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-rw-r--r--library/ssl_tls12_client.c3772
1 files changed, 3772 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a1745205
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3772 @@
+/*
+ * TLS client-side functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#include "ssl_client.h"
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "hash_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ /* We're always including a TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
+ * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
+ * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
+ if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len );
+
+ /*
+ * Secure renegotiation
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 );
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len );
+
+ memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
+
+ *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 2;
+
+ *p++ = 1;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+
+ *olen = 6;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t kkpp_len = 0;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1 )
+ return( 0 );
+#else
+ if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
+ return( 0 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ /*
+ * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification.
+ * We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance
+ * and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content.
+ */
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ||
+ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+ p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE );
+ if ( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+ psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "psa_pake_output", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 ,
+ "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len );
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len );
+ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) );
+
+ kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len );
+
+ memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *olen = kkpp_len + 4;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t ext_len;
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
+ * } ConnectionId;
+ */
+
+ *olen = 0;
+ if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
+ ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
+ {
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) );
+
+ /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
+ * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) );
+
+ /* Add extension ID + size */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+ ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
+ memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
+
+ *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 1;
+
+ *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code;
+
+ *olen = 5;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+
+ *olen = 4;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+
+ *olen = 4;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
+
+ /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ *olen = 4;
+
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) );
+
+ memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
+
+ *olen += tlen;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0;
+ uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
+ ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
+ ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
+ {
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
+ * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
+ * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
+ * } UseSRTPData;
+ * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
+ }
+ /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length,
+ * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ),
+ * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value
+ */
+ ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) );
+
+ /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes
+ * - the extension tag (2 bytes)
+ * - the extension length (2 bytes)
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */
+ /* micro-optimization:
+ * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH
+ * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0
+ * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments
+ * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len )
+ * >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ */
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len );
+
+ for( protection_profiles_index=0;
+ protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len;
+ protection_profiles_index++ )
+ {
+ profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
+ ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] );
+ if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x",
+ profile_value ) );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles
+ * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "client hello, "
+ "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d",
+ ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]
+ ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF;
+
+ if( mki_len != 0 )
+ {
+ memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len );
+ /*
+ * Increment p to point to the current position.
+ */
+ p += mki_len;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes)
+ * + extension length (2 bytes)
+ * + protection profile length (2 bytes)
+ * + 2 * number of protection profiles
+ * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte)
+ * + mki value
+ */
+ *olen = p - buf;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int uses_ec,
+ size_t *out_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t ext_len = 0;
+
+ (void) ssl;
+ (void) end;
+ (void) uses_ec;
+ (void) ret;
+ (void) ext_len;
+
+ *out_len = 0;
+
+ /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added
+ * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if( uses_ec )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p, end,
+ &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p, end,
+ &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+ *out_len = p - buf;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
+ if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
+ buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1,
+ ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
+ ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+ {
+ if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ /*
+ * server should use the extension only if we did,
+ * and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1)
+ */
+ if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ||
+ len != 1 ||
+ buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ size_t peer_cid_len;
+
+ if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
+ ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
+ /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */
+ ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+ }
+
+ if( len == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ peer_cid_len = *buf++;
+ len--;
+
+ if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ if( len != peer_cid_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
+ ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
+ memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
+ len != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+ }
+
+ ((void) buf);
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
+ len != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+ }
+
+ ((void) buf);
+
+ ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
+ len != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+ }
+
+ ((void) buf);
+
+ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ size_t list_size;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ list_size = buf[0];
+
+ p = buf + 1;
+ while( list_size > 0 )
+ {
+ if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
+ p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED )
+ {
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) )
+ ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
+ ( MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ p[0] );
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ list_size--;
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache );
+ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
+ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+ &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+ psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+#else
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ buf, len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+ size_t list_len, name_len;
+ const char **p;
+
+ /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
+ if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
+ * } ProtocolNameList;
+ *
+ * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
+ */
+
+ /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
+ if( len < 4 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
+ if( list_len != len - 2 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ name_len = buf[2];
+ if( name_len != list_len - 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
+ for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
+ {
+ if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
+ memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+ size_t i, mki_len = 0;
+ uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0;
+
+ /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
+ if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
+ ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
+ ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
+ * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
+ * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
+ * } UseSRTPData;
+
+ * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ */
+ if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes)
+ * + protection profile (2 bytes)
+ * + mki_len(1 byte)
+ * and optional srtp_mki
+ */
+ if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+
+ /*
+ * get the server protection profile
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only
+ * one protection profile in server Hello
+ */
+ if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+
+ server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3];
+ server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
+ server_protection_profile_value );
+ if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+ server_protection ) ) );
+ }
+
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+
+ /*
+ * Check we have the server profile in our list
+ */
+ for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++)
+ {
+ if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] )
+ {
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+ server_protection ) ) );
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */
+ if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep
+ * one as negotiated */
+ if( len == 5 )
+ {
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RFC5764:
+ * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response
+ * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client
+ * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert.
