diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ssl/handshake_client.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ssl/handshake_client.cc | 1898 |
1 files changed, 1898 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc b/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9efbf0ad --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc @@ -0,0 +1,1898 @@ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/aead.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/buf.h> +#include <openssl/bytestring.h> +#include <openssl/ec_key.h> +#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> + +#include "../crypto/internal.h" +#include "internal.h" + + +static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int dtls1_get_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); +static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs); + +int ssl3_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int ret = -1; + + assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); + assert(!ssl->server); + + for (;;) { + int state = hs->state; + + switch (hs->state) { + case SSL_ST_INIT: + ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: + ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + + if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) { + if (hs->early_data_offered) { + if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs) || + !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session->master_key, + ssl->session->master_key_length) || + !tls13_derive_early_secrets(hs) || + !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, + hs->early_traffic_secret, + hs->hash_len)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } else { + hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; + } + } else { + hs->next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; + break; + + case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: + assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl)); + ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify_request(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) { + ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; + } else { + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_WRITE_EARLY_DATA: + /* Stash the early data session, so connection properties may be queried + * out of it. */ + hs->in_early_data = 1; + hs->early_session = ssl->session; + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session); + + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; + hs->can_early_write = 1; + ret = 1; + goto end; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: + ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(hs); + if (hs->state == SSL_ST_TLS13) { + break; + } + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + } else { + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: + if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { + ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: + if (hs->certificate_status_expected) { + ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: + if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { + ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: + ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: + if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { + ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: + ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: + if (hs->cert_request) { + ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: + ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: + if (hs->cert_request && ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { + ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) || + !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: + if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) { + ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: + if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { + ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: + ret = ssl3_send_finished(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; + + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE; + } else { + /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then + * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that + * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those + * hashes. */ + ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && + ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) && + /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state + * machine). */ + !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { + hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; + } else { + hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + } + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + hs->in_false_start = 1; + hs->can_early_write = 1; + ret = 1; + goto end; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: + if (hs->ticket_expected) { + ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: + ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + + if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: + ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); + + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; + } else { + hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: + ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + hs->state = hs->next_state; + if (hs->state != SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl); + } + break; + + case SSL_ST_TLS13: { + int early_return = 0; + ret = tls13_handshake(hs, &early_return); + if (ret <= 0) { + goto end; + } + + if (early_return) { + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE; + break; + } + + case SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE: + ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */); + + SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session); + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session); + ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session; + } else { + /* We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability + * of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may + * have taken a reference to the temporary session. */ + ssl->s3->established_session = + SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL); + if (ssl->s3->established_session == NULL) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0; + + SSL_SESSION_free(hs->new_session); + hs->new_session = NULL; + } + + hs->state = SSL_ST_OK; + break; + + case SSL_ST_OK: { + const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; + ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; + if (is_initial_handshake) { + /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ + ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + } + + ret = 1; + ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + goto end; + } + + default: + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + if (hs->state != state) { + ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); + } + } + +end: + ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); + return ret; +} + +uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) { + /* Use the client_random for entropy. This both avoids calling |RAND_bytes| on + * a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are deterministic. This + * allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the + * same group be advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares. */ + uint16_t ret = ssl->s3->client_random[index]; + /* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */ + ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a; + ret |= ret << 8; + return ret; +} + +/* ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of + * disabled algorithms. */ +static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_a, + uint32_t *out_mask_k) { + *out_mask_a = 0; + *out_mask_k = 0; + + /* PSK requires a client callback. */ + if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { + *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; + *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; + } +} + +static int ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + uint32_t mask_a, mask_k; + ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k); + + CBB child; + if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ + if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled && + !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_cipher))) { + return 0; + } + + /* Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on + * hardware support. */ + if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { + if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() && + !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) { + return 0; + } + if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) || + !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) { + return 0; + } + if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() && + !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) { + return 0; + } + } + + if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); + int any_enabled = 0; + for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); + /* Skip disabled ciphers */ + if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || + (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) { + continue; + } + if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > hs->max_version || + SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < hs->min_version) { + continue; + } + any_enabled = 1; + if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) { + return 0; + } + } + + /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ + if (!any_enabled && hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + } + + /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is + * added. */ + if (hs->max_version == SSL3_VERSION && + !