From 5cfc547ba8dd953bf240e522d3a83c24b59d2ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hansen Kurli Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 16:50:55 +0800 Subject: Remove ppp Legacy VPNs are now removed. Bug: 161776767 Test: m Change-Id: I3935f91a705b912adff30856cf07f36abdd3688b --- pppd/chap_ms.c | 1015 -------------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1015 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 pppd/chap_ms.c (limited to 'pppd/chap_ms.c') diff --git a/pppd/chap_ms.c b/pppd/chap_ms.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3c0e52c..0000000 --- a/pppd/chap_ms.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1015 +0,0 @@ -/* - * chap_ms.c - Microsoft MS-CHAP compatible implementation. - * - * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -/* - * Modifications by Lauri Pesonen / lpesonen@clinet.fi, april 1997 - * - * Implemented LANManager type password response to MS-CHAP challenges. - * Now pppd provides both NT style and LANMan style blocks, and the - * prefered is set by option "ms-lanman". Default is to use NT. - * The hash text (StdText) was taken from Win95 RASAPI32.DLL. - * - * You should also use DOMAIN\\USERNAME as described in README.MSCHAP80 - */ - -/* - * Modifications by Frank Cusack, frank@google.com, March 2002. - * - * Implemented MS-CHAPv2 functionality, heavily based on sample - * implementation in RFC 2759. Implemented MPPE functionality, - * heavily based on sample implementation in RFC 3079. - * - * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - */ - -#define RCSID "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.38 2007/12/01 20:10:51 carlsonj Exp $" - -#ifdef CHAPMS - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "pppd.h" -#include "chap-new.h" -#include "chap_ms.h" -#if defined(__ANDROID__) -#include "openssl-hash.h" -#else -#include "md4.h" -#include "sha1.h" -#endif -#include "pppcrypt.h" -#include "magic.h" - -static const char rcsid[] = RCSID; - - -static void ascii2unicode __P((char[], int, u_char[])); -static void NTPasswordHash __P((u_char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE])); -static void ChallengeResponse __P((u_char *, u_char *, u_char[24])); -static void ChapMS_NT __P((u_char *, char *, int, u_char[24])); -static void ChapMS2_NT __P((u_char *, u_char[16], char *, char *, int, - u_char[24])); -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain - __P((char*, int, u_char[24], u_char[16], u_char *, - char *, u_char[41])); -#ifdef MSLANMAN -static void ChapMS_LANMan __P((u_char *, char *, int, u_char *)); -#endif - -#ifdef MPPE -static void Set_Start_Key __P((u_char *, char *, int)); -static void SetMasterKeys __P((char *, int, u_char[24], int)); -#endif - -#ifdef MSLANMAN -bool ms_lanman = 0; /* Use LanMan password instead of NT */ - /* Has meaning only with MS-CHAP challenges */ -#endif - -#ifdef MPPE -u_char mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; -u_char mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; -int mppe_keys_set = 0; /* Have the MPPE keys been set? */ - -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY -/* For MPPE debug */ -/* Use "[]|}{?/><,`!2&&(" (sans quotes) for RFC 3079 MS-CHAPv2 test value */ -static char *mschap_challenge = NULL; -/* Use "!@\#$%^&*()_+:3|~" (sans quotes, backslash is to escape #) for ... */ -static char *mschap2_peer_challenge = NULL; -#endif - -#include "fsm.h" /* Need to poke MPPE options */ -#include "ccp.h" -#include -#endif - -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -static option_t chapms_option_list[] = { -#ifdef MSLANMAN - { "ms-lanman", o_bool, &ms_lanman, - "Use LanMan passwd when using MS-CHAP", 1 }, -#endif -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - { "mschap-challenge", o_string, &mschap_challenge, - "specify CHAP challenge" }, - { "mschap2-peer-challenge", o_string, &mschap2_peer_challenge, - "specify CHAP peer challenge" }, -#endif - { NULL } -}; - -/* - * chapms_generate_challenge - generate a challenge for MS-CHAP. - * For MS-CHAP the challenge length is fixed at 8 bytes. - * The length goes in challenge[0] and the actual challenge starts - * at challenge[1]. - */ -static void -chapms_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) -{ - *challenge++ = 8; -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8) - memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8); - else -#endif - random_bytes(challenge, 8); -} - -static void -chapms2_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) -{ - *challenge++ = 16; -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16) - memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16); - else -#endif - random_bytes(challenge, 16); -} - -static int -chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name, - unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) -{ - unsigned char md[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN]; - int diff; - int challenge_len, response_len; - - challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 8 */ - response_len = *response++; - if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN) - goto bad; - -#ifndef MSLANMAN - if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) { - /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */ - notice("Peer request for LANMAN auth not supported"); - goto bad; - } -#endif - - /* Generate the expected response. */ - ChapMS(challenge, (char *)secret, secret_len, md); - -#ifdef MSLANMAN - /* Determine which part of response to