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authorThe Android Open Source Project <initial-contribution@android.com>2009-03-03 18:28:21 -0800
committerThe Android Open Source Project <initial-contribution@android.com>2009-03-03 18:28:21 -0800
commit4992dc5127843624d3deb2d54af917a7ec50fb45 (patch)
tree0cbcf7d3a36648aec263dcd0744dc5231e7a6844 /common-kex.c
parent1abbfe5d373a44e7e0525fb7971ef0e00955f2e4 (diff)
downloaddropbear-4992dc5127843624d3deb2d54af917a7ec50fb45.tar.gz
auto import from //depot/cupcake/@135843
Diffstat (limited to 'common-kex.c')
-rw-r--r--common-kex.c720
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 720 deletions
diff --git a/common-kex.c b/common-kex.c
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@@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Dropbear SSH
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2002-2004 Matt Johnston
- * Portions Copyright (c) 2004 by Mihnea Stoenescu
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
- * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
- * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
- * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
- * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
- * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
- *
- * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
- * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
- * SOFTWARE. */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "dbutil.h"
-#include "algo.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "bignum.h"
-#include "random.h"
-
-/* diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 value for p */
-static const unsigned char dh_p_val[] = {
- 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
- 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
- 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
- 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
- 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
- 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
- 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
- 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
- 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
- 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
- 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
-#define DH_P_LEN sizeof(dh_p_val)
-
-static const int DH_G_VAL = 2;
-
-static void kexinitialise();
-void gen_new_keys();
-#ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB
-static void gen_new_zstreams();
-#endif
-static void read_kex_algos();
-/* helper function for gen_new_keys */
-static void hashkeys(unsigned char *out, int outlen,
- const hash_state * hs, unsigned const char X);
-
-
-/* Send our list of algorithms we can use */
-void send_msg_kexinit() {
-
- CHECKCLEARTOWRITE();
- buf_putbyte(ses.writepayload, SSH_MSG_KEXINIT);
-
- /* cookie */
- genrandom(buf_getwriteptr(ses.writepayload, 16), 16);
- buf_incrwritepos(ses.writepayload, 16);
-
- /* kex algos */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshkex);
-
- /* server_host_key_algorithms */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshhostkey);
-
- /* encryption_algorithms_client_to_server */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshciphers);
-
- /* encryption_algorithms_server_to_client */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshciphers);
-
- /* mac_algorithms_client_to_server */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshhashes);
-
- /* mac_algorithms_server_to_client */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshhashes);
-
- /* compression_algorithms_client_to_server */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshcompress);
-
- /* compression_algorithms_server_to_client */
- buf_put_algolist(ses.writepayload, sshcompress);
-
- /* languages_client_to_server */
- buf_putstring(ses.writepayload, "", 0);
-
- /* languages_server_to_client */
- buf_putstring(ses.writepayload, "", 0);
-
- /* first_kex_packet_follows - unimplemented for now */
- buf_putbyte(ses.writepayload, 0x00);
-
- /* reserved unit32 */
- buf_putint(ses.writepayload, 0);
-
- /* set up transmitted kex packet buffer for hashing.
- * This is freed after the end of the kex */
- ses.transkexinit = buf_newcopy(ses.writepayload);
-
- encrypt_packet();
- ses.dataallowed = 0; /* don't send other packets during kex */
-
- TRACE(("DATAALLOWED=0"))
- TRACE(("-> KEXINIT"))
- ses.kexstate.sentkexinit = 1;
-}
-
-/* *** NOTE regarding (send|recv)_msg_newkeys ***
- * Changed by mihnea from the original kex.c to set dataallowed after a
- * completed key exchange, no matter the order in which it was performed.
- * This enables client mode without affecting server functionality.
