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Diffstat (limited to 'monitor.c')
-rw-r--r--monitor.c411
1 files changed, 214 insertions, 197 deletions
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index b454cc165..677641cb4 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.210 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.228 2021/08/11 05:20:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
-extern u_char session_id[];
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
@@ -121,8 +120,6 @@ int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -160,7 +157,7 @@ static Authctxt *authctxt;
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
-static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
@@ -309,8 +306,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
- debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
- auth_method);
+ debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
@@ -318,8 +314,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
- fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
- __func__, ent->type);
+ fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
+ ent->type);
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
authenticated = 0;
@@ -352,12 +348,11 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
}
if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
- fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
+ fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
- debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
- __func__, authctxt->user);
+ debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
@@ -420,47 +415,47 @@ static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct sshbuf *logmsg;
- u_int len, level;
+ u_int len, level, forced;
char *msg;
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
/* Read length */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
+ debug_f("child log fd closed");
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
return -1;
}
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
- fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
+ fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
/* Read severity, message */
sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
/* Log it */
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- __func__, level);
- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+ fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+ sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
@@ -486,7 +481,7 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
- fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (pfd[1].revents) {
/*
@@ -501,13 +496,13 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
- debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type)
@@ -517,15 +512,13 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
if (ent->f != NULL) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
- fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
- type);
+ fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
- debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
- type);
+ debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
}
@@ -535,7 +528,7 @@ monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
return ret;
}
- fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
/* NOTREACHED */
return (-1);
@@ -580,21 +573,19 @@ mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
+ debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
- fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
+ fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
sshbuf_reset(m);
dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
if (dh == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
@@ -602,7 +593,7 @@ mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
DH_free(dh);
}
@@ -624,15 +615,15 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
u_int keyid, compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
- debug3("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (keyid > INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
+ fatal_f("invalid key ID");
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
@@ -651,21 +642,20 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
- fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
+ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
- "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
- __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
+ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
+ datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
@@ -679,25 +669,22 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
- options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sign");
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
- p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
} else
- fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
- debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
- is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen);
+ debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
+ is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
free(alg);
free(p);
@@ -711,8 +698,14 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
return (0);
}
-/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+#define PUTPW(b, id) \
+ do { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
+ &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
+ } while (0)
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
@@ -721,13 +714,13 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r, allowed = 0;
u_int i;
- debug3("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
- fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
+ fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
@@ -739,7 +732,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (pwent == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
goto out;
}
@@ -748,10 +741,18 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
authctxt->pw = pwent;
authctxt->valid = 1;
- /* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
+ /* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
+ PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
+ PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+ PUTPW(m, pw_change);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+ PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
@@ -761,26 +762,23 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (options.x != NULL) { \
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
- } \
+ if (options.x != NULL && \
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
@@ -795,10 +793,10 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
* authentication to succeed.
*/
- debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+ debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
}
- debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+ debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
@@ -821,7 +819,7 @@ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
free(banner);
@@ -837,9 +835,8 @@ mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
free(authctxt->style);
@@ -889,10 +886,10 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
size_t plen = 0;
if (!options.password_authentication)
- fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
#if !defined(ANDROID)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(ssh, passwd);
@@ -904,13 +901,14 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM");
#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
@@ -933,19 +931,19 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
- fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (success) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
}
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
@@ -965,23 +963,23 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r, authok;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
- fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
- debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
+ debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
free(response);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
@@ -1160,25 +1158,23 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *cuser, *chost;
u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
- enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+ u_int type = 0;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
- debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
- fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
+ (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
+ fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key");
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
@@ -1188,7 +1184,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
- options.pubkey_key_types))
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
break;
allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
@@ -1200,7 +1196,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
- options.hostbased_key_types))
+ options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
break;
allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
@@ -1209,13 +1205,13 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
cuser, chost);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
break;
}
}
- debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
- auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+ debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
+ pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
(key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
@@ -1227,7 +1223,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
key_blobtype = type;
key_opts = opts;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
@@ -1242,9 +1238,9 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (!allowed)
@@ -1254,7 +1250,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
}
static int
-monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
@@ -1264,9 +1260,9 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
int r, fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
@@ -1274,21 +1270,21 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
@@ -1301,17 +1297,17 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
if (type == 0)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -1330,9 +1326,9 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
u_char type;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
@@ -1340,11 +1336,11 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
@@ -1357,17 +1353,17 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
cp[len - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
@@ -1376,7 +1372,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
/* verify client user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
@@ -1394,18 +1390,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int r, ret, req_presence = 0, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
+ int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
+ int encoded_ret;
struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
if (*sigalg == '\0') {
@@ -1415,11 +1412,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
- valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
auth_method = "publickey";
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
@@ -1432,15 +1429,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
- fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
+ key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
+ (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
- debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key,
+ debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
(ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
(ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
@@ -1459,6 +1458,18 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
ssh_remote_port(ssh));
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
}
+ req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
+ if (req_verify &&
+ (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+ "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
+ "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
}
auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
@@ -1472,11 +1483,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (sig_details != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
}
sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
@@ -1516,9 +1527,9 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
static void
mm_session_close(Session *s)
{
- debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
session_unused(s->self);
@@ -1531,7 +1542,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
Session *s;
int r, res, fd0;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
sshbuf_reset(m);
s = session_new();
@@ -1547,11 +1558,11 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
- fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
+ fatal_f("dup2");
mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
@@ -1560,28 +1571,28 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
/* send messages generated by record_login */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("send fds failed");
/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (fd0 != 0)
- error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
+ error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
- /* slave is not needed */
+ /* slave side of pty is not needed */
close(s->ttyfd);
s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
return (0);
@@ -1589,7 +1600,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
@@ -1601,10 +1612,10 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
char *tty;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
sshbuf_reset(m);
@@ -1618,7 +1629,7 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
- debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
+ debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
/* The child is terminating */
session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
@@ -1700,33 +1711,39 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
struct kex *kex;
int r;
- debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
+ debug3_f("packet_set_state");
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
-
- if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
- /* XXX set callbacks */
+ if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
+ if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
+ fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
+ }
+ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
+ session_id2_len) != 0)
+ fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
+ /* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
- kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
- }
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
/* This function requires careful sanity checking */
@@ -1734,13 +1751,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
void
mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+ debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
child_state);
- debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
+ debug3_f("GOT new keys");
}
@@ -1760,7 +1777,7 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
#endif
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
@@ -1774,7 +1791,7 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
if (do_logfds) {
if (pipe(pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
@@ -1813,10 +1830,10 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
goid.elements = p;
goid.length = len;
@@ -1826,7 +1843,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
@@ -1846,10 +1863,10 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
@@ -1857,7 +1874,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
@@ -1878,11 +1895,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
@@ -1891,7 +1908,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
@@ -1908,15 +1925,15 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
const char *displayname;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-24 14:12:20 +0000