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Bug: 22914603
Change-Id: I7650f1b691665bce3024556c2ea38e122c9cb2cf
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We no longer test the keymaster1 interface. That's okay, because it
will be gone shortly.
Change-Id: Id30c2fcda5d535165a0081a783b2252c112e5474
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SoftKeymasterDevice was incorrectly directly sending deletion requests
to wrapped hardware. In some cases the key blob passed in by
SoftKeymasterDevice is a hardware blob encapsulated by a wrapper, and we
need to remove the encapsulation before passing it on.
Bug: 25676862
Change-Id: Ic315c6b08d9ec15aa0be8f28f485a221bc7f1135
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Also, ensure that we always put some error on the OpenSSL error queue
whenever a wrapped keymaster0 operation fails. Higher layers will look
a the last entry on the queue and use it to determine what error code to
return. Not putting any error on the queue means that those higher
layers will get whatever error was last enqueued, making the result
effectively random. Non-determinism bad.
Bug: 25337630
Change-Id: I701ab735dd089f5258b2252f543906d9f3baa7a2
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Change-Id: Ic78b0fa12bda1cd361fd505e13002651861c72ef
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The keymaster1 specification only requires HW modules to implement
SHA256 out of the list of keymaster1 digest modes. That would force
many keys to be software only, and would break legacy scenarios. This
change uses SoftKeymasterDevice to front keymaster modules that don't
implement the full suite of digests, quietly inserting KM_DIGEST_NONE
and KM_PAD_NONE into key generation/import requests when necessary, then
performing the digesting, and sometimes padding, in software, then
delegating crypto operations to the hardware.
This is only done for RSA and EC keys. Software digesting isn't
possible for HMAC or AES-GCM keys.
Note that this is not the complete fix for the bug. Some changes in
keystore are also required, coming in another CL.
Bug: 24873723
Change-Id: I740572eb11341fb0659085309da01d5cbcd3854d
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When RSA messages that are shorter than the key size, and padding is not
applied, BoringSSL (sensbibly) refuses, because odds are very high that
the caller is doing something dumb. However, this causes some (dumb)
things that used to work to no longer work.
This CL also fixes the error code returned when a message is signed or
encrypted which is the same length as the public modulus but is
numerically larger than or equal to the public modulus. Rather than
KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, it now returns KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT.
Bug: 22599805
Change-Id: I99aca5516b092f3676ffdc6c5de39f2777e3d275
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unknown.""" into mnc-dev
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This reverts commit 0e0cea3bc8aea903a50c1ee18e9f3309e9f67515.
Bug: 22511313
Change-Id: I9c31b8ef604d961e20652c69498324b9dfce5911
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KM_DIGEST_NONE and KM_PAD_NONE have implicit meanings of "any digest"
and "any padding", respectively, as well as the expected meanings of "no
digest" and "no padding". This CL changes that so they mean only "no
digest" and "no padding".
Bug: 22556114
Change-Id: I7b0b4c079067d85ba1aa39ae7edf0c6b17a9a500
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This reverts commit 9972a539acb4d17368ee607465d61b48acd71bde.
Change-Id: Id5beb9c8ae8f3b106adc5f5e62eca0194b926be8
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This is for compatibility with Bouncy Castle.
Bug: 22492259
Change-Id: I753e5fd223404ba960b6a35862bbd20f519f369b
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Bug: 22511313
Change-Id: I699df8010e27a546b2186896890c0099bfb149ae
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HMAC and AES-GCM keys must be bound to a mininum MAC/tag length at
creation, and operations may not specify a length smaller than the
minimum, or provide a length smaller than the minimum during
verification.
Bug: 22337277
Change-Id: Id5ae2f4259045ba1418c28e9de8f4a47e67fd433
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Bug: 22405614
Change-Id: Ia5eb67a571a9d46acca4b4e708bb8178bd3acd0d
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BoringSSL doesn't pre-truncate too-long digests before calling the ECDSA
sign operation via the ENGINE interface, and TrustyKeymaster is picky
about accepting them. This means that trying to sign a message with,
say, a 256-bit key and a 384-bit hash fails on Volantis.
