diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vtls/openssl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/vtls/openssl.c | 1110 |
1 files changed, 736 insertions, 374 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c index 760758d23..28a1ae6da 100644 --- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c +++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| * - * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2020, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. * * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms @@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ #include <limits.h> +/* Wincrypt must be included before anything that could include OpenSSL. */ +#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO) +#include <wincrypt.h> +/* Undefine wincrypt conflicting symbols for BoringSSL. */ +#undef X509_NAME +#undef X509_EXTENSIONS +#undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL +#undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO +#undef OCSP_REQUEST +#undef OCSP_RESPONSE +#endif + #include "urldata.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */ @@ -41,11 +53,13 @@ #include "slist.h" #include "select.h" #include "vtls.h" +#include "keylog.h" #include "strcase.h" #include "hostcheck.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "strerror.h" #include "curl_printf.h" + #include <openssl/ssl.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/x509v3.h> @@ -142,10 +156,6 @@ #endif #endif -#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER -#define OpenSSL_version_num() LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER -#endif - #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \ !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) @@ -190,6 +200,10 @@ !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)) #define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES #define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH +/* SET_EC_CURVES available under the same preconditions: see + * https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_groups.html + */ +#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES #endif #if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) @@ -211,29 +225,17 @@ "ALL:!EXPORT:!EXPORT40:!EXPORT56:!aNULL:!LOW:!RC4:@STRENGTH" #endif -#define ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE - -#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE -typedef struct ssl_tap_state { - int master_key_length; - unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; -} ssl_tap_state_t; -#endif /* ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE */ - struct ssl_backend_data { /* these ones requires specific SSL-types */ SSL_CTX* ctx; SSL* handle; X509* server_cert; -#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE - /* tap_state holds the last seen master key if we're logging them */ - ssl_tap_state_t tap_state; +#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK + /* Set to true once a valid keylog entry has been created to avoid dupes. */ + bool keylog_done; #endif }; -#define BACKEND connssl->backend - /* * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have @@ -242,57 +244,27 @@ struct ssl_backend_data { */ #define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024 -#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE -/* The fp for the open SSLKEYLOGFILE, or NULL if not open */ -static FILE *keylog_file_fp; - #ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK static void ossl_keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) { (void)ssl; - /* Using fputs here instead of fprintf since libcurl's fprintf replacement - may not be thread-safe. */ - if(keylog_file_fp && line && *line) { - char stackbuf[256]; - char *buf; - size_t linelen = strlen(line); - - if(linelen <= sizeof(stackbuf) - 2) - buf = stackbuf; - else { - buf = malloc(linelen + 2); - if(!buf) - return; - } - memcpy(buf, line, linelen); - buf[linelen] = '\n'; - buf[linelen + 1] = '\0'; - - fputs(buf, keylog_file_fp); - if(buf != stackbuf) - free(buf); - } + Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line); } #else -#define KEYLOG_PREFIX "CLIENT_RANDOM " -#define KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(KEYLOG_PREFIX) - 1) /* - * tap_ssl_key is called by libcurl to make the CLIENT_RANDOMs if the OpenSSL - * being used doesn't have native support for doing that. + * ossl_log_tls12_secret is called by libcurl to make the CLIENT_RANDOMs if the + * OpenSSL being used doesn't have native support for doing that. */ -static void tap_ssl_key(const SSL *ssl, ssl_tap_state_t *state) +static void +ossl_log_tls12_secret(const SSL *ssl, bool *keylog_done) { - const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF"; - int pos, i; - char line[KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 + - 2 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + 1 + 1]; const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int master_key_length = 0; - if(!session || !keylog_file_fp) + if(!session || *keylog_done) return; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \ @@ -311,44 +283,17 @@ static void tap_ssl_key(const SSL *ssl, ssl_tap_state_t *state) } #endif + /* The handshake has not progressed sufficiently yet, or this is a TLS 1.3 + * session (when curl was built with older OpenSSL headers and running with + * newer OpenSSL runtime libraries). */ if(master_key_length <= 0) return; - /* Skip writing keys if there is no key or it did not change. */ - if(state->master_key_length == master_key_length && - !memcmp(state->master_key, master_key, master_key_length) && - !memcmp(state->client_random, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { - return; - } - - state->master_key_length = master_key_length; - memcpy(state->master_key, master_key, master_key_length); - memcpy(state->client_random, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - - memcpy(line, KEYLOG_PREFIX, KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN); - pos = KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN; - - /* Client Random for SSLv3/TLS */ - for(i = 0; i < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; i++) { - line[pos++] = hex[client_random[i] >> 4]; - line[pos++] = hex[client_random[i] & 0xF]; - } - line[pos++] = ' '; - - /* Master Secret (size is at most SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) */ - for(i = 0; i < master_key_length; i++) { - line[pos++] = hex[master_key[i] >> 4]; - line[pos++] = hex[master_key[i] & 0xF]; - } - line[pos++] = '\n'; - line[pos] = '\0'; - - /* Using fputs here instead of fprintf since libcurl's fprintf replacement - may not be thread-safe. */ - fputs(line, keylog_file_fp); + *keylog_done = true; + Curl_tls_keylog_write("CLIENT_RANDOM", client_random, + master_key, master_key_length); } #endif /* !HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK */ -#endif /* ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE */ static const char *SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err) { @@ -392,11 +337,20 @@ static const char *SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err) */ static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size) { + if(size) + *buf = '\0'; + #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL ERR_error_string_n((uint32_t)error, buf, size); #else ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size); #endif + + if(size > 1 && !