- */
-
-/* Bring new keys into use after a key exchange, and let the client know*/
-void send_msg_newkeys() {
-
- TRACE(("enter send_msg_newkeys"))
-
- /* generate the kexinit request */
- CHECKCLEARTOWRITE();
- buf_putbyte(ses.writepayload, SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- encrypt_packet();
-
-
- /* set up our state */
- if (ses.kexstate.recvnewkeys) {
- TRACE(("while RECVNEWKEYS=1"))
- gen_new_keys();
- kexinitialise(); /* we've finished with this kex */
- TRACE((" -> DATAALLOWED=1"))
- ses.dataallowed = 1; /* we can send other packets again now */
- ses.kexstate.donefirstkex = 1;
- } else {
- ses.kexstate.sentnewkeys = 1;
- TRACE(("SENTNEWKEYS=1"))
- }
-
- TRACE(("-> MSG_NEWKEYS"))
- TRACE(("leave send_msg_newkeys"))
-}
-
-/* Bring the new keys into use after a key exchange */
-void recv_msg_newkeys() {
-
- TRACE(("<- MSG_NEWKEYS"))
- TRACE(("enter recv_msg_newkeys"))
-
- /* simply check if we've sent SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, and if so,
- * switch to the new keys */
- if (ses.kexstate.sentnewkeys) {
- TRACE(("while SENTNEWKEYS=1"))
- gen_new_keys();
- kexinitialise(); /* we've finished with this kex */
- TRACE((" -> DATAALLOWED=1"))
- ses.dataallowed = 1; /* we can send other packets again now */
- ses.kexstate.donefirstkex = 1;
- } else {
- TRACE(("RECVNEWKEYS=1"))
- ses.kexstate.recvnewkeys = 1;
- }
-
- TRACE(("leave recv_msg_newkeys"))
-}
-
-
-/* Set up the kex for the first time */
-void kexfirstinitialise() {
-
- ses.kexstate.donefirstkex = 0;
- kexinitialise();
-}
-
-/* Reset the kex state, ready for a new negotiation */
-static void kexinitialise() {
-
- struct timeval tv;
-
- TRACE(("kexinitialise()"))
-
- /* sent/recv'd MSG_KEXINIT */
- ses.kexstate.sentkexinit = 0;
- ses.kexstate.recvkexinit = 0;
-
- /* sent/recv'd MSG_NEWKEYS */
- ses.kexstate.recvnewkeys = 0;
- ses.kexstate.sentnewkeys = 0;
-
- /* first_packet_follows */
- ses.kexstate.firstfollows = 0;
-
- ses.kexstate.datatrans = 0;
- ses.kexstate.datarecv = 0;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, 0) < 0) {
- dropbear_exit("Error getting time");
- }
- ses.kexstate.lastkextime = tv.tv_sec;
-
-}
-
-/* Helper function for gen_new_keys, creates a hash. It makes a copy of the
- * already initialised hash_state hs, which should already have processed
- * the dh_K and hash, since these are common. X is the letter 'A', 'B' etc.
- * out must have at least min(SHA1_HASH_SIZE, outlen) bytes allocated.
- * The output will only be expanded once, as we are assured that
- * outlen <= 2*SHA1_HASH_SIZE for all known hashes.
- *
- * See Section 7.2 of rfc4253 (ssh transport) for details */
-static void hashkeys(unsigned char *out, int outlen,
- const hash_state * hs, const unsigned char X) {
-
- hash_state hs2;
- unsigned char k2[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; /* used to extending */
-
- memcpy(&hs2, hs, sizeof(hash_state));
- sha1_process(&hs2, &X, 1);
- sha1_process(&hs2, ses.session_id, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- sha1_done(&hs2, out);
- if (SHA1_HASH_SIZE < outlen) {
- /* need to extend */
- memcpy(&hs2, hs, sizeof(hash_state));
- sha1_process(&hs2, out, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- sha1_done(&hs2, k2);
- memcpy(&out[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], k2, outlen - SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- }
-}
-
-/* Generate the actual encryption/integrity keys, using the results of the
- * key exchange, as specified in section 5.2 of the IETF secsh-transport
- * draft. This occurs after the DH key-exchange.
