/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, 0, /* finish_mac_length */ (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function, }; /* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script * never regresses this. */ OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT( SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET, ssl_alert_reason_code_mismatch); int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return(0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session=NULL; } s->hit=0; s->shutdown=0; #if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ if (s->renegotiate) return(1); #else if (s->renegotiate) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif s->type=0; s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); s->version=s->method->version; s->client_version=s->version; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; #if 0 s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; #endif if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); s->first_packet=0; #if 1 /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return(0); } else #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return(1); } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method=meth; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list( ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return(0); } return(1); } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return(NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return(NULL); } s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); s->options=ctx->options; s->mode=ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having * duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; } else s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; #if 0 s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; #endif s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!s->param) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); #if 0 s->purpose = ctx->purpose; s->trust = ctx->trust; #endif s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx=ctx; s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->initial_ctx=ctx; if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) goto err; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length * 2); if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) goto err; s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup( s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) goto err; s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; } s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; s->method=ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->references=1; s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; SSL_clear(s); CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) { s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) goto err; } s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback; s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback; if (!s->server) { s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = s->ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled; s->ocsp_stapling_enabled = s->ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled; } return(s); err: if (s != NULL) { if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); if (s->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ OPENSSL_free(s); } OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in * use by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); } int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); } void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free( struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers); OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags); OPENSSL_free(cipher_list); } struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ssl_cipher_preference_list_dup( struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) { struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL; size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list->ciphers); ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); if (!ret) goto err; ret->ciphers = NULL; ret->in_group_flags = NULL; ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list->ciphers); if (!ret->ciphers) goto err; ret->in_group_flags = BUF_memdup(cipher_list->in_group_flags, n); if (!ret->in_group_flags) goto err; return ret; err: if (ret && ret->ciphers) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers); if (ret) OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers) { struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL; size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); if (!ret) goto err; ret->ciphers = NULL; ret->in_group_flags = NULL; ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ciphers); if (!ret->ciphers) goto err; ret->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(n); if (!ret->in_group_flags) goto err; memset(ret->in_group_flags, 0, n); return ret; err: if (ret && ret->ciphers) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers); if (ret) OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if(s == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL",s); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (s->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } if (s->rbio != NULL) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ if (s->tlsext_hostname) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private) EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private); if (s->psk_identity_hint) OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint); if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); if (s->next_proto_negotiated) OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); if (s->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); } OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) { /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio; s->bbio->next_bio=NULL; } } if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->rbio=rbio; s->wbio=wbio; } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->rbio); } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; b=SSL_get_rbio(s); r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); return(ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; b=SSL_get_wbio(s); r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); return(ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (bio == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_fd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio); ret=1; err: return(ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd)) { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (bio == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_wfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio); } else SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret=1; err: return(ret); } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd)) { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (bio == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_rfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s)); } else SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s)); ret=1; err: return(ret); } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return(s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode=mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback=callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) { s->read_ahead=yes; } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return(s->read_ahead); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, * so we'd better not return -1.) */ return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r=NULL; else r=s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return NULL; return X509_up_ref(r); } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) r=NULL; else r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ return(r); } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ( (ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return(0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return(0); } return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return(0); } if (ssl->cert == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return(0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return(0); } return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); return(s->method->ssl_accept(s)); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; } int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_read, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(0); } return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_peek, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return(0); } return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return(-1); } return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_shutdown, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (!SSL_in_init(s)) return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); else return(1); } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate=1; s->new_session=1; return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate=1; s->new_session=0; return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; * false again once a handshake has finished */ return (s->renegotiate != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return(s->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l=s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(s->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return(s->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(s->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return(s->mode &=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l=s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) return 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { s->d1->mtu = larg; return larg; } return 0; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; s->max_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return s->s3->send_connection_binding; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return(s->cert->cert_flags|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return(s->cert->cert_flags &=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: if (parg) { if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) return 0; *(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw; return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen; } else { /* Passing a NULL |parg| returns the size of a single * cipher suite value. */ return 2; } default: return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); } } LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return(ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l=ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l=ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l=ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return(ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l=ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return(ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return(ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return(ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(ctx->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return(ctx->mode&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return(ctx->cert->cert_flags|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return(ctx->cert->cert_flags &=~larg); default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) { long l; const SSL_CIPHER *a = in_a; const SSL_CIPHER *b = in_b; const long a_id = a->id; const long b_id = b->id; l = a_id - b_id; if (l == 0L) return(0); else return((l > 0)?1:-1); } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER **ap, const SSL_CIPHER **bp) { long l; const long a_id = (*ap)->id; const long b_id = (*bp)->id; l = a_id - b_id; if (l == 0) return(0); else return((l > 0)?1:-1); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL) return NULL; if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return(s->cipher_list->ciphers); } if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers; } if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return(s->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers); } return(NULL); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return(s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return(NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return NULL; sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) return NULL; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); if (c == NULL) return NULL; return c->name; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert); /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been * updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str, ctx->cert); if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, uint8_t *p) { size_t i; const SSL_CIPHER *c; CERT *ct = s->cert; uint8_t *q; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); if (sk == NULL) return(0); q=p; for (i=0; ialgorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) continue; s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(c), p); } /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ if (p == q) { return 0; } /* Add SCSVs. */ if (!s->renegotiate) { s2n(SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); } if (s->fallback_scsv) { s2n(SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); } return(p-q); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { CBS cipher_suites = *cbs; const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s->s3) s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return NULL; } sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (sk == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!CBS_stow(&cipher_suites, &s->cert->ciphers_raw, &s->cert->ciphers_rawlen)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { uint16_t cipher_suite; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Check for SCSV. */ if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating. */ if (s->renegotiate) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; continue; } /* Check for FALLBACK_SCSV. */ if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { if (s->version < ssl_get_max_version(s)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto err; } continue; } c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); if (c != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } return sk; err: if (sk != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return NULL; } /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) { ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; } int SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) { /* Currently not implemented server-side. */ if (ssl->server) return 0; ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; return 1; } void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) { ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; } int SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) { /* Currently not implemented server-side. */ if (ssl->server) return 0; ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; return 1; } void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) { SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; *out_len = 0; *out = NULL; if (ssl->server) return; if (!session || !session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list) return; *out = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list; *out_len = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length; } void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) { SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; *out_len = 0; *out = NULL; if (ssl->server) return; if (!session || !session->ocsp_response) return; *out = session->ocsp_response; *out_len = session->ocsp_response_length; } /* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. * * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. * * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: * * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection * or have a default application level protocol. * * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the * API that this fallback case was enacted. * * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol * a client should use. * * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. * * It returns either * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) { for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) { if (server[i] == client[j] && memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) { /* We found a match */ result = &server[i]; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; goto found; } j += client[j]; j++; } i += server[i]; i++; } /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ result = client; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; found: *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; *outlen = result[0]; return status; } /* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. * * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const uint8_t **data, unsigned *len) { *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; } } /* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to * it. * * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. * * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). * * Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos, unsigned protos_len) { if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) return 1; ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). * * Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos, unsigned protos_len) { if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) return 1; ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the * client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = NULL; if (ssl->s3) *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; if (*data == NULL) *len = 0; else *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context) { if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen, use_context); } static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { