1 files changed, 0 insertions, 108 deletions
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c4577dc97d..0000000000
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_
-#define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_
-
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "build/build_config.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl_forward.h"
-#include "sandbox/sandbox_export.h"
-
-// These are helpers to build seccomp-bpf policies, i.e. policies for a
-// sandbox that reduces the Linux kernel's attack surface. They return a
-// bpf_dsl::ResultExpr suitable to restrict certain system call parameters.
-
-namespace sandbox {
-
-// Allow clone(2) for threads.
-// Reject fork(2) attempts with EPERM.
-// Don't restrict on ASAN.
-// Crash if anything else is attempted.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork();
-
-// Allow PR_SET_NAME, PR_SET_DUMPABLE, PR_GET_DUMPABLE.
-// Crash if anything else is attempted.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictPrctl();
-
-// Allow TCGETS and FIONREAD.
-// Crash if anything else is attempted.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictIoctl();
-
-// Restrict the flags argument in mmap(2).
-// Only allow: MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS |
-// MAP_STACK | MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_DENYWRITE.
-// Crash if any other flag is used.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictMmapFlags();
-
-// Restrict the prot argument in mprotect(2).
-// Only allow: PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictMprotectFlags();
-
-// Restrict fcntl(2) cmd argument to:
-// We allow F_GETFL, F_SETFL, F_GETFD, F_SETFD, F_DUPFD, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC,
-// F_SETLK, F_SETLKW and F_GETLK.
-// Also, in F_SETFL, restrict the allowed flags to: O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND |
-// O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC | O_LARGEFILE | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOATIME.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands();
-
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
-// Restrict socketcall(2) to only allow socketpair(2), send(2), recv(2),
-// sendto(2), recvfrom(2), shutdown(2), sendmsg(2) and recvmsg(2).
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictSocketcallCommand();
-#endif
-
-// Restrict |sysno| (which must be kill, tkill or tgkill) by allowing tgkill or
-// kill iff the first parameter is |target_pid|, crashing otherwise or if
-// |sysno| is tkill.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictKillTarget(pid_t target_pid,
-                                                      int sysno);
-
-// Crash if FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI is used in the second argument of futex(2).
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictFutex();
-
-// Crash if |which| is not PRIO_PROCESS. EPERM if |who| is not 0, neither
-// |target_pid| while calling setpriority(2) / getpriority(2).
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictGetSetpriority(pid_t target_pid);
-
-// Restricts |pid| for sched_* syscalls which take a pid as the first argument.
-// We only allow calling these syscalls if the pid argument is equal to the pid
-// of the sandboxed process or 0 (indicating the current thread).  The following
-// syscalls are supported:
-//
-// sched_getaffinity(), sched_getattr(), sched_getparam(), sched_getscheduler(),
-// sched_rr_get_interval(), sched_setaffinity(), sched_setattr(),
-// sched_setparam(), sched_setscheduler()
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictSchedTarget(pid_t target_pid,
-                                                       int sysno);
-
-// Restricts the |pid| argument of prlimit64 to 0 (meaning the calling process)
-// or target_pid.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictPrlimit64(pid_t target_pid);
-
-// Restricts the |who| argument of getrusage to RUSAGE_SELF (meaning the calling
-// process).
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictGetrusage();
-
-// Restrict |clk_id| for clock_getres(), clock_gettime() and clock_settime().
-// We allow accessing only CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID,
-// CLOCK_REALTIME, and CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID.  In particular, this disallows
-// access to arbitrary per-{process,thread} CPU-time clock IDs (such as those
-// returned by {clock,pthread}_getcpuclockid), which can leak information
-// about the state of the host OS.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictClockID();
-
-// Restrict the flags argument to getrandom() to allow only no flags, or
-// GRND_NONBLOCK.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictGetRandom();
-
-// Restrict |new_limit| to NULL, and |pid| to the calling process (or 0) for
-// prlimit64().  This allows only getting rlimits on the current process.
-// Otherwise, fail gracefully; see crbug.com/160157.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictPrlimitToGetrlimit(pid_t target_pid);
-
-}  // namespace sandbox.
-
-#endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_