+ */
+ if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len ||
+ ( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ if( len > 5 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
+ }
+#endif
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+/*
+ * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
+ uint16_t dtls_legacy_version;
+ unsigned char cookie_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
+
+ /* Check that there is enough room for:
+ * - 2 bytes of version
+ * - 1 byte of cookie_len
+ */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion server_version;
+ * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
+ * } HelloVerifyRequest;
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
+ dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff)
+ * The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to
+ * legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2)
+ */
+ if( dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) );
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
+
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
+ }
+
+ cookie_len = *p++;
+ if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
+
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->cookie );
+
+ ssl->handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len );
+ if( ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ memcpy( ssl->handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len );
+ ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+ /* Start over at ClientHello */
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl );
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret, i;
+ size_t n;
+ size_t ext_len;
+ unsigned char *buf, *ext;
+ unsigned char comp;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
+#endif
+ int handshake_failure = 0;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ /* No alert on a read error. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ buf = ssl->in_msg;
+
+ if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
+ {
+ ssl->renego_records_seen++;
+
+ if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
+ ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) );
+
+ ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ {
+ if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
+ return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We made it through the verification process */
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->cookie );
+ ssl->handshake->cookie = NULL;
+ ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
+ buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 0 . 1 server_version
+ * 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
+ * 34 . 34 session_id length = n
+ * 35 . 34+n session_id
+ * 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite
+ * 37+n . 37+n compression_method
+ *
+ * 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional)
+ * 40+n . .. extensions
+ */
+ buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf, 2 );
+ ssl->tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version( buf, ssl->conf->transport );
+ ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version;
+
+ if( ssl->tls_version < ssl->conf->min_tls_version ||
+ ssl->tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "server version out of bounds - min: [0x%x], server: [0x%x], max: [0x%x]",
+ (unsigned)ssl->conf->min_tls_version,
+ (unsigned)ssl->tls_version,
+ (unsigned)ssl->conf->max_tls_version ) );
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
+
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) |
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) |
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) |
+ ( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) );
+
+ memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
+
+ n = buf[34];
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
+
+ if( n > 32 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n )
+ {
+ ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 )
+ | ( buf[39 + n] ) );
+
+ if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
+ ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ }
+ else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n )
+ {
+ ext_len = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ /* ciphersuite (used later) */
+ i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n];
+
+ /*
+ * Read and check compression
+ */
+ comp = buf[37 + n];
+
+ if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize update checksum functions
+ */
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
+ if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the session can be resumed
+ */
+ if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 ||
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
+#endif
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i ||
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
+ memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->state++;
+ ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
+#endif
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
+ memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
+ ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d",
+ buf[37 + n] ) );
+
+ /*
+ * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello.
+ */
+ i = 0;
+ while( 1 )
+ {
+ if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] ==
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite )
+ {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite );
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ssl, suite_info, ssl->tls_version,
+ ssl->tls_version ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
+ ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ ext = buf + 40 + n;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
+ ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) );
+
+ while( ext_len )
+ {
+ unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 )
+ | ( ext[1] ) );
+ unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 )
+ | ( ext[3] ) );
+
+ if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ switch( ext_id )
+ {
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
+#endif
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4,
+ ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl,
+ ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl,
+ ext + 4,
+ ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl,
+ ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl,
+ ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl,
+ ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl,
+ ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl,
+ ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+ default:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) );
+ }
+
+ ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
+ ext += 4 + ext_size;
+
+ if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the
+ * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in
+ * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension.