- *
- * ses.newkeys is the new set of keys which are generated, these are only
- * taken into use after both sides have sent a newkeys message */
-
-/* Originally from kex.c, generalized for cli/svr mode --mihnea */
-void gen_new_keys() {
-
- unsigned char C2S_IV[MAX_IV_LEN];
- unsigned char C2S_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- unsigned char S2C_IV[MAX_IV_LEN];
- unsigned char S2C_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- /* unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; */
- unsigned char *trans_IV, *trans_key, *recv_IV, *recv_key;
-
- hash_state hs;
- unsigned int C2S_keysize, S2C_keysize;
- char mactransletter, macrecvletter; /* Client or server specific */
- int recv_cipher = 0, trans_cipher = 0;
-
- TRACE(("enter gen_new_keys"))
- /* the dh_K and hash are the start of all hashes, we make use of that */
-
- sha1_init(&hs);
- sha1_process_mp(&hs, ses.dh_K);
- mp_clear(ses.dh_K);
- m_free(ses.dh_K);
- sha1_process(&hs, ses.hash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- m_burn(ses.hash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
-
- if (IS_DROPBEAR_CLIENT) {
- trans_IV = C2S_IV;
- recv_IV = S2C_IV;
- trans_key = C2S_key;
- recv_key = S2C_key;
- C2S_keysize = ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->keysize;
- S2C_keysize = ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->keysize;
- mactransletter = 'E';
- macrecvletter = 'F';
- } else {
- trans_IV = S2C_IV;
- recv_IV = C2S_IV;
- trans_key = S2C_key;
- recv_key = C2S_key;
- C2S_keysize = ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->keysize;
- S2C_keysize = ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->keysize;
- mactransletter = 'F';
- macrecvletter = 'E';
- }
-
- hashkeys(C2S_IV, SHA1_HASH_SIZE, &hs, 'A');
- hashkeys(S2C_IV, SHA1_HASH_SIZE, &hs, 'B');
- hashkeys(C2S_key, C2S_keysize, &hs, 'C');
- hashkeys(S2C_key, S2C_keysize, &hs, 'D');
-
- recv_cipher = find_cipher(ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name);
- if (recv_cipher < 0)
- dropbear_exit("crypto error");
-
- if (cbc_start(recv_cipher, recv_IV, recv_key,
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->keysize, 0,
- &ses.newkeys->recv_symmetric_struct) != CRYPT_OK) {
- dropbear_exit("crypto error");
- }
- trans_cipher = find_cipher(ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name);
- if (trans_cipher < 0)
- dropbear_exit("crypto error");
-
- if (cbc_start(trans_cipher, trans_IV, trans_key,
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->keysize, 0,
- &ses.newkeys->trans_symmetric_struct) != CRYPT_OK) {
- dropbear_exit("crypto error");
- }
-
- /* MAC keys */
- hashkeys(ses.newkeys->transmackey,
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_mac->keysize, &hs, mactransletter);
- hashkeys(ses.newkeys->recvmackey,
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_mac->keysize, &hs, macrecvletter);
-
-#ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB
- gen_new_zstreams();
-#endif
-
- /* Switch over to the new keys */
- m_burn(ses.keys, sizeof(struct key_context));
- m_free(ses.keys);
- ses.keys = ses.newkeys;
- ses.newkeys = NULL;
-
- TRACE(("leave gen_new_keys"))
-}
-
-#ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB
-/* Set up new zlib compression streams, close the old ones. Only
- * called from gen_new_keys() */
-static void gen_new_zstreams() {
-
- /* create new zstreams */
- if (ses.newkeys->recv_algo_comp == DROPBEAR_COMP_ZLIB) {
- ses.newkeys->recv_zstream = (z_streamp)m_malloc(sizeof(z_stream));
- ses.newkeys->recv_zstream->zalloc = Z_NULL;
- ses.newkeys->recv_zstream->zfree = Z_NULL;
-
- if (inflateInit(ses.newkeys->recv_zstream) != Z_OK) {
- dropbear_exit("zlib error");
- }
- } else {
- ses.newkeys->recv_zstream = NULL;
- }
-
- if (ses.newkeys->trans_algo_comp == DROPBEAR_COMP_ZLIB) {