*buf) { + strncpy(buf, (error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"), size); + buf[size - 1] = '\0'; + } + return buf; } @@ -613,12 +567,138 @@ static bool is_pkcs11_uri(const char *string) static CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine); +static int +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *in, int type, + const char *key_passwd) +{ + int ret = 0; + X509 *x = NULL; + + if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { + /* j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; */ + x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL); + } + else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { + /* ERR_R_PEM_LIB; */ + x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, + passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd); + } + else { + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + + if(x == NULL) { + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + + ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x); + end: + X509_free(x); + return ret; +} + +static int +SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO* in, int type, + const char *key_passwd) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + + if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) + pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, passwd_callback, + (void *)key_passwd); + else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) + pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); + else { + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + if(pkey == NULL) { + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + end: + return ret; +} + +static int +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO* in, + const char *key_passwd) +{ +/* SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.2 */ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* OpenSSL 1.0.2 or later */ \ + !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ + (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2090100fL)) /* LibreSSL 2.9.1 or later */ + int ret = 0; + X509 *x = NULL; + void *passwd_callback_userdata = (void *)key_passwd; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, + passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd); + + if(x == NULL) { + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + + ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x); + + if(ERR_peek_error() != 0) + ret = 0; + + if(ret) { + X509 *ca; + unsigned long err; + + if(!SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx)) { + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + + while((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback, + passwd_callback_userdata)) + != NULL) { + + if(!SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) { + X509_free(ca); + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + } + + err = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if((ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM) && + (ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) + ERR_clear_error(); + else + ret = 0; + } + + end: + X509_free(x); + return ret; +#else + (void)ctx; /* unused */ + (void)in; /* unused */ + (void)key_passwd; /* unused */ + return 0; +#endif +} + static int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, SSL_CTX* ctx, char *cert_file, + BIO *cert_bio, const char *cert_type, char *key_file, + BIO* key_bio, const char *key_type, char *key_passwd) { @@ -628,10 +708,11 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type); - if(cert_file || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) { + if(cert_file || cert_bio || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) { SSL *ssl; X509 *x509; int cert_done = 0; + int cert_use_result; if(key_passwd) { /* set the password in the callback userdata */ @@ -644,8 +725,10 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, switch(file_type) { case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM: /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */ - if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, - cert_file) != 1) { + cert_use_result = cert_bio ? + SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_bio(ctx, cert_bio, key_passwd) : + SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file); + if(cert_use_result != 1) { failf(data, "could not load PEM client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE " error %s, " @@ -660,9 +743,12 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with ASN1 files. */ - if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, - cert_file, - file_type) != 1) { + + cert_use_result = cert_bio ? + SSL_CTX_use_certificate_bio(ctx, cert_bio, + file_type, key_passwd) : + SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, file_type); + if(cert_use_result != 1) { failf(data, "could not load ASN1 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE " error %s, " @@ -742,27 +828,31 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, PKCS12 *p12 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pri; STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL; + if(!cert_bio) { + fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + if(fp == NULL) { + failf(data, + "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE + " error %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer)) ); + return 0; + } - fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); - if(fp == NULL) { - failf(data, - "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE - " error %s", - ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, - sizeof(error_buffer)) ); - return 0; + if(BIO_read_filename(fp, cert_file) <= 0) { + failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file); + BIO_free(fp); + return 0; + } } - if(BIO_read_filename(fp, cert_file) <= 0) { - failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file); + p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(cert_bio ? cert_bio : fp, NULL); + if(fp) BIO_free(fp); - return 0; - } - p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(fp, NULL); - BIO_free(fp); if(!p12) { - failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file); + failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", + cert_bio ? "(memory blob)" : cert_file); return 0; } @@ -843,8 +933,10 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, return 0; } - if(!key_file) + if((!key_file) && (!key_bio)) { key_file = cert_file; + key_bio = cert_bio; + } else file_type = do_file_type(key_type); @@ -854,9 +946,12 @@ int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1: - if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) { + cert_use_result = key_bio ? + SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_bio(ctx, key_bio, file_type, key_passwd) : + SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type); + if(cert_use_result != 1) { failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s", - key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM"); + key_file?key_file:"(memory blob)", key_type?key_type:"PEM"); return 0; } break; @@ -1016,10 +1111,6 @@ static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size) */ static int Curl_ossl_init(void) { -#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE - char *keylog_file_name; -#endif - OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(); #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE @@ -1052,26 +1143,7 @@ static int Curl_ossl_init(void) OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE - if(!keylog_file_fp) { - keylog_file_name = curl_getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE"); - if(keylog_file_name) { - keylog_file_fp = fopen(keylog_file_name, FOPEN_APPENDTEXT); - if(keylog_file_fp) { -#ifdef WIN32 - if(setvbuf(keylog_file_fp, NULL, _IONBF, 0)) -#else - if(setvbuf(keylog_file_fp, NULL, _IOLBF, 4096)) -#endif - { - fclose(keylog_file_fp); - keylog_file_fp = NULL; - } - } - Curl_safefree(keylog_file_name); - } - } -#endif + Curl_tls_keylog_open(); /* Initialize the extra data indexes */ if(ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0) @@ -1114,12 +1186,7 @@ static void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void) #endif #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE - if(keylog_file_fp) { - fclose(keylog_file_fp); - keylog_file_fp = NULL; - } -#endif + Curl_tls_keylog_close(); } /* @@ -1264,19 +1331,19 @@ static struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data) return list; } - static void ossl_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl) { - if(BACKEND->handle) { - (void)SSL_shutdown(BACKEND->handle); - SSL_set_connect_state(BACKEND->handle); + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; + if(backend->handle) { + (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle); + SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle); - SSL_free(BACKEND->handle); - BACKEND->handle = NULL; + SSL_free(backend->handle); + backend->handle = NULL; } - if(BACKEND->ctx) { - SSL_CTX_free(BACKEND->ctx); - BACKEND->ctx = NULL; + if(backend->ctx) { + SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx); + backend->ctx = NULL; } } @@ -1286,7 +1353,9 @@ static void ossl_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl) static void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) { ossl_close(&conn->ssl[sockindex]); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY ossl_close(&conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex]); +#endif } /* @@ -1305,6 +1374,7 @@ static int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) int buffsize; int err; bool done = FALSE; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code @@ -1313,10 +1383,10 @@ static int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */ if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE) - (void)SSL_shutdown(BACKEND->handle); + (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle); #endif - if(BACKEND->handle) { + if(backend->handle) { buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf); while(!done) { int what = SOCKET_READABLE(conn->sock[sockindex], @@ -1326,8 +1396,8 @@ static int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close notify alert from the server */ - nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(BACKEND->handle, buf, buffsize); - err = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, (int)nread); + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize); + err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ @@ -1372,7 +1442,7 @@ static int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(data->set.verbose) { #ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN - switch(SSL_get_shutdown(BACKEND->handle)) { + switch(SSL_get_shutdown(backend->handle)) { case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN: infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n"); break; @@ -1387,8 +1457,8 @@ static int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) #endif } - SSL_free(BACKEND->handle); - BACKEND->handle = NULL; + SSL_free(backend->handle); + backend->handle = NULL; } return retval; } @@ -1512,10 +1582,8 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert) CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */ bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */ - const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name : - conn->host.name; - const char * const dispname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? - conn->http_proxy.host.dispname : conn->host.dispname; + const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME(); + const char * const dispname = SSL_HOST_DISPNAME(); #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip && @@ -1573,7 +1641,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert) type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII" It has been however verified that in 0.9.6 and 0.9.7, IA5String - is always zero-terminated. + is always null-terminated. */ if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) && /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name @@ -1707,13 +1775,13 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct connectdata *conn, const unsigned char *p; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; - OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; X509_STORE *st = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; - long len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(BACKEND->handle, &status); + long len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(backend->handle, &status); if(!status) { failf(data, "No OCSP response received"); @@ -1743,8 +1811,8 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct connectdata *conn, goto end; } - ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(BACKEND->handle); - st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx); + ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle); + st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx); #if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \ (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ @@ -1820,7 +1888,8 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct connectdata *conn, } end: - if(br) OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); + if(br) + OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return result; @@ -2207,7 +2276,6 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct connectdata *conn) curl_ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max); /* convert cURL max SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */ - ossl_ssl_version_max = 0; switch(curl_ssl_version_max) { case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0: ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_VERSION; @@ -2266,7 +2334,7 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION { struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; - SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(BACKEND->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION); + SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(backend->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION); *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; } #else @@ -2394,27 +2462,28 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME bool sni; - const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name : - conn->host.name; + const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME(); + #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 struct in6_addr addr; #else struct in_addr addr; #endif #endif - long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? - &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version); -#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype); #endif - char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert); + char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert); + const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.cert_blob); const char * const ssl_cert_type = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type); const char * const ssl_cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile); const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath); const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer); const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile); char error_buffer[256]; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; + bool imported_native_ca = false; DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state); @@ -2423,7 +2492,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(result) return result; - *certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK; + SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = !X509_V_OK; /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */ @@ -2447,7 +2516,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv2 support"); return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #else -#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; #endif @@ -2460,7 +2529,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv3 support"); return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #else -#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; #endif @@ -2473,25 +2542,25 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - if(BACKEND->ctx) - SSL_CTX_free(BACKEND->ctx); - BACKEND->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method); + if(backend->ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx); + backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method); - if(!BACKEND->ctx) { + if(!backend->ctx) { failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_peek_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer))); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } #ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS - SSL_CTX_set_mode(BACKEND->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); + SSL_CTX_set_mode(backend->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); #endif #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) { /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */ - SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_tls_trace); - SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(BACKEND->ctx, conn); + SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(backend->ctx, ssl_tls_trace); + SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(backend->ctx, conn); } #endif @@ -2557,8 +2626,8 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* "--sslv2" option means SSLv2 only, disable all others */ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L /* 1.1.0 */ - SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(BACKEND->ctx, SSL2_VERSION); - SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(BACKEND->ctx, SSL2_VERSION); + SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(backend->ctx, SSL2_VERSION); + SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(backend->ctx, SSL2_VERSION); #else ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; @@ -2575,8 +2644,8 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* "--sslv3" option means SSLv3 only, disable all others */ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L /* 1.1.0 */ - SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(BACKEND->ctx, SSL3_VERSION); - SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(BACKEND->ctx, SSL3_VERSION); + SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(backend->ctx, SSL3_VERSION); + SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(backend->ctx, SSL3_VERSION); #else ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; @@ -2603,7 +2672,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */ - result = set_ssl_version_min_max(BACKEND->ctx, conn); + result = set_ssl_version_min_max(backend->ctx, conn); #else result = set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(&ctx_options, conn, sockindex); #endif @@ -2616,11 +2685,11 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - SSL_CTX_set_options(BACKEND->ctx, ctx_options); + SSL_CTX_set_options(backend->ctx, ctx_options); #ifdef HAS_NPN if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn) - SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(BACKEND->ctx, select_next_proto_cb, conn); + SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(backend->ctx, select_next_proto_cb, conn); #endif #ifdef HAS_ALPN @@ -2629,8 +2698,11 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) unsigned char protocols[128]; #ifdef USE_NGHTTP2 - if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 && - (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)) { + if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + && (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy) +#endif + ) { protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN; memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, @@ -2648,14 +2720,37 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire * format */ - SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(BACKEND->ctx, protocols, cur); + SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(backend->ctx, protocols, cur); } #endif - if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_type) { - if(!cert_stuff(conn, BACKEND->ctx, ssl_cert, ssl_cert_type, - SSL_SET_OPTION(key), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_type), - SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd))) { + if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_blob || ssl_cert_type) { + BIO *ssl_cert_bio = NULL; + BIO *ssl_key_bio = NULL; + int result_cert_stuff; + if(ssl_cert_blob) { + /* the typecast of blob->len is fine since it is guaranteed to never be + larger than CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH */ + ssl_cert_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(ssl_cert_blob->data, + (int)ssl_cert_blob->len); + if(!ssl_cert_bio) + return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + } + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_blob)) { + ssl_key_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_blob)->data, + (int)SSL_SET_OPTION(key_blob)->len); + if(!ssl_key_bio) + return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + } + result_cert_stuff = cert_stuff(conn, backend->ctx, + ssl_cert, ssl_cert_bio, ssl_cert_type, + SSL_SET_OPTION(key), ssl_key_bio, + SSL_SET_OPTION(key_type), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)); + if(ssl_cert_bio) + BIO_free(ssl_cert_bio); + if(ssl_key_bio) + BIO_free(ssl_key_bio); + if(!result_cert_stuff) { /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */ return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; } @@ -2665,7 +2760,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(!ciphers) ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION; if(ciphers) { - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(BACKEND->ctx, ciphers)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, ciphers)) { failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -2676,7 +2771,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) { char *ciphers13 = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list13); if(ciphers13) { - if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(BACKEND->ctx, ciphers13)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(backend->ctx, ciphers13)) { failf(data, "failed setting TLS 1.3 cipher suite: %s", ciphers13); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -2687,27 +2782,39 