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } OPENSSL_memcpy(private_bytes, priv->d, todo); OPENSSL_memset(private_bytes + todo, 0, sizeof(private_bytes) - todo); - /* Pass a SHA512 hash of the private key and message as additional data into - * the RBG. This is a hardening measure against entropy failure. */ + // Pass a SHA512 hash of the private key and message as additional data into + // the RBG. This is a hardening measure against entropy failure. OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH >= 32, additional_data_is_too_large_for_sha512); SHA512_CTX sha; @@ -281,6 +281,6 @@ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, SHA512_Update(&sha, message, message_len); SHA512_Final(digest, &sha); - /* Select a value k from [1, range-1], following FIPS 186-4 appendix B.5.2. */ + // Select a value k from [1, range-1], following FIPS 186-4 appendix B.5.2. return bn_rand_range_with_additional_data(out, 1, range, digest); } |