diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c b/src/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c index 32923505..5c098dba 100644 --- a/src/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c +++ b/src/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c @@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len, md = ctx->md; } - /* If either |key| is non-NULL or |md| has changed, initialize with a new key - * rather than rewinding the previous one. - * - * TODO(davidben,eroman): Passing the previous |md| with a NULL |key| is - * ambiguous between using the empty key and reusing the previous key. There - * exist callers which intend the latter, but the former is an awkward edge - * case. Fix to API to avoid this. */ + // If either |key| is non-NULL or |md| has changed, initialize with a new key + // rather than rewinding the previous one. + // + // TODO(davidben,eroman): Passing the previous |md| with a NULL |key| is + // ambiguous between using the empty key and reusing the previous key. There + // exist callers which intend the latter, but the former is an awkward edge + // case. Fix to API to avoid this. if (md != ctx->md || key != NULL) { uint8_t pad[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE]; uint8_t key_block[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len, size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md); assert(block_size <= sizeof(key_block)); if (block_size < key_len) { - /* Long keys are hashed. */ + // Long keys are hashed. if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, key_block, &key_block_len)) { @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len, OPENSSL_memcpy(key_block, key, key_len); key_block_len = (unsigned)key_len; } - /* Keys are then padded with zeros. */ + // Keys are then padded with zeros. if (key_block_len != EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE) { OPENSSL_memset(&key_block[key_block_len], 0, sizeof(key_block) - key_block_len); } @@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned int *out_len) { unsigned int i; uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - /* TODO(davidben): The only thing that can officially fail here is - * |EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex|, but even that should be impossible in this case. */ + // TODO(davidben): The only thing that can officially fail here is + // |EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex|, but even that should be impossible in this case. if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i) || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, i) || |