- ses.newkeys->trans_zstream = (z_streamp)m_malloc(sizeof(z_stream));
- ses.newkeys->trans_zstream->zalloc = Z_NULL;
- ses.newkeys->trans_zstream->zfree = Z_NULL;
-
- if (deflateInit(ses.newkeys->trans_zstream, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION)
- != Z_OK) {
- dropbear_exit("zlib error");
- }
- } else {
- ses.newkeys->trans_zstream = NULL;
- }
-
- /* clean up old keys */
- if (ses.keys->recv_zstream != NULL) {
- if (inflateEnd(ses.keys->recv_zstream) == Z_STREAM_ERROR) {
- /* Z_DATA_ERROR is ok, just means that stream isn't ended */
- dropbear_exit("crypto error");
- }
- m_free(ses.keys->recv_zstream);
- }
- if (ses.keys->trans_zstream != NULL) {
- if (deflateEnd(ses.keys->trans_zstream) == Z_STREAM_ERROR) {
- /* Z_DATA_ERROR is ok, just means that stream isn't ended */
- dropbear_exit("crypto error");
- }
- m_free(ses.keys->trans_zstream);
- }
-}
-#endif
-
-
-/* Executed upon receiving a kexinit message from the client to initiate
- * key exchange. If we haven't already done so, we send the list of our
- * preferred algorithms. The client's requested algorithms are processed,
- * and we calculate the first portion of the key-exchange-hash for used
- * later in the key exchange. No response is sent, as the client should
- * initiate the diffie-hellman key exchange */
-
-/* Originally from kex.c, generalized for cli/svr mode --mihnea */
-/* Belongs in common_kex.c where it should be moved after review */
-void recv_msg_kexinit() {
-
- unsigned int kexhashbuf_len = 0;
- unsigned int remote_ident_len = 0;
- unsigned int local_ident_len = 0;
-
- TRACE(("<- KEXINIT"))
- TRACE(("enter recv_msg_kexinit"))
-
- if (!ses.kexstate.sentkexinit) {
- /* we need to send a kex packet */
- send_msg_kexinit();
- TRACE(("continue recv_msg_kexinit: sent kexinit"))
- }
-
- /* start the kex hash */
- local_ident_len = strlen(LOCAL_IDENT);
- remote_ident_len = strlen((char*)ses.remoteident);
-
- kexhashbuf_len = local_ident_len + remote_ident_len
- + ses.transkexinit->len + ses.payload->len
- + KEXHASHBUF_MAX_INTS;
-
- ses.kexhashbuf = buf_new(kexhashbuf_len);
-
- if (IS_DROPBEAR_CLIENT) {
-
- /* read the peer's choice of algos */
- read_kex_algos();
-
- /* V_C, the client's version string (CR and NL excluded) */
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf,
- (unsigned char*)LOCAL_IDENT, local_ident_len);
- /* V_S, the server's version string (CR and NL excluded) */
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.remoteident, remote_ident_len);
-
- /* I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf,
- ses.transkexinit->data, ses.transkexinit->len);
- /* I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buf_setpos(ses.payload, 0);
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.payload->data, ses.payload->len);
-
- } else {
- /* SERVER */
-
- /* read the peer's choice of algos */
- read_kex_algos();
- /* V_C, the client's version string (CR and NL excluded) */
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.remoteident, remote_ident_len);
- /* V_S, the server's version string (CR and NL excluded) */
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf,
- (unsigned char*)LOCAL_IDENT, local_ident_len);
-
- /* I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buf_setpos(ses.payload, 0);
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.payload->data, ses.payload->len);
-
- /* I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT */
- buf_putstring(ses.kexhashbuf,
- ses.transkexinit->data, ses.transkexinit->len);
-
- ses.requirenext = SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
- }
-
- buf_free(ses.transkexinit);
- ses.transkexinit = NULL;
- /* the rest of ses.kexhashbuf will be done after DH exchange */
-
- ses.kexstate.recvkexinit = 1;
-
- TRACE(("leave recv_msg_kexinit"))
-}
-
-/* Initialises and generate one side of the diffie-hellman key exchange values.