This CL also corrects an error in get_supported_digests for ECDSA, which
was advertising support for MD5. BoringSSL doesn't support ECDSA with
MD5 and we're not offering it in the JCA API, so the solution is simply
not to advertise it and to return a better error code if it's requested
anyway.
Bug: 22355708
Change-Id: Iba2dad6953db7eda23951760b734f499a13c5191
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Bug: 22301168
Change-Id: I54b4efffa1786b08704dd6e785360870f155ed80
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Bug: 22229156
Change-Id: I5de66c3ed86244452e7776bff9523e35030713e9
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KM_DIGEST_NONE should mean "any digest" when applied to HMAC keys,
allowing any valid digest to be specified during begin() of an HMAC
signature or verification operation.
Bug: 22119295
Change-Id: I4698435f5d7aaf0a2f66b9c7aa4097f60c9c6eb3
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Note: Moving List.h into system/keymaster is unfortunate, but required
to allow Trusty to use it. b/22088154 tracks cleaning this up.
Bug: 19511945
Change-Id: Ia1dfe5fda5ea78935611b0a7656b323770edcbae
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Also fix an RSA error message.
Bug: 22064177
Change-Id: If52b29a3e870e0318d9ecc0f124074a013cb491a
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Bug: 21998286
Change-Id: I03b21da6a71b7a7a01f3743f01925719191b0124
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Bug: 21955742
Change-Id: I4385a6539229b174facd5f04ce0391e2e8c3608d
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Bug: 21877150
Change-Id: Iaf00c94aaca892a154aea7aa4e3828bfbd8d9630
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Also, handle AAD correctly.
Bug: 21786749
Change-Id: I26a413f39daf3bd946ed494c7c3b5c6f559fb30b
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This support was inadvertently removed in a refactor. There aren't many
of these keys around, since they were only created by pre-release
verions of Nexus 9 software, but we'll support them anyway.
Change-Id: I46c4e9a2866c02b8030d7aef97bb64c45441168b
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Bug: 21777596
Change-Id: I3574156902c8e28b42f36462a9aef3f11ce938d3
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Also adds -Wunused to bring gcc's -Werror inline with clang's to prevent
similar build errors later.
Bug:21583577
Change-Id: Ia051adbb3ea92a8ace914ad958a73348d70cca17
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Bug: 21593823
Change-Id: Id9ed06b1c6805b1cff36577910715eda7727eef4
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Bug: 19919114
Change-Id: I27efed097efbd93d587a50f5d82fad80a96e7527
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Bug: 21499189
Change-Id: I895e566f769691f70f431b2ed139e0c94b0f6ab9
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Also switch to using the EVP APIs where possible for RSA ops.
Change-Id: I092a5c7598073980d36ce5137cfe17f0499a10b9
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Also, switch to useing the EVP API rather than the ECDSA API.
Bug: 21048758
Change-Id: I088b3332285ce2060cac5a7282ec42bea2fa5950
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Bug: 20912868
Change-Id: If63899e3244aed45d939d0165e6d94a1caa9d220
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Change-Id: I3b98c0e0463efcbe3d7498a2f71353ed669a11d9
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Bug: 20912868
Change-Id: I515a125f1247357d2cd9b4633c3b223590848093
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This enabled running the same test suite across different
implementations.
Bug: 20912868
Change-Id: Iaa2c4bcb38224d090aa54184a042375eb835ad60
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Change-Id: I0fdfe3223b351d4a064e5dac0aa5d732fa0ab073
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This reverts commit 13fbe3e93247943c26e7ca2ed27b6d650282b8bf.
Bug: 20912868, 19799085
Change-Id: Iadd6ce5cbe94956c2a2fe277f1bf5b108e4bcf57
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This reverts commit 8ba2a043f0d44ad3f58d4af518f9391c03eca9c3.
I need to update the Volantis non-secure code in sync. Reverting while I get that done.
Change-Id: I0fb9f928e7e624ad678050a04bb873b43b1c9a48
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AndroidKeymaster made a number of assumptions about its context that are
really only valid for TEE-based usage. In addition, KeyFactory made
some similarly TEE-focused assumptions about key blob creation and
parsing.