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) #ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH /* OpenSSL 1.1.1 requires clients to opt-in for PHA */ - SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(BACKEND->ctx, 1); + SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(backend->ctx, 1); #endif -#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES + { + char *curves = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(curves); + if(curves) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(backend->ctx, curves)) { + failf(data, "failed setting curves list: '%s'", curves); + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + } + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) { char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username); infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", ssl_username); - if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_username)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(backend->ctx, ssl_username)) { failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name"); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } - if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(BACKEND->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) { failf(data, "failed setting SRP password"); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) { infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n"); - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(BACKEND->ctx, "SRP")) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, "SRP")) { failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list"); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -2715,19 +2822,195 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) } #endif + +#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO) + /* Import certificates from the Windows root certificate store if requested. + https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9507184/ + https://github.com/d3x0r/SACK/blob/master/src/netlib/ssl_layer.c#L1037 + https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 */ + if((SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) || SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) && + (SSL_SET_OPTION(native_ca_store))) { + X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx); + HCERTSTORE hStore = CertOpenSystemStore((HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY)NULL, + TEXT("ROOT")); + + if(hStore) { + PCCERT_CONTEXT pContext = NULL; + /* The array of enhanced key usage OIDs will vary per certificate and is + declared outside of the loop so that rather than malloc/free each + iteration we can grow it with realloc, when necessary. */ + CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *enhkey_usage = NULL; + DWORD enhkey_usage_size = 0; + + /* This loop makes a best effort to import all valid certificates from + the MS root store. If a certificate cannot be imported it is skipped. + 'result' is used to store only hard-fail conditions (such as out of + memory) that cause an early break. */ + result = CURLE_OK; + for(;;) { + X509 *x509; + FILETIME now; + BYTE key_usage[2]; + DWORD req_size; + const unsigned char *encoded_cert; +#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) + char cert_name[256]; +#endif + + pContext = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pContext); + if(!pContext) + break; + +#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) + if(!CertGetNameStringA(pContext, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, + NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) { + strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown"); + } + infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"\n", cert_name); +#endif + + encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded; + if(!encoded_cert) + continue; + + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&now); + if(CompareFileTime(&pContext->pCertInfo->NotBefore, &now) > 0 || + CompareFileTime(&now, &pContext->pCertInfo->NotAfter) > 0) + continue; + + /* If key usage exists check for signing attribute */ + if(CertGetIntendedKeyUsage(pContext->dwCertEncodingType, + pContext->pCertInfo, + key_usage, sizeof(key_usage))) { + if(!(key_usage[0] & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE)) + continue; + } + else if(GetLastError()) + continue; + + /* If enhanced key usage exists check for server auth attribute. + * + * Note "In a Microsoft environment, a certificate might also have EKU + * extended properties that specify valid uses for the certificate." + * The call below checks both, and behavior varies depending on what is + * found. For more details see CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage doc. + */ + if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, NULL, &req_size)) { + if(req_size && req_size > enhkey_usage_size) { + void *tmp = realloc(enhkey_usage, req_size); + + if(!tmp) { + failf(data, "SSL: Out of memory allocating for OID list"); + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + break; + } + + enhkey_usage = (CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *)tmp; + enhkey_usage_size = req_size; + } + + if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, enhkey_usage, &req_size)) { + if(!enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier) { + /* "If GetLastError returns CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND, the certificate is + good for all uses. If it returns zero, the certificate has no + valid uses." */ + if((HRESULT)GetLastError() != CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND) + continue; + } + else { + DWORD i; + bool found = false; + + for(i = 0; i < enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier; ++i) { + if(!strcmp("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1" /* OID server auth */, + enhkey_usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i])) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + + if(!found) + continue; + } + } + else + continue; + } + else + continue; + + x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &encoded_cert, pContext->cbCertEncoded); + if(!x509) + continue; + + /* Try to import the certificate. This may fail for legitimate reasons + such as duplicate certificate, which is allowed by MS but not + OpenSSL. */ + if(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509) == 1) { +#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) + infof(data, "SSL: Imported cert \"%s\"\n", cert_name); +#endif + imported_native_ca = true; + } + X509_free(x509); + } + + free(enhkey_usage); + CertFreeCertificateContext(pContext); + CertCloseStore(hStore, 0); + + if(result) + return result; + } + if(imported_native_ca) + infof(data, "successfully imported windows ca store\n"); + else + infof(data, "error importing windows ca store, continuing anyway\n"); + } +#endif + +#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3) + /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */ + { + if(ssl_cafile) { + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) { + if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */ + infof(data, "error setting certificate file, continuing anyway\n"); + } + infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n", ssl_cafile); + } + if(ssl_capath) { + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) { + if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */ + infof(data, "error setting certificate path, continuing anyway\n"); + } + infof(data, " CApath: %s\n", ssl_capath); + } + } +#else if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) { /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify the servers certificate. */ - if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) { - if(verifypeer) { + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) { + if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) { /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ - failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:\n" - " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s", + failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:" + " CAfile: %s CApath: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; } - /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification + /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification is required. */ infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations," " continuing anyway:\n"); @@ -2736,24 +3019,23 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* Everything is fine. */ infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n"); } - infof(data, - " CAfile: %s\n" - " CApath: %s\n", - ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", - ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); + infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none"); + infof(data, " CApath: %s\n", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); } +#endif + #ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK - else if(verifypeer) { + if(verifypeer && !ssl_cafile && !ssl_capath && !imported_native_ca) { /* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't work so use openssl's built in default as fallback */ - SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(BACKEND->ctx); + SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(backend->ctx); } #endif if(ssl_crlfile) { /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate * revocation */ - lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx), + lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx), X509_LOOKUP_file()); if(!lookup || (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, ssl_crlfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) { @@ -2762,37 +3044,50 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) } /* Everything is fine. */ infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n"); - X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx), + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", ssl_crlfile); } - /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid - problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. Newer versions of - OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which gives us the same - fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we prefer that if - available. - https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest - */ -#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !defined(X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS) if(verifypeer) { - X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx), + /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid + problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. Newer versions of + OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default but we do not know how to + determine that in a reliable manner. + https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest + */ +#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx), X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); - } #endif +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN + if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(no_partialchain) && !ssl_crlfile) { + /* Have intermediate certificates in the trust store be treated as + trust-anchors, in the same way as self-signed root CA certificates + are. This allows users to verify servers using the intermediate cert + only, instead of needing the whole chain. + + Due to OpenSSL bug https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5081 we + cannot do partial chains with CRL check. + */ + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx), + X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN); + } +#endif + } /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */ - SSL_CTX_set_verify(BACKEND->ctx, + SSL_CTX_set_verify(backend->ctx, verifypeer ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); /* Enable logging of secrets to the file specified in env SSLKEYLOGFILE. */ -#if defined(ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE) && defined(HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK) - if(keylog_file_fp) { - SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(BACKEND->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback); +#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK + if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { + SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback); } #endif @@ -2800,14 +3095,16 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to avoid that OpenSSL creates * an internal session cache. */ - SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(BACKEND->ctx, + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(backend->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); - SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(BACKEND->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(backend->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb); /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { - result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, BACKEND->ctx, + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, backend->ctx, data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); if(result) { failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback"); return result; @@ -2815,10 +3112,10 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) } /* Lets make an SSL structure */ - if(BACKEND->handle) - SSL_free(BACKEND->handle); - BACKEND->handle = SSL_new(BACKEND->ctx); - if(!BACKEND->handle) { + if(backend->handle) + SSL_free(backend->handle); + backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx); + if(!backend->handle) { failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!"); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } @@ -2826,23 +3123,23 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) - SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(BACKEND->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); + SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(backend->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && defined(ALLOW_RENEG) - SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(BACKEND->handle, ssl_renegotiate_freely); + SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(backend->handle, ssl_renegotiate_freely); #endif - SSL_set_connect_state(BACKEND->handle); + SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle); - BACKEND->server_cert = 0x0; + backend->server_cert = 0x0; #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) && #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) && #endif sni && - !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(BACKEND->handle, hostname)) + !