verify against */ - if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) - diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], - &md[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN); - else -#endif - diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], &md[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], - MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN); - - if (diff == 0) { - slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); - return 1; - } - - bad: - /* See comments below for MS-CHAP V2 */ - slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0", - challenge_len, challenge); - return 0; -} - -static int -chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name, - unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) -{ - unsigned char md[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; - char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; - int challenge_len, response_len; - - challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 16 */ - response_len = *response++; - if (response_len != MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN) - goto bad; /* not even the right length */ - - /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */ - ChapMS2(challenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], name, - (char *)secret, secret_len, md, - (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); - - /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */ - /* - * Per RFC 2759, success message must be formatted as - * "S= M=" - * where - * is the Authenticator Response (mutual auth) - * is a text message - * - * However, some versions of Windows (win98 tested) do not know - * about the M= part (required per RFC 2759) and flag - * it as an error (reported incorrectly as an encryption error - * to the user). Since the RFC requires it, and it can be - * useful information, we supply it if the peer is a conforming - * system. Luckily (?), win98 sets the Flags field to 0x04 - * (contrary to RFC requirements) so we can use that to - * distinguish between conforming and non-conforming systems. - * - * Special thanks to Alex Swiridov for - * help debugging this. - */ - if (memcmp(&md[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], - MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) == 0) { - if (response[MS_CHAP2_FLAGS]) - slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s", saresponse); - else - slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s M=%s", - saresponse, "Access granted"); - return 1; - } - - bad: - /* - * Failure message must be formatted as - * "E=e R=r C=c V=v M=m" - * where - * e = error code (we use 691, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE) - * r = retry (we use 1, ok to retry) - * c = challenge to use for next response, we reuse previous - * v = Change Password version supported, we use 0 - * m = text message - * - * The M=m part is only for MS-CHAPv2. Neither win2k nor - * win98 (others untested) display the message to the user anyway. - * They also both ignore the E=e code. - * - * Note that it's safe to reuse the same challenge as we don't - * actually accept another response based on the error message - * (and no clients try to resend a response anyway). - * - * Basically, this whole bit is useless code, even the small - * implementation here is only because of overspecification. - */ - slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0 M=%s", - challenge_len, challenge, "Access denied"); - return 0; -} - -static void -chapms_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, - unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *private) -{ - challenge++; /* skip length, should be 8 */ - *response++ = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; - ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, response); -} - -struct chapms2_response_cache_entry { - int id; - unsigned char challenge[16]; - unsigned char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; - unsigned char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH]; -}; - -#define CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE 10 -static struct chapms2_response_cache_entry - chapms2_response_cache[CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE]; -static int chapms2_response_cache_next_index = 0; -static int chapms2_response_cache_size = 0; - -static void -chapms2_add_to_response_cache(int id, unsigned char *challenge, - unsigned char *response, - unsigned char *auth_response) -{ - int i = chapms2_response_cache_next_index; - - chapms2_response_cache[i].id = id; - memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].challenge, challenge, 16); - memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].response, response, - MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); - memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].auth_response, - auth_response, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH); - chapms2_response_cache_next_index = - (i + 1) % CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE; - if (chapms2_response_cache_next_index > chapms2_response_cache_size) - chapms2_response_cache_size = chapms2_response_cache_next_index; - dbglog("added response cache entry %d", i); -} - -static struct chapms2_response_cache_entry* -chapms2_find_in_response_cache(int id, unsigned char *challenge, - unsigned char *auth_response) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < chapms2_response_cache_size; i++) { - if (id == chapms2_response_cache[i].id - && (!challenge - || memcmp(challenge, - chapms2_response_cache[i].challenge, - 16) == 0) - && (!auth_response - || memcmp(auth_response, - chapms2_response_cache[i].auth_response, - MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) == 0)) { - dbglog("response found in cache (entry %d)", i); - return &chapms2_response_cache[i]; - } - } - return NULL; /* not found */ -} - -static void -chapms2_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, - unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *private) -{ - const struct chapms2_response_cache_entry *cache_entry; - unsigned char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; - - challenge++; /* skip length, should be 16 */ - *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; - cache_entry = chapms2_find_in_response_cache(id, challenge, NULL); - if (cache_entry) { - memcpy(response, cache_entry->response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); - return; - } - ChapMS2(challenge, -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - mschap2_peer_challenge, -#else - NULL, -#endif - our_name, secret, secret_len, response, auth_response, - MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE); - chapms2_add_to_response_cache(id, challenge, response, auth_response); -} - -static int -chapms2_check_success(int id, unsigned char *msg, int len) -{ - if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || - strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) { - /* Packet does not start with "S=" */ - error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); - return 0; - } - msg += 2; - len -= 2; - if (len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH - || !chapms2_find_in_response_cache(id, NULL /* challenge */, msg)) { - /* Authenticator Response did not match expected. */ - error("MS-CHAPv2 mutual authentication failed."); - return 0; - } - /* Authenticator Response matches. */ - msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */ - len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; - if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) { - msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */ - } else if (len) { - /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */ - error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static void -chapms_handle_failure(unsigned char *inp, int len) -{ - int err; - char *p, *msg; - - /* We want a null-terminated string for strxxx(). */ - msg = malloc(len + 1); - if (!msg) { - notice("Out of memory in chapms_handle_failure"); - return; - } - BCOPY(inp, msg, len); - msg[len] = 0; - p = msg; - - /* - * Deal with MS-CHAP formatted failure messages; just print the - * M= part (if any). For MS-CHAP we're not really supposed - * to use M=, but it shouldn't hurt. See - * chapms[2]_verify_response. - */ - if (!strncmp(p, "E=", 2)) - err = strtol(p+2, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ - else - goto print_msg; /* Message is badly formatted. */ - - if (len && ((p = strstr(p, " M=")) != NULL)) { - /* M= field found. */ - p += 3; - } else { - /* No M=; use the error code. */ - switch (err) { - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS: - p = "E=646 Restricted logon hours"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED: - p = "E=647 Account disabled"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED: - p = "E=648 Password expired"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION: - p = "E=649 No dialin permission"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE: - p = "E=691 Authentication failure"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD: - /* Should never see this, we don't support Change Password. */ - p = "E=709 Error changing password"; - break; - - default: - free(msg); - error("Unknown MS-CHAP authentication failure: %.*v", - len, inp); - return; - } - } -print_msg: - if (p != NULL) - error("MS-CHAP authentication failed: %v", p); - free(msg); -} - -static void -ChallengeResponse(u_char *challenge, - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char response[24]) -{ - u_char ZPasswordHash[21]; - - BZERO(ZPasswordHash, sizeof(ZPasswordHash)); - BCOPY(PasswordHash, ZPasswordHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - -#if 0 - dbglog("ChallengeResponse - ZPasswordHash %.*B", - sizeof(ZPasswordHash), ZPasswordHash); -#endif - - (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 0); - DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 0); - (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 7); - DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 8); - (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 14); - DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 16); - -#if 0 - dbglog("ChallengeResponse - response %.24B", response); -#endif -} - -void -ChallengeHash(u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge, - char *username, u_char Challenge[8]) - -{ - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char sha1Hash[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - char *user; - - /* remove domain from "domain\username" */ - if ((user = strrchr(username, '\\')) != NULL) - ++user; - else - user = username; - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, (unsigned char *)user, strlen(user)); - SHA1_Final(sha1Hash, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(sha1Hash, Challenge, 8); -} - -/* - * Convert the ASCII version of the password to Unicode. - * This implicitly supports 8-bit ISO8859/1 characters. - * This gives us the