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-rw-r--r--src/services.c1469
1 files changed, 1469 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/services.c b/src/services.c
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1469 @@
+
+/*
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ * and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Red Hat, Inc. James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Fine-grained netlink support
+ * IPv6 support
+ * Code cleanup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
+ */
+
+/* FLASK */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <sepol/policydb/policydb.h>
+#include <sepol/policydb/sidtab.h>
+#include <sepol/policydb/services.h>
+#include <sepol/policydb/conditional.h>
+#include <sepol/policydb/flask.h>
+
+#include "debug.h"
+#include "private.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "dso.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+#define BUG() do { ERR(NULL, "Badness at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); } while (0)
+#define BUG_ON(x) do { if (x) ERR(NULL, "Badness at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); } while (0)
+
+static int selinux_enforcing = 1;
+
+static sidtab_t mysidtab, *sidtab = &mysidtab;
+static policydb_t mypolicydb, *policydb = &mypolicydb;
+
+int hidden sepol_set_sidtab(sidtab_t * s)
+{
+ sidtab = s;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int hidden sepol_set_policydb(policydb_t * p)
+{
+ policydb = p;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sepol_set_policydb_from_file(FILE * fp)
+{
+ struct policy_file pf;
+
+ policy_file_init(&pf);
+ pf.fp = fp;
+ pf.type = PF_USE_STDIO;
+ if (mypolicydb.policy_type)
+ policydb_destroy(&mypolicydb);
+ if (policydb_init(&mypolicydb)) {
+ ERR(NULL, "Out of memory!");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (policydb_read(&mypolicydb, &pf, 0)) {
+ ERR(NULL, "can't read binary policy: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ policydb = &mypolicydb;
+ return sepol_sidtab_init(sidtab);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The largest sequence number that has been used when
+ * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
+ * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static uint32_t latest_granting = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(context_struct_t * scontext,
+ context_struct_t * tcontext,
+ context_struct_t * xcontext,
+ constraint_expr_t * cexpr)
+{
+ uint32_t val1, val2;
+ context_struct_t *c;
+ role_datum_t *r1, *r2;
+ mls_level_t *l1, *l2;
+ constraint_expr_t *e;
+ int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return 0;
+ switch (e->attr) {
+ case CEXPR_USER:
+ val1 = scontext->user;
+ val2 = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_TYPE:
+ val1 = scontext->type;
+ val2 = tcontext->type;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ROLE:
+ val1 = scontext->role;
+ val2 = tcontext->role;
+ r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+ r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] =
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] =
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] =
+ (!ebitmap_get_bit
+ (&r1->dominates, val2 - 1)
+ && !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1));
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_L1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H1:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L2H2:
+ l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ mls_ops:
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return 0;
+ c = scontext;
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+ c = tcontext;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+ c = xcontext;
+ if (!c) {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+ val1 = c->user;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+ val1 = c->role;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+ val1 = c->type;
+ else {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
+ * the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static int context_struct_compute_av(context_struct_t * scontext,
+ context_struct_t * tcontext,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ sepol_access_vector_t requested,
+ struct sepol_av_decision *avd,
+ unsigned int *reason)
+{
+ constraint_node_t *constraint;
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ avtab_key_t avkey;
+ class_datum_t *tclass_datum;
+ avtab_ptr_t node;
+ ebitmap_t *sattr, *tattr;
+ ebitmap_node_t *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized class %d", tclass);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
+ */
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ *reason = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+ * this permission check, then use it.
+ */
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(snode, i))
+ continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
+ continue;
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node =
+ avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+ node != NULL;
+ node =
+ avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified ==
+ AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+ }
+
+ /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (requested & ~avd->allowed) {
+ *reason |= SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_TE;
+ requested &= avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+ * the MLS policy).
+ */
+ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+ !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ avd->allowed =
+ (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ if (requested & ~avd->allowed) {
+ *reason |= SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_CONS;
+ requested &= avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If checking process transition permission and the
+ * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+ * pair.