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { + if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { + return 0; + } + } + + if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { + return 0; + } + } + + return CBB_flush(out); +} + +int ssl_write_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; + CBB body; + if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ + int has_session_id = ssl->session != NULL && + !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && + ssl->session->session_id_length > 0; + + CBB child; + if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, hs->client_version) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || + !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) { + return 0; + } + + if (has_session_id) { + if (!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id, + ssl->session->session_id_length)) { + return 0; + } + } else { + /* In TLS 1.3 experimental encodings, send a fake placeholder session ID + * when we do not otherwise have one to send. */ + if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION && + ssl->tls13_variant == tls13_experiment && + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) { + return 0; + } + } + + if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { + if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) { + return 0; + } + } + + size_t header_len = + SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, &body) || + !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) || + !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) || + !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body))) { + return 0; + } + + uint8_t *msg = NULL; + size_t len; + if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg, &len)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder + * PSK binder. */ + if (hs->needs_psk_binder && + !tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, msg, len)) { + OPENSSL_free(msg); + return 0; + } + + return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len); +} + +static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + /* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we + * may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */ + if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init(&hs->transcript)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* Freeze the version range. */ + if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) { + return -1; + } + + /* Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version, + * even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and + * some servers fail when it changes across handshakes. */ + if (SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl)) { + hs->client_version = + hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : DTLS1_VERSION; + } else { + hs->client_version = + hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION : hs->max_version; + } + + /* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled + * version, drop it. */ + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + if (ssl->session->is_server || + !ssl_supports_version(hs, ssl->session->ssl_version) || + (ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 && + ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen == 0) || + ssl->session->not_resumable || + !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) { + ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); + } + } + + /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't + * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ + if ((!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) && + !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) { + return -1; + } + + /* Initialize a random session ID for the experimental TLS 1.3 variant. */ + if (ssl->tls13_variant == tls13_experiment) { + hs->session_id_len = sizeof(hs->session_id); + if (!RAND_bytes(hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) { + return -1; + } + } + + if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int dtls1_get_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + CBS hello_verify_request, cookie; + uint16_t server_version; + + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0; + ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return 1; + } + + CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) || + !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) || + CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie) || + CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)); + ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie); + + ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1; + return 1; +} + +static int parse_server_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO && + ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return 0; + } + + CBS server_hello; + CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, out)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* The server version may also be in the supported_versions extension if + * applicable. */ + if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO || + *out != TLS1_2_VERSION) { + return 1; + } + + uint8_t sid_length; + if (!CBS_skip(&server_hello, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || + !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &sid_length) || + !CBS_skip(&server_hello, sid_length + 2 /* cipher_suite */ + + 1 /* compression_method */)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* The extensions block may not be present. */ + if (CBS_len(&server_hello) == 0) { + return 1; + } + + CBS extensions; + if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &extensions) || + CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + int have_supported_versions; + CBS supported_versions; + const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { + {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions, + &supported_versions}, + }; + + uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, + OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), + 1 /* ignore unknown */)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); + return 0; + } + + if (have_supported_versions && + (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions, out) || + CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && + ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { + /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert + * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and + * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial + * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. + * + * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); + } + return ret; + } + + uint16_t server_version; + if (!parse_server_version(hs, &server_version)) { + return -1; + } + + if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, server_version)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return -1; + } + + assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); + if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { + ssl->version = server_version; + /* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is + * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ + ssl->s3->have_version = 1; + } else if (server_version != ssl->version) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return -1; + } + + if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { + hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13; + hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_client_handshake; + return 1; + } + + if (hs->early_data_offered) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return -1; + } + + ssl_clear_tls13_state(hs); + + if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) { + return -1; + } + + CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; + uint16_t cipher_suite; + uint8_t compression_method; + CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + if (!CBS_skip(&server_hello, 2 /* version */) || + !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || + !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || + CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || + !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || + !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* Copy over the server random. */ + OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS + * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */ + + if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL && + ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 && + CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, + ssl->session->session_id_length)) { + ssl->s3->session_reused = 1; + } else { + /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to + * fill out. */ + ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); + if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ + hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); + OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), + CBS_len(&session_id)); + } + + const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); + if (c == NULL) { + /* unknown cipher */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + + /* The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled. */ + uint32_t mask_a, mask_k; + ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k); + if ((c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) || + SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) || + SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) || + !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, c)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + if (ssl->session->cipher != c) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) { + /* This is actually a client application bug. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, + SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + } else { + hs->new_session->cipher = c; + } + hs->new_cipher = c; + + /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the + * ServerHello. */ + if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), + c->algorithm_prf) || + !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate + * which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake + * buffer may be released. */ + if (ssl->session != NULL || + !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { + SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); + } + + /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ + if (compression_method != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + return -1; + } + + /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ + if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { + /* wrong packet length */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->session != NULL && + hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { + if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); + } else { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); + } + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || + !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + CBS cbs; + CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + + uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); + EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey); + hs->peer_pubkey = NULL; + hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->peer_pubkey, NULL, + &cbs, ssl->ctx->pool); + if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); + return -1; + } + + if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0 || + CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 || + !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate( + hs, hs->peer_pubkey, + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, 0))) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + + /* Disallow the server certificate from changing during a renegotiation. See + * https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation, + * so this check is sufficient. */ + if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) { + if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ssl->s3->established_session->certs) != + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) { + const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert = + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->s3->established_session->certs, i); + const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert = + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i); + if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) || + OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert), + CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert), + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change + * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ + ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return 1; + } + + if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; + uint8_t status_type; + CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || + status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || + !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || + CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || + CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &hs->new_session->ocsp_response, + &hs->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(hs->new_session, ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; + EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + /* Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message. */ + if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return -1; + } + + ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return 1; + } + + if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ + CBS server_key_exchange; + CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; + + uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { + CBS psk_identity_hint; + + /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ + if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, + &psk_identity_hint)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in + * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK + * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. + * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. + * + * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than + * a specific identity. */ + if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || + CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we + * treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint + * (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell + * empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty + * and missing as identical. */ + if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 && + !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &hs->peer_psk_identity_hint)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { + /* Parse the server parameters. */ + uint8_t group_type; + uint16_t group_id; + CBS point; + if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) || + group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || + !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) || + !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hs->new_session->group_id = group_id; + + /* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */ + if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + goto err; + } + + /* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */ + if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) || + !CBS_stow(&point, &hs->peer_key, &hs->peer_key_len)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + + /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while + * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive + * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ + CBS parameter; + CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), + CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); + + /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ + if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) { + uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0; + if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); + goto err; + } + hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm; + } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm, + hs->peer_pubkey)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; + } + + /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ + CBS signature; + if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || + CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + CBB transcript; + uint8_t *transcript_data; + size_t transcript_len; + if (!CBB_init(&transcript, 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(¶meter)) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, CBS_data(¶meter), CBS_len(¶meter)) || + !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) { + CBB_cleanup(&transcript); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + int sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify( + ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm, + hs->peer_pubkey, transcript_data, transcript_len); + OPENSSL_free(transcript_data); + +#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) + sig_ok = 1; + ERR_clear_error(); +#endif + if (!sig_ok) { + /* bad signature */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ + assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); + + if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + return 1; + +err: + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + EC_KEY_free(ecdh); + return -1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (msg_ret <= 0) { + return msg_ret; + } + + if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { + ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing + * client auth. */ + SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); + return 1; + } + + if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) || + !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + CBS cbs; + CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + + /* Get the certificate types. */ + CBS certificate_types; + if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &hs->certificate_types, + &hs->num_certificate_types)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + CBS supported_signature_algorithms; + if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || + !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } + + uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ca_names = + ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &cbs); + if (ca_names == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); + return -1; + } + + if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ca_names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + hs->cert_request = 1; + sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->ca_names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); + hs->ca_names = ca_names; + ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs); + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) || + !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + /* ServerHelloDone is empty. */ + if (ssl->init_num > 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + /* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */ + if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { + int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); + if (ret < 0) { + ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return -1; + } + if (ret == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } + + if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { + /* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */ + SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); + + /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is replaced with a warning alert. */ + if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (!ssl->method->add_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, + SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE)) { + return -1; + } + return 1; + } + } + + if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs) || + !ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + return 1; +} + +static_assert(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned), + "size_t is smaller than unsigned"); + +static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; + CBB body; + if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + return -1; + } + + uint8_t *pms = NULL; + size_t pms_len = 0; + uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ + unsigned psk_len = 0; + uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { + if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); + goto err; + } + + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; + OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + psk_len = + ssl->psk_client_callback(ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, + sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk)); + if (psk_len == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); + + OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->psk_identity); + hs->new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); + if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Write out psk_identity. */ + CBB child; + if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity, + OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) || + !CBB_flush(&body)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + pms = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); + if (pms == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey); + if (rsa == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8; + pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff; + if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { + goto err; + } + + CBB child, *enc_pms = &body; + size_t enc_pms_len; + /* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */ + if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { + if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) { + goto err; + } + enc_pms = &child; + } + + uint8_t *ptr; + if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) || + !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) || + !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) || + !CBB_flush(&body)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { + /* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */ + CBB child; + if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) { + goto err; + } + + /* Compute the premaster. */ + uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, &alert, + hs->peer_key, hs->peer_key_len)) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); + goto err; + } + if (!CBB_flush(&body)) { + goto err; + } + + /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ + SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_key); + hs->peer_key = NULL; + hs->peer_key_len = 0; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as + * the pre-shared key. */ + pms_len = psk_len; + pms = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); + if (pms == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_memset(pms, 0, pms_len); + } else { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared + * key. */ + if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { + CBB pms_cbb, child; + uint8_t *new_pms; + size_t new_pms_len; + + CBB_zero(&pms_cbb); + if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || + !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || + !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || + !CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { + CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); + OPENSSL_free(pms); + pms = new_pms; + pms_len = new_pms_len; + } + + /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the + * master secret. */ + if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { + goto err; + } + + hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret( + hs, hs->new_session->master_key, pms, pms_len); + if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) { + goto err; + } + hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret; + OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); + OPENSSL_free(pms); + + return 1; + +err: + if (pms != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); + OPENSSL_free(pms); + } + return -1; +} + +static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl)); + + bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; + CBB body, child; + if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, + SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) { + return -1; + } + + uint16_t signature_algorithm; + if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) { + return -1; + } + if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + /* Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */ + if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } + + /* Set aside space for the signature. */ + const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey); + uint8_t *ptr; + if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || + !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { + return -1; + } + + size_t sig_len = max_sig_len; + /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a + * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */ + if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY); + return -1; + } + + uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest, + &digest_len, hs->new_session, + signature_algorithm)) { + return -1; + } + + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL); + int ok = pctx != NULL && + EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) && + EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, ptr, &sig_len, digest, digest_len); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + if (!ok) { + return -1; + } + } else { + switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, + signature_algorithm, + (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data, + hs->transcript.buffer->length)) { + case ssl_private_key_success: + break; + case ssl_private_key_failure: + return -1; + case ssl_private_key_retry: + ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; + return -1; + } + } + + if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || + !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { + return -1; + } + + /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ + SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript); + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0}; + size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32); + + CBB cbb, body, child; + if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) || + !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, + ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) || + !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || + !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) || + !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + CBB_cleanup(&cbb); + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) { + ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; + return -1; + } + + CBB cbb, body; + if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) || + !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) || + !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + CBB_cleanup(&cbb); + return -1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { + SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; + int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl); + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) || + !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) { + return -1; + } + + CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; + uint32_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; + CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); + if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || + !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || + CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) { + /* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after + * negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in + * |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update. */ + hs->ticket_expected = 0; + return 1; + } + + int session_renewed = ssl->session != NULL; + SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session; + if (session_renewed) { + /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are + * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the + * existing session. */ + session = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH); + if (session == NULL) { + /* This should never happen. */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + /* |tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued. */ + ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session); + + if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; + + /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use + * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in + * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ + if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), + session->session_id, &session->session_id_length, + EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + goto err; + } + + if (session_renewed) { + session->not_resumable = 0; + SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); + ssl->session = session; + } + + return 1; + +err: + if (session_renewed) { + SSL_SESSION_free(session); + } + return -1; +} |