little-endian representation, which - * is assumed by all M$ CHAP RFCs. (Unicode byte ordering - * is machine-dependent.) - */ -static void -ascii2unicode(char ascii[], int ascii_len, u_char unicode[]) -{ - int i; - - BZERO(unicode, ascii_len * 2); - for (i = 0; i < ascii_len; i++) - unicode[i * 2] = (u_char) ascii[i]; -} - -static void -NTPasswordHash(u_char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) -{ -#if defined(__ANDROID__) - /* We link with MD4 routines in openssl, we have to take bytes instead */ - int mdlen = secret_len; -#else -#ifdef __NetBSD__ - /* NetBSD uses the libc md4 routines which take bytes instead of bits */ - int mdlen = secret_len; -#else - int mdlen = secret_len * 8; -#endif -#endif - MD4_CTX md4Context; - - MD4Init(&md4Context); - /* MD4Update can take at most 64 bytes at a time */ - while (mdlen > 512) { - MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, 512); - secret += 64; - mdlen -= 512; - } - MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, mdlen); - MD4Final(hash, &md4Context); - -} - -static void -ChapMS_NT(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - u_char NTResponse[24]) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - - ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); -} - -static void -ChapMS2_NT(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, - char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char Challenge[8]; - - ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); - - /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - - ChallengeResponse(Challenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); -} - -#ifdef MSLANMAN -static u_char *StdText = (u_char *)"KGS!@#$%"; /* key from rasapi32.dll */ - -static void -ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *response) -{ - int i; - u_char UcasePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD]; /* max is actually 14 */ - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* LANMan password is case insensitive */ - BZERO(UcasePassword, sizeof(UcasePassword)); - for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) - UcasePassword[i] = (u_char)toupper(secret[i]); - (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 0); - DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 0 ); - (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 7); - DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 8 ); - ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); -} -#endif - - -void -GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], - u_char *rchallenge, char *username, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) -{ - /* - * "Magic" constants used in response generation, from RFC 2759. - */ - u_char Magic1[39] = /* "Magic server to client signing constant" */ - { 0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, - 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65, - 0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, - 0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74 }; - u_char Magic2[41] = /* "Pad to make it do more than one iteration" */ - { 0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F, - 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, - 0x6E }; - - int i; - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char Challenge[8]; - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Digest, sizeof(Digest)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Challenge, sizeof(Challenge)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic2, sizeof(Magic2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */ - for (i = 0; i < MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), sizeof(Digest)); i++) - sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); -} - - -static void -GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain - (char *secret, int secret_len, - u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], - u_char *rchallenge, char *username, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), - PasswordHashHash); - - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, PeerChallenge, - rchallenge, username, authResponse); -} - - -#ifdef MPPE -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from the NTPasswordHashHash. - * RFC 2548 (RADIUS support) requires us to export this function (ugh). - */ -void -mppe_set_keys(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) -{ - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 8); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - /* Same key in both directions. */ - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); - - mppe_keys_set = 1; -} - -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAP credentials. (see RFC 3079) - */ -static void -Set_Start_Key(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - - mppe_set_keys(rchallenge, PasswordHashHash); -} - -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAPv2 credentials. (see RFC 3079) - * - * This helper function used in the Winbind module, which gets the - * NTHashHash from the server. - */ -void -mppe_set_keys2(u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) -{ - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char MasterKey[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - - u_char SHApad1[40] = - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - u_char SHApad2[40] = - { 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 }; - - /* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */ - u_char Magic1[27] = - { 