- * See the ietf-secsh-transport draft, section 6, for details */
-/* dh_pub and dh_priv MUST be already initialised */
-void gen_kexdh_vals(mp_int *dh_pub, mp_int *dh_priv) {
-
- DEF_MP_INT(dh_p);
- DEF_MP_INT(dh_q);
- DEF_MP_INT(dh_g);
-
- TRACE(("enter send_msg_kexdh_reply"))
-
- m_mp_init_multi(&dh_g, &dh_p, &dh_q, NULL);
-
- /* read the prime and generator*/
- bytes_to_mp(&dh_p, (unsigned char*)dh_p_val, DH_P_LEN);
-
- if (mp_set_int(&dh_g, DH_G_VAL) != MP_OKAY) {
- dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error");
- }
-
- /* calculate q = (p-1)/2 */
- /* dh_priv is just a temp var here */
- if (mp_sub_d(&dh_p, 1, dh_priv) != MP_OKAY) {
- dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error");
- }
- if (mp_div_2(dh_priv, &dh_q) != MP_OKAY) {
- dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error");
- }
-
- /* Generate a private portion 0 < dh_priv < dh_q */
- gen_random_mpint(&dh_q, dh_priv);
-
- /* f = g^y mod p */
- if (mp_exptmod(&dh_g, dh_priv, &dh_p, dh_pub) != MP_OKAY) {
- dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error");
- }
- mp_clear_multi(&dh_g, &dh_p, &dh_q, NULL);
-}
-
-/* This function is fairly common between client/server, with some substitution
- * of dh_e/dh_f etc. Hence these arguments:
- * dh_pub_us is 'e' for the client, 'f' for the server. dh_pub_them is
- * vice-versa. dh_priv is the x/y value corresponding to dh_pub_us */
-void kexdh_comb_key(mp_int *dh_pub_us, mp_int *dh_priv, mp_int *dh_pub_them,
- sign_key *hostkey) {
-
- mp_int dh_p;
- mp_int *dh_e = NULL, *dh_f = NULL;
- hash_state hs;
-
- /* read the prime and generator*/
- m_mp_init(&dh_p);
- bytes_to_mp(&dh_p, dh_p_val, DH_P_LEN);
-
- /* Check that dh_pub_them (dh_e or dh_f) is in the range [1, p-1] */
- if (mp_cmp(dh_pub_them, &dh_p) != MP_LT
- || mp_cmp_d(dh_pub_them, 0) != MP_GT) {
- dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error");
- }
-
- /* K = e^y mod p = f^x mod p */
- ses.dh_K = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
- m_mp_init(ses.dh_K);
- if (mp_exptmod(dh_pub_them, dh_priv, &dh_p, ses.dh_K) != MP_OKAY) {
- dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error");
- }
-
- /* clear no longer needed vars */
- mp_clear_multi(&dh_p, NULL);
-
- /* From here on, the code needs to work with the _same_ vars on each side,
- * not vice-versaing for client/server */
- if (IS_DROPBEAR_CLIENT) {
- dh_e = dh_pub_us;
- dh_f = dh_pub_them;
- } else {
- dh_e = dh_pub_them;
- dh_f = dh_pub_us;
- }
-
- /* Create the remainder of the hash buffer, to generate the exchange hash */
- /* K_S, the host key */
- buf_put_pub_key(ses.kexhashbuf, hostkey, ses.newkeys->algo_hostkey);
- /* e, exchange value sent by the client */
- buf_putmpint(ses.kexhashbuf, dh_e);
- /* f, exchange value sent by the server */
- buf_putmpint(ses.kexhashbuf, dh_f);
- /* K, the shared secret */
- buf_putmpint(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.dh_K);
-
- /* calculate the hash H to sign */
- sha1_init(&hs);
- buf_setpos(ses.kexhashbuf, 0);
- sha1_process(&hs, buf_getptr(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.kexhashbuf->len),
- ses.kexhashbuf->len);
- sha1_done(&hs, ses.hash);
-
- buf_burn(ses.kexhashbuf);
- buf_free(ses.kexhashbuf);
- ses.kexhashbuf = NULL;
-
- /* first time around, we set the session_id to H */
- if (ses.session_id == NULL) {
- /* create the session_id, this never needs freeing */
- ses.session_id = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- memcpy(ses.session_id, ses.hash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- }
-}
-
-/* read the other side's algo list. buf_match_algo is a callback to match
- * algos for the client or server. */
-static void read_kex_algos() {
-
- /* for asymmetry */
- algo_type * c2s_hash_algo = NULL;
- algo_type * s2c_hash_algo = NULL;
- algo_type * c2s_cipher_algo = NULL;
- algo_type * s2c_cipher_algo = NULL;
- algo_type * c2s_comp_algo = NULL;
- algo_type * s2c_comp_algo = NULL;
- /* the generic one */
- algo_type * algo = NULL;
-
- /* which algo couldn't match */
- char * erralgo = NULL;
-
- int goodguess = 0;
- int allgood = 1; /* we AND this with each goodguess and see if its still
- true after */
-
- buf_incrpos(ses.payload, 16); /* start after the cookie */
