/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num); if (ret < 0) return(-1); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case * we'll ignore the result anyway */ ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret); if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); return(1); } s->init_off+=ret; s->init_num-=ret; return(0); } int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) { unsigned char *p; int i; unsigned long l; if (s->state == a) { p = ssl_handshake_start(s); i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (i == 0) return 0; s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); l=i; /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; } else { assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; } ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l); s->state=b; } /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } /* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; int slen; /* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will * set the appropriate error. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return; if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); } int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) { int al,i,ok; long n; unsigned char *p; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */ ssl3_take_mac(s); ssl3_hash_current_message(s); /* If this occurs, we have missed a message. * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; p = s->init_msg; i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (i != n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); goto f_err; } /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) { assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; } else { assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); return(0); } /* for these 2 messages, we need to * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign * ssl->session->read_compression assign * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == a) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p=SSL3_MT_CCS; s->init_num=1; s->init_off=0; s->state=b; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); } unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { unsigned char *p; unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) return 0; l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); p = ssl_handshake_start(s); l2n3(l,p); l += 3; ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l); return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); } /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), * maximum acceptable body length 'max'. * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1', * the body is read in state 'stn'. */ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int hash_message, int *ok) { unsigned char *p; unsigned long l; long n; int i,al; if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { /* A SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE call cannot be combined * with reuse_message; the SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE * would have to have been applied to the previous call. */ assert(hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE); s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0; if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } *ok=1; s->init_msg = (uint8_t*)s->init_buf->data + 4; s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; return s->init_num; } p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */ { int skip_message; do { while (s->init_num < 4) { i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate=SSL_READING; *ok = 0; return i; } s->init_num+=i; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them * if their format is correct. Does not count for * 'Finished' MAC. */ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) { s->init_num = 0; skip_message = 1; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } } while (skip_message); /* s->init_num == 4 */ if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) && (stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B)) { /* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac. * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because * we have not completed the handshake. */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); } s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++); n2l3(p,l); if (l > (unsigned long)max) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); goto f_err; } if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); goto f_err; } if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.message_size=l; s->state=stn; s->init_msg = (uint8_t*)s->init_buf->data + 4; s->init_num = 0; } /* next state (stn) */ p = s->init_msg; n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate=SSL_READING; *ok = 0; return i; } s->init_num += i; n -= i; } /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE) ssl3_hash_current_message(s); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); *ok=1; return s->init_num; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: *ok=0; return(-1); } void ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) { /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in the hash. */ size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; ssl3_finish_mac(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + header_len); } /* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */ OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max); int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const EVP_MD **out_md, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const uint8_t *hdata; size_t hdatalen; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; unsigned len; if (!BIO_mem_contents(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return 0; } *out_len = len; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 || s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) return 0; *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* Using a NULL signature MD makes EVP_PKEY_sign perform * a raw RSA signature, rather than wrapping in a * DigestInfo. */ *out_md = NULL; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) return 0; *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; *out_md = EVP_sha1(); } else { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_PKEY *pk; int ret= -1,i; if (pkey == NULL) pk=X509_get_pubkey(x); else pk=pkey; if (pk == NULL) goto err; i=pk->type; if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) { ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; } err: if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return(ret); } int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { int al; switch(type) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; break; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; break; case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; break; default: al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; break; } return(al); } int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; size_t len,align=0,headerlen; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; else headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); #endif if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) { len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) { s->s3->init_extra = 1; len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; } if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) goto err; s->s3->rbuf.buf = p; s->s3->rbuf.len = len; } s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); return 1; err: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_read_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; size_t len,align=0,headerlen; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; else headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); #endif if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) { len = s->max_send_fragment + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) goto err; s->s3->wbuf.buf = p; s->s3->wbuf.len = len; } return 1; err: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_write_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return 0; if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) return 0; return 1; } int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->wbuf.buf); s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL; } return 1; } int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL; } return 1; }