+ */
+ if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
+ (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+ for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+ tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ra)
+ avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+ }
+
+ if (requested & ~avd->allowed) {
+ *reason |= SEPOL_COMPUTEAV_RBAC;
+ requested &= avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int hidden sepol_validate_transition(sepol_security_id_t oldsid,
+ sepol_security_id_t newsid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tasksid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass)
+{
+ context_struct_t *ocontext;
+ context_struct_t *ncontext;
+ context_struct_t *tcontext;
+ class_datum_t *tclass_datum;
+ constraint_node_t *constraint;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized class %d", tclass);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ ocontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
+ if (!ocontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", oldsid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ncontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
+ if (!ncontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", newsid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", tasksid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int hidden sepol_compute_av_reason(sepol_security_id_t ssid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tsid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ sepol_access_vector_t requested,
+ struct sepol_av_decision *avd,
+ unsigned int *reason)
+{
+ context_struct_t *scontext = 0, *tcontext = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ scontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tcontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+ requested, avd, reason);
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int hidden sepol_compute_av(sepol_security_id_t ssid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tsid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ sepol_access_vector_t requested,
+ struct sepol_av_decision *avd)
+{
+ unsigned int reason = 0;
+ return sepol_compute_av_reason(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd,
+ &reason);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context associated with `sid' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_sid_to_context(sepol_security_id_t sid,
+ sepol_security_context_t * scontext,
+ size_t * scontext_len)
+{
+ context_struct_t *context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ context = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = context_to_string(NULL, policydb, context, scontext, scontext_len);
+ out:
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by `scontext'.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_context_to_sid(const sepol_security_context_t scontext,
+ size_t scontext_len, sepol_security_id_t * sid)
+{
+
+ context_struct_t *context = NULL;
+
+ /* First, create the context */
+ if (context_from_string(NULL, policydb, &context,
+ scontext, scontext_len) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Obtain the new sid */
+ if (sid && (sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, context, sid) < 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ context_destroy(context);
+ free(context);
+ return STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+ err:
+ if (context) {
+ context_destroy(context);
+ free(context);
+ }
+ ERR(NULL, "could not convert %s to sid", scontext);
+ return STATUS_ERR;
+}
+
+static inline int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(context_struct_t *
+ scontext,
+ context_struct_t *
+ tcontext,
+ sepol_security_class_t
+ tclass,
+ context_struct_t *
+ newcontext)
+{
+ if (selinux_enforcing) {
+ return -EACCES;
+ } else {
+ sepol_security_context_t s, t, n;
+ size_t slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+ context_to_string(NULL, policydb, scontext, &s, &slen);
+ context_to_string(NULL, policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen);
+ context_to_string(NULL, policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen);
+ ERR(NULL, "invalid context %s for "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ n, s, t, policydb->p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1]);
+ free(s);
+ free(t);
+ free(n);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int sepol_compute_sid(sepol_security_id_t ssid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tsid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ uint32_t specified, sepol_security_id_t * out_sid)
+{
+ context_struct_t *scontext = 0, *tcontext = 0, newcontext;
+ struct role_trans *roletr = 0;
+ avtab_key_t avkey;
+ avtab_datum_t *avdatum;
+ avtab_ptr_t node;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ scontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tcontext = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ ERR(NULL, "unrecognized SID %d", tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ context_init(&newcontext);
+
+ /* Set the user identity. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ /* Use the process user identity. */
+ newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the related object owner. */
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the role and type to default values. */
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ /* Use the current role and type of process. */
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Use the well-defined object role. */
+ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+ /* Use the type of the related object. */
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = specified;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+ /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+ if (!avdatum) {
+ node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+ for (; node != NULL;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+ avdatum = &node->datum;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (avdatum) {
+ /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+ newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for class-specific changes. */
+ switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+ /* Look for a role transition rule. */
+ for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr;
+ roletr = roletr->next) {
+ if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
+ roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
+ /* Use the role transition rule. */
+ newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the MLS attributes.
