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Diffstat (limited to 'java/com/google/security/wycheproof/testcases/AesGcmTest.java')
-rw-r--r-- | java/com/google/security/wycheproof/testcases/AesGcmTest.java | 473 |
1 files changed, 473 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/java/com/google/security/wycheproof/testcases/AesGcmTest.java b/java/com/google/security/wycheproof/testcases/AesGcmTest.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e4a879 --- /dev/null +++ b/java/com/google/security/wycheproof/testcases/AesGcmTest.java @@ -0,0 +1,473 @@ +/** + * @license + * Copyright 2016 Google Inc. All rights reserved. + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package com.google.security.wycheproof; + +import com.google.security.wycheproof.WycheproofRunner.ExcludedTest; +import com.google.security.wycheproof.WycheproofRunner.ProviderType; +import com.google.security.wycheproof.WycheproofRunner.SlowTest; +import java.nio.ByteBuffer; +import java.security.AlgorithmParameterGenerator; +import java.security.AlgorithmParameters; +import java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException; +import java.security.InvalidKeyException; +import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException; +import java.security.SecureRandom; +import java.util.ArrayList; +import java.util.Arrays; +import javax.crypto.Cipher; +import javax.crypto.ShortBufferException; +import javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec; +import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec; +import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec; +import junit.framework.TestCase; + +// TODO(bleichen): +// - For EAX I was able to derive some special cases by inverting OMAC. +// Not sure if that is possible here. +/** + * Testing AES-GCM + * + * <p>Other tests using AES-GCM are: CipherInputStreamTest.java CipherOuputStreamTest.java + */ +public class AesGcmTest extends TestCase { + + /** Test vectors */ + public static class GcmTestVector { + final byte[] pt; + final byte[] aad; + final byte[] ct; + final String ptHex; + final String ctHex; + final GCMParameterSpec parameters; + final SecretKeySpec key; + final int nonceLengthInBits; + final int tagLengthInBits; + + public GcmTestVector( + String message, + String keyMaterial, + String nonce, + String aad, + String ciphertext, + String tag) { + this.ptHex = message; + this.pt = TestUtil.hexToBytes(message); + this.aad = TestUtil.hexToBytes(aad); + this.ct = TestUtil.hexToBytes(ciphertext + tag); + this.ctHex = ciphertext + tag; + this.tagLengthInBits = 4 * tag.length(); + this.nonceLengthInBits = 4 * nonce.length(); + this.parameters = new GCMParameterSpec(tagLengthInBits, TestUtil.hexToBytes(nonce)); + this.key = new SecretKeySpec(TestUtil.hexToBytes(keyMaterial), "AES"); + } + }; + + private static final GcmTestVector[] GCM_TEST_VECTORS = { + new GcmTestVector( + "001d0c231287c1182784554ca3a21908", + "5b9604fe14eadba931b0ccf34843dab9", + "028318abc1824029138141a2", + "", + "26073cc1d851beff176384dc9896d5ff", + "0a3ea7a5487cb5f7d70fb6c58d038554"), + new GcmTestVector( + "001d0c231287c1182784554ca3a21908", + "5b9604fe14eadba931b0ccf34843dab9", + "921d2507fa8007b7bd067d34", + "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff", + "49d8b9783e911913d87094d1f63cc765", + "1e348ba07cca2cf04c618cb4"), + new GcmTestVector( + "2035af313d1346ab00154fea78322105", + "aa023d0478dcb2b2312498293d9a9129", + "0432bc49ac34412081288127", + "aac39231129872a2", + "eea945f3d0f98cc0fbab472a0cf24e87", + "4bb9b4812519dadf9e1232016d068133"), + new GcmTestVector( + "2035af313d1346ab00154fea78322105", + "aa023d0478dcb2b2312498293d9a9129", + "0432bc49ac344120", + "aac39231129872a2", + "64c36bb3b732034e3a7d04efc5197785", + "b7d0dd70b00d65b97cfd080ff4b819d1"), + new GcmTestVector( + "02efd2e5782312827ed5d230189a2a342b277ce048462193", + "2034a82547276c83dd3212a813572bce", + "3254202d854734812398127a3d134421", + "1a0293d8f90219058902139013908190bc490890d3ff12a3", + "64069c2d58690561f27ee199e6b479b6369eec688672bde9", + "9b7abadd6e69c1d9ec925786534f5075"), + }; + + /** + * Returns the GCM test vectors supported by the current provider. + * This is necessary since not every provider supports all parameters sizes. + * For example SUNJCE does not support 8 byte tags and Conscrypt only supports + * 12 byte nonces. + * Such restrictions are often made because AES-GCM is a relatively weak algorithm and + * especially small parameter sizes can lead to easy attacks. + * Avoiding such small parameter sizes should not be seen as a bug in the library. + * + * <p>The only assumption we make here is that all test