-
- ses.newkeys = (struct key_context*)m_malloc(sizeof(struct key_context));
-
- /* kex_algorithms */
- algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshkex, &goodguess);
- allgood &= goodguess;
- if (algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "kex";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("kex algo %s", algo->name))
- ses.newkeys->algo_kex = algo->val;
-
- /* server_host_key_algorithms */
- algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshhostkey, &goodguess);
- allgood &= goodguess;
- if (algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "hostkey";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("hostkey algo %s", algo->name))
- ses.newkeys->algo_hostkey = algo->val;
-
- /* encryption_algorithms_client_to_server */
- c2s_cipher_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshciphers, &goodguess);
- if (c2s_cipher_algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "enc c->s";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("enc c2s is %s", c2s_cipher_algo->name))
-
- /* encryption_algorithms_server_to_client */
- s2c_cipher_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshciphers, &goodguess);
- if (s2c_cipher_algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "enc s->c";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("enc s2c is %s", s2c_cipher_algo->name))
-
- /* mac_algorithms_client_to_server */
- c2s_hash_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshhashes, &goodguess);
- if (c2s_hash_algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "mac c->s";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("hash c2s is %s", c2s_hash_algo->name))
-
- /* mac_algorithms_server_to_client */
- s2c_hash_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshhashes, &goodguess);
- if (s2c_hash_algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "mac s->c";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("hash s2c is %s", s2c_hash_algo->name))
-
- /* compression_algorithms_client_to_server */
- c2s_comp_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshcompress, &goodguess);
- if (c2s_comp_algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "comp c->s";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("hash c2s is %s", c2s_comp_algo->name))
-
- /* compression_algorithms_server_to_client */
- s2c_comp_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshcompress, &goodguess);
- if (s2c_comp_algo == NULL) {
- erralgo = "comp s->c";
- goto error;
- }
- TRACE(("hash s2c is %s", s2c_comp_algo->name))
-
- /* languages_client_to_server */
- buf_eatstring(ses.payload);
-
- /* languages_server_to_client */
- buf_eatstring(ses.payload);
-
- /* first_kex_packet_follows */
- if (buf_getbool(ses.payload)) {
- ses.kexstate.firstfollows = 1;
- /* if the guess wasn't good, we ignore the packet sent */
- if (!allgood) {
- ses.ignorenext = 1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Handle the asymmetry */
- if (IS_DROPBEAR_CLIENT) {
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt =
- (struct dropbear_cipher*)s2c_cipher_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt =
- (struct dropbear_cipher*)c2s_cipher_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_mac =
- (struct dropbear_hash*)s2c_hash_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_mac =
- (struct dropbear_hash*)c2s_hash_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_comp = s2c_comp_algo->val;
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_comp = c2s_comp_algo->val;
- } else {
- /* SERVER */
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt =
- (struct dropbear_cipher*)c2s_cipher_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt =
- (struct dropbear_cipher*)s2c_cipher_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_mac =
- (struct dropbear_hash*)c2s_hash_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_mac =
- (struct dropbear_hash*)s2c_hash_algo->data;
- ses.newkeys->recv_algo_comp = c2s_comp_algo->val;
- ses.newkeys->trans_algo_comp = s2c_comp_algo->val;
- }
-
- /* reserved for future extensions */
- buf_getint(ses.payload);
- return;
-
-error:
- dropbear_exit("no matching algo %s", erralgo);
-}