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Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c')
-rw-r--r--src/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c62
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c b/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
index 9e719f23..dfa3b67d 100644
--- a/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
+++ b/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
@@ -64,16 +64,16 @@
#include "../../internal.h"
-/* digest_to_bn interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a big-endian
- * number and sets |out| to that value. It then truncates |out| so that it's,
- * at most, as long as |order|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise. */
+// digest_to_bn interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a big-endian
+// number and sets |out| to that value. It then truncates |out| so that it's,
+// at most, as long as |order|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
static int digest_to_bn(BIGNUM *out, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const BIGNUM *order) {
size_t num_bits;
num_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
- /* Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
- * bytes. */
+ // Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
+ // bytes.
if (8 * digest_len > num_bits) {
digest_len = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
}
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int digest_to_bn(BIGNUM *out, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
return 0;
}
- /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
+ // If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift
if ((8 * digest_len > num_bits) &&
!BN_rshift(out, out, 8 - (num_bits & 0x7))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const EC_GROUP *group;
const EC_POINT *pub_key;
- /* check input values */
+ // check input values
if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL ||
sig == NULL) {
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
- /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
+ // calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order
int no_inverse;
if (!BN_mod_inverse_odd(u2, &no_inverse, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -169,12 +169,12 @@ int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
goto err;
}
- /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
+ // u1 = m * tmp mod order
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* u2 = r * w mod q */
+ // u2 = r * w mod q
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
+ // if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r
if (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
@@ -236,8 +236,8 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
}
k = BN_new();
- kinv = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
- r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
+ kinv = BN_new(); // this value is later returned in *kinvp
+ r = BN_new(); // this value is later returned in *rp
tmp = BN_new();
if (k == NULL || kinv == NULL || r == NULL || tmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -251,17 +251,17 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
- /* Check that the size of the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4
- * B.5.2). */
+ // Check that the size of the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4
+ // B.5.2).
if (BN_num_bits(order) < 160) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
goto err;
}
do {
- /* If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
- * generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |ECDSA_sign_setup| is
- * being used. */
+ // If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
+ // generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |ECDSA_sign_setup| is
+ // being used.
if (eckey->fixed_k != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(k, eckey->fixed_k)) {
goto err;
@@ -279,18 +279,18 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
goto err;
}
- /* Compute the inverse of k. The order is a prime, so use Fermat's Little
- * Theorem. Note |ec_group_get_mont_data| may return NULL but
- * |bn_mod_inverse_prime| allows this. */
+ // Compute the inverse of k. The order is a prime, so use Fermat's Little
+ // Theorem. Note |ec_group_get_order_mont| may return NULL but
+ // |bn_mod_inverse_prime| allows this.
if (!bn_mod_inverse_prime(kinv, k, order, ctx,
- ec_group_get_mont_data(group))) {
+ ec_group_get_order_mont(group))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
- * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
- * bit-length. */
+ // We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+ // so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+ // bit-length.
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
goto err;
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
}
}
- /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
+ // compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -318,11 +318,11 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
}
} while (BN_is_zero(r));
- /* clear old values if necessary */
+ // clear old values if necessary
BN_clear_free(*rp);
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
- /* save the pre-computed values */
+ // save the pre-computed values
*rp = r;
*kinvp = kinv;
ret = 1;
@@ -417,14 +417,14 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
- /* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller
- * don't to generate new kinv and r values */
+ // if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller
+ // don't to generate new kinv and r values
if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
goto err;
}
} else {
- /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
+ // s != 0 => we have a valid signature
break;
}
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-25 09:42:10 +0000