vectors with 128 bit tags and nonces + * with at least 96 bits are supported. + */ + private Iterable<GcmTestVector> getTestVectors() throws Exception { + ArrayList<GcmTestVector> supported = new ArrayList<GcmTestVector>(); + for (GcmTestVector test : GCM_TEST_VECTORS) { + if (test.nonceLengthInBits != 96 || test.tagLengthInBits != 128) { + try { + // Checks whether the parameter size is supported. + // It would be nice if there was a way to check this without trying to encrypt. + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + } catch (InvalidKeyException | InvalidAlgorithmParameterException ex) { + // Not supported + continue; + } + } + supported.add(test); + } + return supported; + } + + public void testVectors() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + byte[] ct = cipher.doFinal(test.pt); + assertEquals(test.ctHex, TestUtil.bytesToHex(ct)); + } + } + + /** + * Typically one should always call updateAAD before any call to update. This test checks what + * happens if the order is reversed. The test expects that a correct implementation either + * computes the tag correctly or throws an exception. + * + * <p>For example, OpenJdk did compute incorrect tags in this case. The bug has been fixed in + * http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk8u/jdk8u/jdk/rev/89c06ca1e6cc + * + * <p>For example BouncyCastle computes correct tags if the calls are reversed, SunJCE and OpenJdk + * now throw exceptions. + */ + public void testLateUpdateAAD() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + byte[] c0 = cipher.update(test.pt); + try { + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + } catch (java.lang.IllegalStateException ex) { + // Throwing an exception is valid behaviour. + continue; + } + byte[] c1 = cipher.doFinal(); + String result = TestUtil.bytesToHex(c0) + TestUtil.bytesToHex(c1); + assertEquals(test.ctHex, result); + } + } + + /** + * JCE has a dangerous feature: after a doFinal the cipher is typically reinitialized using the + * previous IV. This "feature" can easily break AES-GCM usages, because encrypting twice with + * the same key and IV leaks the authentication key. Hence any reasonable implementation of + * AES-GCM should not allow this. The expected behaviour of OpenJDK can be derived from the tests + * in jdk/test/com/sun/crypto/provider/Cipher/AES/TestGCMKeyAndIvCheck.java. + * OpenJDK does not allow two consecutive initializations for encryption with the same key and IV. + * + * <p>The test here is weaker than the restrictions in OpenJDK. The only requirement here is that + * reusing a Cipher without an explicit init() is caught. + * + * <p>BouncyCastle 1.52 failed this test + * + * <p>Conscrypt failed this test + */ + public void testIvReuse() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + byte[] ct1 = cipher.doFinal(test.pt); + try { + byte[] ct2 = cipher.doFinal(test.pt); + fail( + "It should not possible to reuse an IV." + + " ct1:" + + TestUtil.bytesToHex(ct1) + + " ct2:" + + TestUtil.bytesToHex(ct2)); + } catch (java.lang.IllegalStateException ex) { + // This is expected. + } + } + } + + /** Encryption with ByteBuffers. */ + public void testByteBuffer() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + // Encryption + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + ByteBuffer ptBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(test.pt); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + int outputSize = cipher.getOutputSize(test.pt.length); + ByteBuffer ctBuffer = ByteBuffer.allocate(outputSize); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ptBuffer, ctBuffer); + assertEquals(test.ctHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(ctBuffer)); + + // Decryption + ctBuffer.flip(); + cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + outputSize = cipher.getOutputSize(test.ct.length); + ByteBuffer decrypted = ByteBuffer.allocate(outputSize); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ctBuffer, decrypted); + assertEquals(test.ptHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(decrypted)); + } + } + + /** Encryption with ByteBuffers should be copy-safe. */ + public void testByteBufferAlias() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + // Encryption + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + int outputSize = cipher.getOutputSize(test.pt.length); + byte[] backingArray = new byte[outputSize]; + ByteBuffer ptBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(backingArray); + ptBuffer.put(test.pt); + ptBuffer.flip(); + ByteBuffer ctBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(backingArray); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ptBuffer, ctBuffer); + assertEquals(test.ctHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(ctBuffer)); + + // Decryption + ByteBuffer decrypted = ByteBuffer.wrap(backingArray); + ctBuffer.flip(); + cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ctBuffer, decrypted); + assertEquals(test.ptHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(decrypted)); + } + } + + public void testReadOnlyByteBuffer() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + // Encryption + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + ByteBuffer ptBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(test.pt).asReadOnlyBuffer(); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + int outputSize = cipher.getOutputSize(test.pt.length); + ByteBuffer ctBuffer = ByteBuffer.allocate(outputSize); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ptBuffer, ctBuffer); + assertEquals(test.ctHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(ctBuffer)); + + // Decryption + ctBuffer.flip(); + ctBuffer = ctBuffer.asReadOnlyBuffer(); + cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + outputSize = cipher.getOutputSize(test.ct.length); + ByteBuffer decrypted = ByteBuffer.allocate(outputSize); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ctBuffer, decrypted); + assertEquals(test.ptHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(decrypted)); + } + } + + /** + * If a ByteBuffer is backed by an array and not readonly, then it is possible to access the data + * through the .array() method. An implementation using this possiblity must ensure that it + * considers the offset. + */ + public void testByteBufferWithOffset() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + // Encryption + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + ByteBuffer ptBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(new byte[test.pt.length + 50]); + ptBuffer.position(5); + ptBuffer = ptBuffer.slice(); + ptBuffer.put(test.pt); + ptBuffer.flip(); + + ByteBuffer ctBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(new byte[test.ct.length + 50]); + ctBuffer.position(8); + ctBuffer = ctBuffer.slice(); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ptBuffer, ctBuffer); + assertEquals(test.ctHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(ctBuffer)); + ctBuffer.flip(); + + // Decryption + ByteBuffer decBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(new byte[test.pt.length + 50]); + decBuffer.position(6); + decBuffer = decBuffer.slice(); + cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + cipher.doFinal(ctBuffer, decBuffer); + assertEquals(test.ptHex, TestUtil.byteBufferToHex(decBuffer)); + } + } + + public void testByteBufferTooShort() throws Exception { + for (GcmTestVector test : getTestVectors()) { + // Encryption + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + ByteBuffer ptBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(test.pt); + ByteBuffer ctBuffer = ByteBuffer.allocate(test.ct.length - 1); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + try { + cipher.doFinal(ptBuffer, ctBuffer); + fail("This should not work"); + } catch (ShortBufferException ex) { + // expected + } + + // Decryption + ctBuffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(test.ct); + ByteBuffer decrypted = ByteBuffer.allocate(test.pt.length - 1); + cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, test.key, test.parameters); + cipher.updateAAD(test.aad); + try { + cipher.doFinal(ctBuffer, decrypted); + fail("This should not work"); + } catch (ShortBufferException ex) { + // expected + } + } + } + + /** + * The default authentication tag size should be 128-bit by default for the following reasons: + * <br> + * (1) Security: Ferguson, N., Authentication Weaknesses in GCM, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web + * page], http://www.csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/ + * CWC-GCM/Ferguson2.pdf, May 20, 2005. This paper points out that a n-bit tag has lower strength + * than expected. <br> + * (2) Compatibility: Assume an implementer tests some code using one provider than switches to + * another provider. Such a switch should ideally not lower the security. <br> + * Conscrypt used to have only 12-byte authentication tag (b/26186727). + */ + public void testDefaultTagSizeIvParameterSpec() throws Exception { + byte[] counter = new byte[12]; + byte[] input = new byte[16]; + byte[] key = new byte[16]; + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + try { + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"), new IvParameterSpec(counter)); + } catch (InvalidAlgorithmParameterException