uint32_t hash = ((uint32_t) a->session_id[0]) || ((uint32_t) a->session_id[1] << 8) || ((uint32_t) a->session_id[2] << 16) || ((uint32_t) a->session_id[3] << 24); return hash; } /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session * with a matching session ID. */ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return(1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return(1); return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; if (meth == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return(NULL); } if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX)); ret->method=meth; ret->cert_store=NULL; ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; ret->session_cache_head=NULL; ret->session_cache_tail=NULL; /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; ret->new_session_cb=0; ret->remove_session_cb=0; ret->get_session_cb=0; ret->generate_session_id=0; memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); ret->references=1; ret->quiet_shutdown=0; ret->info_callback=NULL; ret->app_verify_callback=0; ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead=0; ret->msg_callback=0; ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; #if 0 ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ #endif ret->sid_ctx_length=0; ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->default_passwd_callback=0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; ret->client_cert_cb=0; ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id, meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert); if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ret->param) goto err; if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs=NULL; ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; ret->psk_client_callback=NULL; ret->psk_server_callback=NULL; /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; return(ret); err: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); return(NULL); } void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (a->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list); if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); if (a->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list_tls11); if (a->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(a->cert); if (a->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); if (a->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); if (a->psk_identity_hint) OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL) OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private) EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private); if (a->keylog_bio) BIO_free(a->keylog_bio); OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode=mode; ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; int rsa_enc,rsa_sign,dh_tmp; unsigned long mask_k,mask_a; int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok; int have_ecdh_tmp; X509 *x = NULL; if (c == NULL) return; dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); rsa_sign= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); have_ecc_cert= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; mask_k=0; mask_a=0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); #endif if (rsa_enc) mask_k|=SSL_kRSA; if (dh_tmp) mask_k|=SSL_kEDH; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask_a|=SSL_aRSA; } mask_a|=SSL_aNULL; /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on * the key usage extension. */ if (have_ecc_cert) { cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]; x = cpk->x509; /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) ecdsa_ok = 0; if (ecdsa_ok) { mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA; } } if (have_ecdh_tmp) { mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH; } mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; c->mask_k=mask_k; c->mask_a=mask_a; c->valid=1; } /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_a; int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); } if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) { int idx; idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; if (idx == -1) OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_server_cert_index, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return idx; } CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) { CERT *c; int i; c = s->cert; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); /* This may or may not be an error. */ if (i < 0) return NULL; /* May be NULL. */ return &c->pkeys[i]; } EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) { unsigned long alg_a; CERT *c; int idx = -1; alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c=s->cert; if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; if (idx == -1) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_sign_pkey, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } if (pmd) *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; } void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) { int i; /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i=s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx,s->session)) && (s->initial_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (!s->initial_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ?s->initial_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good :s->initial_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->initial_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->method; } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return(s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn= -1; int ret=1; if (s->method != meth) { if (s->handshake_func != NULL) conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); if (s->method->version == meth->version) s->method=meth; else { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=meth; ret=s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (conn == 1) s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect; else if (conn == 0) s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept; } return(ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake * etc, where we do encode the error */ if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return(SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_session(s)) return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION); if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_certificate(s)) return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE); if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try * to write to the rbio, and an application program where * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it * should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer * to keep it. */ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { bio=SSL_get_wbio(s); if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s)) { return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP); } if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { /* assume it is the socket being closed */ return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } else { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } } return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret=1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_do_handshake, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return(-1); } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { ret=s->handshake_func(s); } return(ret); } /* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so * one of these calls will reset it */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server=1; s->shutdown=0; s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server=0; s->shutdown=0; s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_void_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_const_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bad_method, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(NULL); } static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) { if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION) return("TLSv1.2"); else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION) return("TLSv1.1"); else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) return("TLSv1"); else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) return("SSLv3"); else if (version == SSL2_VERSION) return("SSLv2"); else return("unknown"); } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { return ssl_get_version(s->version); } const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *sess) { return ssl_get_version(sess->ssl_version); } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; } if (s->aead_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_read_ctx->ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->aead_read_ctx); s->aead_read_ctx = NULL; } if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_write_ctx->ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->aead_write_ctx); s->aead_write_ctx = NULL; } } X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->x509); else return(NULL); } EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->privatekey); else return(NULL); } X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->x509; else return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; else return NULL ; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return(s->session->cipher); return(NULL); } const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio == NULL) { bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL) return(0); s->bbio=bbio; } else { bbio=s->bbio; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_init_wbio_buffer, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return(0); } if (push) { if (s->wbio != bbio) s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio); } else { if (s->wbio == bbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio); } return(1); } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ assert(s->wbio != NULL); #endif } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown=mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) { s->shutdown=mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->shutdown); } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return(s->version); } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->ctx); } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) { if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; if (ssl->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (ssl->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); return(ssl->ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath)); } #endif void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) { ssl->info_callback=cb; } /* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) { return ssl->info_callback; } int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->state); } void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { ssl->state = state; } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) { ssl->verify_result=arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->verify_result); } int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) { return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) { return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return(1); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) { if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store=store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return(s->rwstate); } /*! * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param cb the callback */ void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } #ifdef DOXYGEN /*! * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size * of the required key in bits. * \return the temporary RSA key. * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) {} #endif /*! * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { if (s == NULL) return 0; if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } /* Clear hint in SSL and associated SSL_SESSION (if any). */ if (s->psk_identity_hint != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint); s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } if (s->session != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } if (identity_hint != NULL) { /* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in * SSL_SESSION taking precedence. Thus, if SSL_SESSION is avaiable, * we store the hint there, otherwise we store it in SSL. */ if (s->session != NULL) { s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else { s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } } return 1; } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL) return NULL; /* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in SSL_SESSION * taking precedence. */ if (s->session != NULL) return(s->session->psk_identity_hint); return(s->psk_identity_hint); } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return(s->session->psk_identity); } void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *keylog_bio) { if (ctx->keylog_bio != NULL) BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio); ctx->keylog_bio = keylog_bio; } static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; uint8_t *out; size_t i; if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) { return 0; } for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) { *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4]; *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf]; } return 1; } int ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, size_t encrypted_premaster_len, const uint8_t *premaster, size_t premaster_len) { BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio; CBB cbb; uint8_t *out; size_t out_len; int ret; if (bio == NULL) { return 1; } if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len*2 + 1)) { return 0; } if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"RSA ", 4) || /* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are * logged. */ !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)" ", 1) || !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, premaster, premaster_len) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"\n", 1) || !CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) { CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ret = BIO_write(bio, out, out_len) >= 0 && BIO_flush(bio); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); OPENSSL_free(out); return ret; } int ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *client_random, size_t client_random_len, const uint8_t *master, size_t master_len) { BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio; CBB cbb; uint8_t *out; size_t out_len; int ret; if (bio == NULL) { return 1; } if (client_random_len != 32) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_master_secret, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 14 + 64 + 1 + master_len*2 + 1)) { return 0; } if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14) || !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, client_random, 32) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)" ", 1) || !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, master, master_len) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"\n", 1) || !CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) { CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ret = BIO_write(bio, out, out_len) >= 0 && BIO_flush(bio); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); OPENSSL_free(out); return ret; } int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s) { return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */ !s->hit && /* full-handshake */ s->version >= SSL3_VERSION && s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 && /* cutthrough only applies to write() */ (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && /* cutthrough enabled */ ssl3_can_cutthrough(s) && /* cutthrough allowed */ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 && /* not a renegotiation handshake */ (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A || /* ready to write app-data*/ s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)); } void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t* ssl_size, size_t* ssl_ctx_size, size_t* ssl_session_size) { *ssl_size = sizeof(SSL); *ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX); *ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION); } int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; /* require a strong enough cipher */ if (SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) < 128) return 0; /* require ALPN or NPN extension */ if (!s->s3->alpn_selected && !s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { return 0; } /* require a forward-secret cipher */ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); if (!c || (c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEDH && c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEECDH)) { return 0; } return 1; } /* ssl_get_max_version returns the maximum SSL/TLS version number supported by * |s|, or zero if all versions are disabled. */ int ssl_get_max_version(const SSL *s) { /* Only one version supported for DTLS. */ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) return DTLS1_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) return TLS1_2_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) return TLS1_1_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) return TLS1_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) return SSL3_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) return SSL2_VERSION; return 0; } /* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md * Returns newly allocated ctx; */ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL); return *hash; } void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); *hash=NULL; } void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) { s->debug = debug; } int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) { return s->hit; } int SSL_is_server(SSL *s) { return s->server; }