Both concerns have been moved to a new KeymasterContext class, which is
responsible for building and parsing key blobs in a manner appropriate
for the context in which AndroidKeymaster is running, as well as
providing other context-specific services, such as random number
generation.
In addition, the refactor reduces the need for the KeyBlob and
UnencryptedKeyBlob classes, which encode too many assumptions about blob
formatting and encryption, to the point that they can be removed and
replaced by a handful of utility functions which are much cleaner and
more flexible.
How to review this CL:
I looked hard at breaking this up into smaller CLs, but it's mostly not
feasible. However, it's probably easier to approach it by starting with
the fundamental changes, and then looking at the cascade effects.
1. Look at keymaster_context.h. The core of the change was pulling this
set of features out of AndroidKeymaster. Note that the revised approach
to key blob creation does not involve the KeyBlob and UnencryptedKeyBlob
classes, but instead goes directly from raw key material plus ancillary
data (e.g. auth sets) to a serialized buffer ready to return to
keystore. The same is true in reverse direction for parsing key blobs.
2. Look at key.h. The revised KeyFactory GenerateKey, ImportKey and
LoadKey methods are essential. GenerateKey and ImportKey no longer
produce a Key object, because all that's needed is a returnable blob.
LoadKey produces a Key object, but it starts with raw key material,
rather than an UnencryptedKeyBlob. Also note the change to the Key
class; because Key objects are only created by LoadKey, when there's a
need to use a key, there's only one constructor.
3. Look at asymmetric_key.h, rsa_key.h and rsa_key.cpp. rsa_key.cpp
provides a good example of how the new structure works. GenerateKey and
ImportKey do all of the work necessary to produce an OpenSSL RSA key and
extract the internal representation (using EvpToKeyMaterial; defined in
asymmetric_key.h because it's the same for EC keys). Then, with the raw
key data in hand, they call KeymasterContext::CreateKeyBlob to wrap the
key data in a key blob that can be returned to the caller -- whatever
that wrapping means in the current context. There's a subtlety not
apparent here which is crucial to the rationale for the refactoring:
RsaKeyFactory uses KeymasterContext::get_instance to retrieve the
context, but key factories which depend on operating in a particular
context can use a different way to get their context object, which may
have a larger interface. RsaKeymaster0KeyFactory will do this.
4. Look at soft_keymaster_context. In
particular, SoftKeymasterContext::CreateKeyBlob and ParseKeyBlob.
CreateKeyBlob allocates authorization tags from key_description to
hw_enforced and sw_enforced, then encrypts the key material and
serializes it to a blob. This approach is compatible with the keys
softkeymaster has been producing, but I'm going to change it (post M),
because there's no reason to bother encrypting SW keys with a SW key.
ParseKeyBlob reverses the process to recover the unencrypted key
material and the auth lists. One debatable point was the decision to
implement BuildHiddenAuthorizations and SetAuthorizations here, since
all contexts will need something similar, and they really should all do
it the same. I may refactor later to pull that functionality up to
KeymasterContext; it will depend on what I learn implementing
TrustyKeymasterContext and HybridKeymasterContext (used for the
keymaster0 adapter).
5. Look at ocb_utils and auth_encrypted_key_blob. These contain the key
encryption and key blob serialization code which was formerly split
between AndroidKeymaster::SerializeKeyBlob, UnencryptedKeyBlob and
KeyBlob, now divided into separate encryption and serialization
utilities. Note the refactored key_blob_test.cpp, updated to use the
new utilities rather than UnencryptedKeyBlob.
6. Look at soft_keymaster_device.cpp. Since KeyBlob no longer exists to
provide a nice way to peer into a blob to extract the algorithm, for use
in determining how to parse the keymaster0 signing key params (which
come in as a void*, yuck), we now have to use get_key_characteristics to
recover the params. This was the right way all along; the device layer
should not depend on being able to parse key blobs.
7. The rest.
Bug: 20912868, 19799085
Change-Id: Ieb74b8da39974f674eb8baa959bde75011fdd2e8
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Change-Id: I05de61353fc806b90232fab7c1d1cf76aefa35fc
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