+ */
+ if( ssl->handshake->resume )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Renegotiation security checks
+ */
+ if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ }
+ else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ }
+ else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+ if( handshake_failure == 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *end )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ size_t dhm_actual_bitlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Ephemeral DH parameters:
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } ServerDHParams;
+ */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ p, end ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx );
+ if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u",
+ dhm_actual_bitlen,
+ ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *end )
+{
+ uint16_t tls_id;
+ size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
+ uint8_t ecpoint_len;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params;
+ * ECPoint public;
+ * } ServerECDHParams;
+ *
+ * 1 curve_type (must be "named_curve")
+ * 2..3 NamedCurve
+ * 4 ECPoint.len
+ * 5+ ECPoint contents
+ */
+ if( end - *p < 4 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+
+ /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */
+ if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+
+ /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */
+ tls_id = *(*p)++;
+ tls_id <<= 8;
+ tls_id |= *(*p)++;
+
+ /* Check it's a curve we offered */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( ssl, tls_id ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
+ ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve): %u",
+ (unsigned) tls_id ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */
+ if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type =
+ mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+ handshake->ecdh_bits = ecdh_bits;
+
+ /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
+ ecpoint_len = *(*p)++;
+ if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+
+ if( ecpoint_len > sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+
+ memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, *p, ecpoint_len );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
+ *p += ecpoint_len;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
+#else
+ grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
+#endif
+
+ curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
+ if( curve_info == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) );
+
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 )
+ return( -1 );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *end )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+ /*
+ * Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params;
+ * ECPoint public;
+ * } ServerECDHParams;
+ */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ (const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+#endif
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || \
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || \
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *end )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ uint16_t len;
+ ((void) ssl);
+
+ /*
+ * PSK parameters:
+ *
+ * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ if( end - (*p) < 2 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
+ *p += 2;
+
+ if( end - (*p) < len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one
+ * PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if
+ * someone needs that feature.
+ */
+ *p += len;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ size_t offset, size_t *olen,
+ size_t pms_offset )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len_bytes = 2;
+ unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
+ mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
+
+ if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate (part of) the pre-master as
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion client_version;
+ * opaque random[46];
+ * } PreMasterSecret;
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_version( p, ssl->conf->transport,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 );
+
+ if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+ {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+ peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ /*
+ * Now write it out, encrypted
+ */
+ if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ }
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk,
+ p, ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( len_bytes == 2 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen, ssl->out_msg, offset );
+ *olen += 2;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
+ mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
+ mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+ {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+ peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
+ * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */
+ if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ }
+
+ peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, peer_key->grp.id ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE );
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type =
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( peer_key->grp.id,
+ &ecdh_bits ) );
+
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type == 0 || ecdh_bits > 0xffff )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid ecc group conversion to psa." ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits;
+
+ /* Store peer's public key in psa format. */
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen,
+ ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH );
+
+ if ( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary" ), ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = olen;
+#else
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE );
+ }
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
+ * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
+ * operations like ECDHE. */
+ mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ ((void) p);
+ ((void) end);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ ((void) p);
+ ((void) end);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing )
+ {
+ goto start_processing;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
+ * doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
+ */
+ if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
+ {
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
+ {
+ /* Current message is probably either
+ * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
+ ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing;
+
+start_processing:
+#endif
+ p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
+ end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
+ {
+ if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ } /* FALLTHROUGH */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
+ ; /* nothing more to do */
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
+ {
+ if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
+ {
+ if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ /*
+ * The first 3 bytes are:
+ * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE
+ * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID
+ *
+ * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we check only
+ * that TLS ID here
+ */
+ uint16_t read_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 1 );
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+ if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) ) == NULL )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+ }
+
+ if( ( *p != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) ||
+ ( read_tls_id != curve_info->tls_id ) )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ p += 3;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+ &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+ psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ p, end - p );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ {
+ size_t sig_len, hashlen;
+ unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
+ unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
+ size_t params_len = p - params;
+ void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+ uint16_t sig_alg;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
+ {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+ peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ /*
+ * Handle the digitally-signed structure
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+ sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
+ sig_alg, &pk_alg, &md_alg ) != 0 &&
+ ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, sig_alg ) &&
+ ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, sig_alg ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+ p += 2;
+
+ if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read signature
+ */
+
+ if( p > end - 2 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
+ p += 2;
+
+ if( p != end - sig_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the hash that has been signed
+ */