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, - 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d, - 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 }; - /* "On the client side, this is the send key; " - "on the server side, it is the receive key." */ - u_char Magic2[84] = - { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, - 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, - 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; - /* "On the client side, this is the receive key; " - "on the server side, it is the send key." */ - u_char Magic3[84] = - { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, - 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; - u_char *s; - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - SHA1_Final(MasterKey, &sha1Context); - - /* - * generate send key - */ - if (IsServer) - s = Magic3; - else - s = Magic2; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); - - /* - * generate recv key - */ - if (IsServer) - s = Magic2; - else - s = Magic3; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); - - mppe_keys_set = 1; -} - -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAPv2 credentials. (see RFC 3079) - */ -static void -SetMasterKeys(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - mppe_set_keys2(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, IsServer); -} - -#endif /* MPPE */ - - -void -ChapMS(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *response) -{ - BZERO(response, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); - - ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP]); - -#ifdef MSLANMAN - ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, - &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); - - /* preferred method is set by option */ - response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = !ms_lanman; -#else - response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = 1; -#endif - -#ifdef MPPE - Set_Start_Key(rchallenge, secret, secret_len); -#endif -} - - -/* - * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and the PeerChallenge - * field of response is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. - * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into the PeerChallenge field. - * Call this way when verifying a response (or debugging). - * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response. - * - * The PeerChallenge field of response is then used for calculation of the - * Authenticator Response. - */ -void -ChapMS2(u_char *rchallenge, u_char *PeerChallenge, - char *user, char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *response, - u_char authResponse[], int authenticator) -{ - /* ARGSUSED */ - u_char *p = &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE]; - int i; - - BZERO(response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); - - /* Generate the Peer-Challenge if requested, or copy it if supplied. */ - if (!PeerChallenge) - for (i = 0; i < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN; i++) - *p++ = (u_char) (drand48() * 0xff); - else - BCOPY(PeerChallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], - MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); - - /* Generate the NT-Response */ - ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], user, - secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP]); - - /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */ - GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(secret, secret_len, - &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], - &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], - rchallenge, user, authResponse); - -#ifdef MPPE - SetMasterKeys(secret, secret_len, - &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], authenticator); -#endif -} - -#ifdef MPPE -/* - * Set MPPE options from plugins. - */ -void -set_mppe_enc_types(int policy, int types) -{ - /* Early exit for unknown policies. */ - if (policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED || - policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED) - return; - - /* Don't modify MPPE if it's optional and wasn't already configured. */ - if (policy == MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED && !ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe) - return; - - /* - * Disable undesirable encryption types. Note that we don't ENABLE - * any encryption types, to avoid overriding manual configuration. - */ - switch(types) { - case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40: - ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; /* disable 128-bit */ - break; - case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128: - ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; /* disable 40-bit */ - break; - default: - break; - } -} -#endif /* MPPE */ - -static struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest = { - CHAP_MICROSOFT, /* code */ - chapms_generate_challenge, - chapms_verify_response, - chapms_make_response, - NULL, /* check_success */ - chapms_handle_failure, -}; - -static struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest = { - CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2, /* code */ - chapms2_generate_challenge, - chapms2_verify_response, - chapms2_make_response, - chapms2_check_success, - chapms_handle_failure, -}; - -void -chapms_init(void) -{ - chap_register_digest(&chapms_digest); - chap_register_digest(&chapms2_digest); - add_options(chapms_option_list); -} - -#endif /* CHAPMS */ -- cgit v1.2.3