ex) { + // OpenJDK8 does not support IvParameterSpec for GCM. + System.out.println("testDefaultTagSizeIvParameterSpec:" + ex.toString()); + return; + } + byte[] output = cipher.doFinal(input); + assertEquals(input.length + 16, output.length); + } + + /** + * The default authentication tag size should be 128-bit by default for the following reasons: + * <br> + * (1) Security: Ferguson, N., Authentication Weaknesses in GCM, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web + * page], http://www.csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/ + * CWC-GCM/Ferguson2.pdf, May 20, 2005. This paper points out that a n-bit tag has lower strength + * than expected. <br> + * (2) Compatibility: Assume an implementer tests some code using one provider than switches to + * another provider. Such a switch should ideally not lower the security. <br> + * BouncyCastle used to have only 12-byte authentication tag (b/26186727). + */ + public void testDefaultTagSizeAlgorithmParameterGenerator() throws Exception { + byte[] input = new byte[10]; + byte[] key = new byte[16]; + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + try { + AlgorithmParameterGenerator.getInstance("GCM"); + } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException ex) { + // Conscrypt does not support AlgorithmParameterGenerator for GCM. + System.out.println("testDefaultTagSizeAlgorithmParameterGenerator:" + ex.toString()); + return; + } + AlgorithmParameters param = AlgorithmParameterGenerator.getInstance("GCM").generateParameters(); + cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"), param); + byte[] output = cipher.doFinal(input); + assertEquals(input.length + 16, output.length); + } + + /** + * Test AES-GCM wrapped around counter bug which leaks plaintext and authentication key. Let's + * consider 12-byte IV, counter = IV || 0^31 || 1. For each encryption block, the last 4 bytes of + * the counter is increased by 1. After 2^32 blocks, the counter will be wrapped around causing + * counter collision and hence, leaking plaintext and authentication key as explained below. The + * library must make a check to make sure that the plaintext's length never exceeds 2^32 - 2 + * blocks. Note that this is different from usual IV collisions because it happens even if users + * use different IVs. <br> + * We have: <br> + * J0 = IV || 0^31 || 1 <br> + * Plaintext: P[0], P[1], P[2], .... <br> + * Ciphertext: <br> + * C[0] = Enc(K, (J0 + 1) % 2^32) XOR P[0] <br> + * C[1] = Enc(K, (J0 + 2) % 2^32) XOR P[1] <br> + * C[2] = Enc(K, (J0 + 3) % 2^32) XOR P[2] <br> + * ... <br> + * C[2^32 - 1] = Enc(K, J0) XOR P[2^32 - 1] <br> + * C[2^32] = Enc(K, (J0 + 1)% 2^32) XOR P[2^32] <br> + * It means that after 2^32 blocks, the counter is wrapped around causing counter collisions. In + * counter mode, once the counter is collided then it's reasonable to assume that the plaintext is + * leaked. As the ciphertext is already known to attacker, Enc(K, J0) is leaked. <br> + * Now, as the authentication tag T is computed as GHASH(H, {}, C) XOR E(K, J0), the attacker can + * learn GHASH(H, {}, C}. It essentially means that the attacker finds a polynomial where H is the + * root (see Joux attack http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf). + * Solving polynomial equation in GF(2^128) is enough to extract the authentication key. + * + * <p>BouncyCastle used to have this bug (CVE-2015-6644). + * + * <p>OpenJDK8 used to have this bug (http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk8u/jdk8u/jdk/rev/0c3ed12cdaf5) + * + * <p>The test is slow as we have to encrypt 2^32 blocks. + */ + // TODO(quannguyen): Is there a faster way to test it? +/* + @ExcludedTest( + providers = {ProviderType.CONSCRYPT}, + comment = "Conscrypt doesn't support streaming, would crash") + @SlowTest( + providers = {ProviderType.BOUNCY_CASTLE, ProviderType.SPONGY_CASTLE, ProviderType.OPENJDK}) + public void testWrappedAroundCounter() throws Exception { + try { + byte[] iv = new byte[12]; + byte[] input = new byte[16]; + byte[] key = new byte[16]; + (new SecureRandom()).nextBytes(key); + Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding"); + cipher.init( + Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"), new GCMParameterSpec(16 * 8, iv)); + byte[] output = cipher.update(input); + for (long i = 0; i < 4294967296L + 2; i++) { + byte[] output1 = cipher.update(input); + assertFalse("GCM Wrapped Around Counter" + i, Arrays.equals(output, output1)); + } + fail("Expected Exception"); + } catch (Exception expected) { + System.out.println("testWrappedAroundcounter:" + expected.toString()); + } + } +*/ +} |