+ if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
+ params, params_len,
+ md_alg );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
+
+ /*
+ * Verify signature
+ */
+ if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+ if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options;
+ rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
+ rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len =
+ mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( md_alg );
+ if( rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( pk_alg, &rsassa_pss_options,
+ peer_pk,
+ md_alg, hash, hashlen,
+ p, sig_len );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk,
+ md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx );
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ int send_alert_msg = 1;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ send_alert_msg = ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS );
+#endif
+ if( send_alert_msg )
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+#endif
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
+ * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
+ * operations like ECDHE. */
+ mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+exit:
+ ssl->state++;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
+
+ if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t n = 0;
+ size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ size_t sig_alg_len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ unsigned char *sig_alg;
+ unsigned char *dn;
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
+
+ if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+ ssl->state++;
+ ssl->handshake->client_auth =
+ ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request",
+ ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) );
+
+ if( ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 )
+ {
+ /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */
+ ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
+ * supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ *
+ * Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
+ * ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
+ * if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
+ * and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
+ * the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
+ *
+ * Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
+ * point we only have one hash available (see comments in
+ * write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have.
+ *
+ * However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
+ * superficially sane.
+ */
+ buf = ssl->in_msg;
+
+ /* certificate_types */
+ if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
+ n = cert_type_len;
+
+ /*
+ * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf:
+ * * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
+ * SSL is 3),
+ * * distinguished name length otherwise.
+ * Both reach at most the index:
+ * ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
+ * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
+ * regardless of the actual code path.
+ */
+ if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ /* supported_signature_algorithms */
+ sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
+ | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
+
+ /*
+ * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below:
+ * sig_alg[i + 1],
+ * where:
+ * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n,
+ * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1.
+ * Therefore the furthest access is:
+ * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1],
+ * which reduces to:
+ * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len],
+ * which is one less than we need the buf to be.
+ */
+ if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n;
+ for( size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %02x %02x",
+ sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) );
+ }
+#endif
+
+ n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
+
+ /* certificate_authorities */
+ dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
+ | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
+
+ n += dn_len;
+ if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n - dn_len;
+ for( size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len )
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2;
+ mbedtls_x509_name name;
+ size_t asn1_len;
+ char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
+ memset( &name, 0, sizeof( name ) );
+ dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( dn + i, 0 );
+ if( dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 ||
+ mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + asn1_len, &name ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "DN hint: %.*s",
+ mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( s, sizeof(s), &name ), s ) );
+ mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow( name.next );
+ }
+#endif
+
+exit:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
+ ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ size_t header_len;
+ size_t content_len;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
+ {
+ /*
+ * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
+ */
+ content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx );
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4 );
+ header_len = 6;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ),
+ &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster,
+ MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
+ &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ header_len = 4;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
+
+ /*
+ * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
+ */
+
+ /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
+ * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
+ * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
+ * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
+ * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
+ * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
+ * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
+ key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
+ psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
+ psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
+
+ /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+ status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
+ &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+
+ /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+ * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
+ * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
+ unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1;
+ unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+ size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( end - own_pubkey );
+ size_t own_pubkey_len;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+ &own_pubkey_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
+ content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
+
+ /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */
+
+ /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+ status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster,
+ sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ),
+ &ssl->handshake->pmslen );
+
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+#else
+ /*
+ * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value
+ */
+ header_len = 4;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ {
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
+ goto ecdh_calc_secret;
+
+ mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ &content_len,
+ &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+#endif
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len;
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
+ }
+
+ecdh_calc_secret:
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
+#endif
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+#endif
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
+ {
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ /*
+ * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
+ /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
+ * and we check that the server's choice is among the
+ * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+
+ /* uint16 to store content length */
+ const size_t content_len_size = 2;
+
+ header_len = 4;
+
+ if( header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len
+ > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ }
+
+ unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
+
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ header_len += content_len_size;
+
+ memcpy( p, ssl->conf->psk_identity,
+ ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+ header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
+
+ /*
+ * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
+ */
+
+ /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
+ * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
+ * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
+ * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
+ * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
+ * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
+ * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
+ key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
+ psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
+ psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
+
+ /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+ status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
+ &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+
+ /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+ * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
+ * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
+ unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1;
+ unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+ size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( end - own_pubkey );
+ size_t own_pubkey_len = 0;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+ &own_pubkey_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+ }
+
+ *p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
+ content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
+
+ /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
+ * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
+ * - the PSK itself
+ */
+ unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ const unsigned char* const pms_end = pms +
+ sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
+ /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
+ const size_t zlen_size = 2;
+ size_t zlen = 0;
+
+ /* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */
+ status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+ pms + zlen_size,
+ pms_end - ( pms + zlen_size ),
+ &zlen );
+
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
+ handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+ else if( destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( destruction_status ) );
+
+ /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, pms, 0 );
+ pms += zlen_size + zlen;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
+ {
+ /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
+ * and we check that the server's choice is among the
+ * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ header_len = 4;
+ content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+ if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
+
+ memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len,
+ ssl->conf->psk_identity,
+ ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
+ header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
+ {
+ content_len = 0;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
+ &content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
+ {
+ /*
+ * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
+ */
+ content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx );
+
+ if( header_len + 2 + content_len >
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
+ ( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
+ ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ),
+ &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
+ size_t pms_len;
+
+ /* Write length only when we know the actual value */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ pms + 2, pms_end - ( pms + 2 ), &pms_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( pms_len, pms, 0 );
+ pms += 2 + pms_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
+ {
+ /*
+ * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ &content_len,
+ &ssl->out_msg[header_len],
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+ "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
+ {
+ header_len = 4;
+ if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
+ &content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+ {
+ header_len = 4;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
+ unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN -
+ header_len;
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+ out_p, end_p - out_p, &content_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO );
+ if ( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+ psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "psa_pake_output", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ ssl->out_msg + header_len,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
+ &content_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
+ {
+ ((void) ciphersuite_info);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len;
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client key exchange" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+}
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
+ unsigned char hash[48];
+ unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ size_t hashlen;
+ void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf );
+#else
+ size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf );
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
+ {
+ goto sign;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 ||
+ mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
+ ssl->state++;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make a signature of the handshake digests
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
+
+sign:
+#endif
+
+ ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen );
+
+ /*
+ * digitally-signed struct {
+ * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
+ * };
+ *
+ * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the
+ * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature
+ * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message.
+ *
+ * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this
+ * shortcut.
+ *
+ * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and
+ * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server
+ * side.
+ */
+ if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
+ {
+ md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
+ ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+ ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256;
+ }
+ ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
+
+ /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
+ hashlen = 0;
+ offset = 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
+ rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
+#endif
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
+ md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
+ ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset,
+ out_buf_len - 6 - offset,
+ &n,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+#endif
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4 );
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset;
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ uint32_t lifetime;
+ size_t ticket_len;
+ unsigned char *ticket;
+ const unsigned char *msg;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } NewSessionTicket;
+ *
+ * 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint
+ * 4 . 5 ticket_len (n)
+ * 6 . 5+n ticket content
+ */
+ if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
+ ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
+
+ lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
+ ( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
+
+ ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
+
+ if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) );
+
+ /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
+ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+
+ /*
+ * Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
+ * to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
+ */
+ if( ticket_len == 0 )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
+ ssl->session->ticket_len );
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
+ ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
+ ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
+ mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
+
+ if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len );
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5077 section 3.4:
+ * "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
+ * discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) );
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+/*
+ * SSL handshake -- client side -- single step
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
+ * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch( ssl->state )
+ {
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * ==> ClientHello
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * <== ServerHello
+ * Certificate
+ * ( ServerKeyExchange )
+ * ( CertificateRequest )
+ * ServerHelloDone
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+ ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+ ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * ==> ( Certificate/Alert )
+ * ClientKeyExchange
+ * ( CertificateVerify )
+ * ChangeCipherSpec
+ * Finished
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * <== ( NewSessionTicket )
+ * ChangeCipherSpec
+ * Finished
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl );
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ }
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-14 11:21:20 +0000