+ This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+ &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+ rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+ tcontext,
+ tclass, &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+ out:
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new object in the
+ * class `tclass' based on a SID pair.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_transition_sid(sepol_security_id_t ssid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tsid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ sepol_security_id_t * out_sid)
+{
+ return sepol_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a
+ * polyinstantiated object of class `tclass' based on
+ * a SID pair.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_member_sid(sepol_security_id_t ssid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tsid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ sepol_security_id_t * out_sid)
+{
+ return sepol_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object in the
+ * class `tclass' based on a SID pair.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_change_sid(sepol_security_id_t ssid,
+ sepol_security_id_t tsid,
+ sepol_security_class_t tclass,
+ sepol_security_id_t * out_sid)
+{
+ return sepol_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same value
+ * in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_perm(hashtab_key_t key, hashtab_datum_t datum, void *p)
+{
+ hashtab_t h;
+ perm_datum_t *perdatum, *perdatum2;
+
+ h = (hashtab_t) p;
+ perdatum = (perm_datum_t *) datum;
+
+ perdatum2 = (perm_datum_t *) hashtab_search(h, key);
+ if (!perdatum2) {
+ ERR(NULL, "permission %s disappeared", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (perdatum->s.value != perdatum2->s.value) {
+ ERR(NULL, "the value of permissions %s changed", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each class that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same
+ * attributes in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_class(hashtab_key_t key, hashtab_datum_t datum, void *p)
+{
+ policydb_t *newp;
+ class_datum_t *cladatum, *cladatum2;
+
+ newp = (policydb_t *) p;
+ cladatum = (class_datum_t *) datum;
+
+ cladatum2 =
+ (class_datum_t *) hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
+ if (!cladatum2) {
+ ERR(NULL, "class %s disappeared", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (cladatum->s.value != cladatum2->s.value) {
+ ERR(NULL, "the value of class %s changed", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
+ (!cladatum->comdatum && cladatum2->comdatum)) {
+ ERR(NULL, "the inherits clause for the access "
+ "vector definition for class %s changed", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (cladatum->comdatum) {
+ if (hashtab_map
+ (cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+ cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table)) {
+ ERR(NULL,
+ " in the access vector definition "
+ "for class %s\n", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+ cladatum2->permissions.table)) {
+ ERR(NULL, " in access vector definition for class %s", key);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(sepol_security_id_t sid,
+ context_struct_t * context, void *arg)
+{
+ sidtab_t *s = arg;
+
+ return sepol_sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(context_struct_t *
+ context)
+{
+ if (selinux_enforcing) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ sepol_security_context_t s;
+ size_t len;
+
+ context_to_string(NULL, policydb, context, &s, &len);
+ ERR(NULL, "context %s is invalid", s);
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ policydb_t *oldp;
+ policydb_t *newp;
+} convert_context_args_t;
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(sepol_security_id_t key __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ context_struct_t * c, void *p)
+{
+ convert_context_args_t *args;
+ context_struct_t oldc;
+ role_datum_t *role;
+ type_datum_t *typdatum;
+ user_datum_t *usrdatum;
+ sepol_security_context_t s;
+ size_t len;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ args = (convert_context_args_t *) p;
+
+ if (context_cpy(&oldc, c))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Convert the user. */
+ usrdatum = (user_datum_t *) hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+ args->oldp->
+ p_user_val_to_name[c->user -
+ 1]);
+
+ if (!usrdatum) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->user = usrdatum->s.value;
+
+ /* Convert the role. */
+ role = (role_datum_t *) hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+ args->oldp->
+ p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+ if (!role) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->role = role->s.value;
+
+ /* Convert the type. */
+ typdatum = (type_datum_t *)
+ hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+ args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+ if (!typdatum) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ c->type = typdatum->s.value;
+
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ context_destroy(&oldc);
+ return 0;
+
+ bad:
+ context_to_string(NULL, policydb, &oldc, &s, &len);
+ context_destroy(&oldc);
+ ERR(NULL, "invalidating context %s", s);
+ free(s);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Reading from a policy "file". */
+int hidden next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+ size_t nread;
+
+ switch (fp->type) {
+ case PF_USE_STDIO:
+ nread = fread(buf, bytes, 1, fp->fp);
+
+ if (nread != 1)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PF_USE_MEMORY:
+ if (bytes > fp->len)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+ fp->data += bytes;
+ fp->len -= bytes;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t hidden put_entry(const void *ptr, size_t size, size_t n,
+ struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ size_t bytes = size * n;
+
+ switch (fp->type) {
+ case PF_USE_STDIO:
+ return fwrite(ptr, size, n, fp->fp);
+ case PF_USE_MEMORY:
+ if (bytes > fp->len) {
+ errno = ENOSPC;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(fp->data, ptr, bytes);
+ fp->data += bytes;
+ fp->len -= bytes;
+ return n;
+ case PF_LEN:
+ fp->len += bytes;
+ return n;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a new set of configuration data from
+ * a policy database binary representation file.
+ *
+ * Verify that each class that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same
+ * attributes in the new policy.
+ *
+ * Convert the context structures in the SID table to the
+ * new representation and verify that all entries
+ * in the SID table are valid under the new policy.
+ *
+ * Change the active policy database to use the new
+ * configuration data.
+ *
+ * Reset the access vector cache.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ policydb_t oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
+ sidtab_t oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+ convert_context_args_t args;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct policy_file file, *fp;
+
+ policy_file_init(&file);
+ file.type = PF_USE_MEMORY;
+ file.data = data;
+ file.len = len;
+ fp = &file;
+
+ if (policydb_init(&newpolicydb))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp, 1)) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ sepol_sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+
+ /* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
+ if (hashtab_map
+ (policydb->p_classes.table, validate_class, &newpolicydb)) {
+ ERR(NULL, "the definition of an existing class changed");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Clone the SID table. */
+ sepol_sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
+ if (sepol_sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+ args.oldp = policydb;
+ args.newp = &newpolicydb;
+ sepol_sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+
+ /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+ memcpy(&oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof *policydb);
+ sepol_sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
+
+ /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+ memcpy(policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof *policydb);
+ sepol_sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
+
+ /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+ policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
+ sepol_sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ sepol_sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the SIDs to use for an unlabeled file system
+ * that is being mounted from the device with the
+ * the kdevname `name'. The `fs_sid' SID is returned for
+ * the file system and the `file_sid' SID is returned
+ * for all files within that file system.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_fs_sid(char *name,
+ sepol_security_id_t * fs_sid,
+ sepol_security_id_t * file_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ ocontext_t *c;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FS];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(c->u.name, name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[1],
+ &c->sid[1]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *fs_sid = c->sid[0];
+ *file_sid = c->sid[1];
+ } else {
+ *fs_sid = SECINITSID_FS;
+ *file_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the SID of the port specified by
+ * `domain', `type', `protocol', and `port'.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_port_sid(uint16_t domain __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ uint16_t type __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ uint8_t protocol,
+ uint16_t port, sepol_security_id_t * out_sid)
+{
+ ocontext_t *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+ c->u.port.low_port <= port && c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the SIDs to use for a network interface
+ * with the name `name'. The `if_sid' SID is returned for
+ * the interface and the `msg_sid' SID is returned as
+ * the default SID for messages received on the
+ * interface.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_netif_sid(char *name,
+ sepol_security_id_t * if_sid,
+ sepol_security_id_t * msg_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ ocontext_t *c;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[1],
+ &c->sid[1]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *if_sid = c->sid[0];
+ *msg_sid = c->sid[1];
+ } else {
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+ *msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(uint32_t * input, uint32_t * addr,
+ uint32_t * mask)
+{
+ int i, fail = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return !fail;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the SID of the node specified by the address
+ * `addrp' where `addrlen' is the length of the address
+ * in bytes and `domain' is the communications domain or
+ * address family in which the address should be interpreted.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_node_sid(uint16_t domain,
+ void *addrp,
+ size_t addrlen, sepol_security_id_t * out_sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ ocontext_t *c;
+
+ switch (domain) {
+ case AF_INET:{
+ uint32_t addr;
+
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ addr = *((uint32_t *) addrp);
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(uint64_t) * 2) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+ while (c) {
+ if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+ c->u.node6.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by `fromsid'.
+ * Set `*sids' to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs. Set `*nel' to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+int hidden sepol_get_user_sids(sepol_security_id_t fromsid,
+ char *username,
+ sepol_security_id_t ** sids, uint32_t * nel)
+{
+ context_struct_t *fromcon, usercon;
+ sepol_security_id_t *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+ uint32_t mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+ user_datum_t *user;
+ role_datum_t *role;
+ struct sepol_av_decision avd;
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int i, j, reason;
+ ebitmap_node_t *rnode, *tnode;
+
+ fromcon = sepol_sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
+ if (!fromcon) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ user = (user_datum_t *) hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table,
+ username);
+ if (!user) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ usercon.user = user->s.value;
+
+ mysids = malloc(maxnel * sizeof(sepol_security_id_t));
+ if (!mysids) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(mysids, 0, maxnel * sizeof(sepol_security_id_t));
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_bit(&user->roles.roles, rnode, i) {
+ if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(rnode, i))
+ continue;
+ role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
+ usercon.role = i + 1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_bit(&role->types.types, tnode, j) {
+ if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
+ continue;
+ usercon.type = j + 1;
+ if (usercon.type == fromcon->type)
+ continue;
+
+ if (mls_setup_user_range
+ (fromcon, user, &usercon, policydb->mls))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION,
+ &avd, &reason);
+ if (rc || !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
+ continue;
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon,
+ &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ free(mysids);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (mynel < maxnel) {
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ } else {
+ maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+ mysids2 =
+ malloc(maxnel *
+ sizeof(sepol_security_id_t));
+
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ free(mysids);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(mysids2, 0,
+ maxnel * sizeof(sepol_security_id_t));
+ memcpy(mysids2, mysids,
+ mynel * sizeof(sepol_security_id_t));
+ free(mysids);
+ mysids = mysids2;
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *sids = mysids;
+ *nel = mynel;
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the SID to use for a file in a filesystem
+ * that cannot support a persistent label mapping or use another
+ * fixed labeling behavior like transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ */
+int hidden sepol_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ char *path,
+ sepol_security_class_t sclass,
+ sepol_security_id_t * sid)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ genfs_t *genfs;
+ ocontext_t *c;
+ int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
+
+ for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+ if (cmp <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!genfs || cmp) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+ (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!c) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *sid = c->sid[0];
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int hidden sepol_fs_use(const char *fstype,
+ unsigned int *behavior, sepol_security_id_t * sid)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ ocontext_t *c;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ *behavior = c->v.behavior;
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sepol_sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else {
+ rc = sepol_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* FLASK */