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(backend->handle, hostname)) infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) " "TLS extension\n"); #endif @@ -2856,14 +3153,14 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0) { /* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback. * The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */ - SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, connectdata_idx, conn); - SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, sockindex_idx, conn->sock + sockindex); + SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, connectdata_idx, conn); + SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx, conn->sock + sockindex); } Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn); if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) { /* we got a session id, use it! */ - if(!SSL_set_session(BACKEND->handle, ssl_sessionid)) { + if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, @@ -2876,6 +3173,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); } +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) { BIO *const bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); SSL *handle = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle; @@ -2883,9 +3181,11 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) DEBUGASSERT(handle != NULL); DEBUGASSERT(bio != NULL); BIO_set_ssl(bio, handle, FALSE); - SSL_set_bio(BACKEND->handle, bio, bio); + SSL_set_bio(backend->handle, bio, bio); } - else if(!SSL_set_fd(BACKEND->handle, (int)sockfd)) { + else +#endif + if(!SSL_set_fd(backend->handle, (int)sockfd)) { /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer))); @@ -2902,26 +3202,28 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; int err; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; - long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? - &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state); ERR_clear_error(); - err = SSL_connect(BACKEND->handle); - /* If keylogging is enabled but the keylog callback is not supported then log - secrets here, immediately after SSL_connect by using tap_ssl_key. */ -#if defined(ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE) && !defined(HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK) - tap_ssl_key(BACKEND->handle, &BACKEND->tap_state); + err = SSL_connect(backend->handle); +#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK + if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { + /* If key logging is enabled, wait for the handshake to complete and then + * proceed with logging secrets (for TLS 1.2 or older). + */ + ossl_log_tls12_secret(backend->handle, &backend->keylog_done); + } #endif /* 1 is fine 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled" <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */ if(1 != err) { - int detail = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, err); + int detail = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, err); if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) { connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading; @@ -2958,12 +3260,13 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail); if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) && - (reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED)) { + ((reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED) || + (reason == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED))) { result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(BACKEND->handle); + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle); if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { - *certverifyresult = lerr; + SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = lerr; msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), "SSL certificate problem: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr)); @@ -2985,11 +3288,19 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) * the SO_ERROR is also lost. */ if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) { - const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? - conn->http_proxy.host.name : conn->host.name; + const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME(); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY const long int port = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->port : conn->remote_port; +#else + const long int port = conn->remote_port; +#endif + char extramsg[80]=""; + int sockerr = SOCKERRNO; + if(sockerr && detail == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) + Curl_strerror(sockerr, extramsg, sizeof(extramsg)); failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_connect: %s in connection to %s:%ld ", - SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail), hostname, port); + extramsg[0] ? extramsg : SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail), + hostname, port); return result; } @@ -3005,8 +3316,8 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* Informational message */ infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n", - get_ssl_version_txt(BACKEND->handle), - SSL_get_cipher(BACKEND->handle)); + get_ssl_version_txt(backend->handle), + SSL_get_cipher(backend->handle)); #ifdef HAS_ALPN /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was @@ -3015,7 +3326,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) { const unsigned char *neg_protocol; unsigned int len; - SSL_get0_alpn_selected(BACKEND->handle, &neg_protocol, &len); + SSL_get0_alpn_selected(backend->handle, &neg_protocol, &len); if(len != 0) { infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", len, neg_protocol); @@ -3065,7 +3376,7 @@ do { \ Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \ if(1 != BIO_reset(mem)) \ break; \ -} WHILE_FALSE +} while(0) static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data, BIO *mem, @@ -3097,31 +3408,28 @@ do { \ if(_type->_name) { \ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \ } \ -} WHILE_FALSE +} while(0) #endif -static int X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data, +static void X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data, int certnum, CONST_EXTS STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts) { int i; - size_t j; if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0) /* no extensions, bail out */ - return 1; + return; for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); BUF_MEM *biomem; - char buf[512]; - char *ptr = buf; char namebuf[128]; BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if(!bio_out) - return 1; + return; obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); @@ -3131,26 +3439,10 @@ static int X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data, ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext)); BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem); - - for(j = 0; j < (size_t)biomem->length; j++) { - const char *sep = ""; - if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') { - sep = ", "; - j++; /* skip the newline */ - }; - while((j<(size_t)biomem->length) && (biomem->data[j] == ' ')) - j++; - if(j<(size_t)biomem->length) - ptr += msnprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep, - biomem->data[j]); - } - - Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf); - + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, namebuf, biomem->data, + biomem->length); BIO_free(bio_out); - } - return 0; /* all is fine */ } #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL @@ -3169,8 +3461,9 @@ static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn, struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; numcert_t numcerts; BIO *mem; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; - sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(BACKEND->handle); + sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle); if(!sk) { return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } @@ -3453,16 +3746,15 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, char error_buffer[256]=""; char buffer[2048]; const char *ptr; - long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? - &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */ (void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl); - BACKEND->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(BACKEND->handle); - if(!BACKEND->server_cert) { + backend->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(backend->handle); + if(!backend->server_cert) { BIO_free(mem); if(!strict) return CURLE_OK; @@ -3473,19 +3765,19 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, infof(data, "%s certificate:\n", SSL_IS_PROXY() ? "Proxy" : "Server"); - rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(BACKEND->server_cert), + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(backend->server_cert), buffer, sizeof(buffer)); infof(data, " subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS { long len; - ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(BACKEND->server_cert)); + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(backend->server_cert)); len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr); infof(data, " start date: %.*s\n", len, ptr); (void)BIO_reset(mem); - ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(BACKEND->server_cert)); + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(backend->server_cert)); len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr); infof(data, " expire date: %.*s\n", len, ptr); (void)BIO_reset(mem); @@ -3495,15 +3787,15 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, BIO_free(mem); if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) { - result = verifyhost(conn, BACKEND->server_cert); + result = verifyhost(conn, backend->server_cert); if(result) { - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; return result; } } - rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(BACKEND->server_cert), + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(backend->server_cert), buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if(rc) { if(strict) @@ -3517,27 +3809,32 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, deallocating the certificate. */ /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */ - if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) { - fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); - if(fp == NULL) { - failf(data, - "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE - " error %s", - ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, - sizeof(error_buffer)) ); - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert) || SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)) { + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)) + fp = BIO_new_mem_buf(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)->data, + (int)SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)->len); + else { + fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + if(fp == NULL) { + failf(data, + "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE + " error %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer)) ); + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } - if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) <= 0) { - if(strict) - failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)", - SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); - BIO_free(fp); - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; - return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) <= 0) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)", + SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); + BIO_free(fp); + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } } issuer = PEM_read_bio_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL); @@ -3547,19 +3844,19 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); BIO_free(fp); X509_free(issuer); - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; } - if(X509_check_issued(issuer, BACKEND->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) { + if(X509_check_issued(issuer, backend->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) { if(strict) failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)", SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); BIO_free(fp); X509_free(issuer); - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; } @@ -3569,9 +3866,9 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, X509_free(issuer); } - lerr = *certverifyresult = SSL_get_verify_result(BACKEND->handle); - - if(*certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) { + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle); + SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = lerr; + if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) { /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */ @@ -3594,8 +3891,8 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) { result = verifystatus(conn, connssl); if(result) { - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; return result; } } @@ -3608,13 +3905,13 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, ptr = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY] : data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_ORIG]; if(!result && ptr) { - result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, BACKEND->server_cert, ptr); + result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, backend->server_cert, ptr); if(result) failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!"); } - X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); - BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(backend->server_cert); + backend->server_cert = NULL; connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; return result; @@ -3655,7 +3952,6 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; - timediff_t timeout_ms; int what; /* check if the connection has already been established */ @@ -3666,7 +3962,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) { /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */ - timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); if(timeout_ms < 0) { /* no need to continue if time already is up */ @@ -3684,7 +3980,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) { /* check allowed time left */ - timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); if(timeout_ms < 0) { /* no need to continue if time already is up */ @@ -3702,7 +3998,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd, - nonblocking?0:(time_t)timeout_ms); + nonblocking?0:timeout_ms); if(what < 0) { /* fatal error */ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO); @@ -3781,14 +4077,15 @@ static bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn, int connindex) { const struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[connindex]; - const struct ssl_connect_data *proxyssl = &conn->proxy_ssl[connindex]; - if(connssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(connssl->backend->handle)) return TRUE; - - if(proxyssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(proxyssl->backend->handle)) - return TRUE; - +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + { + const struct ssl_connect_data *proxyssl = &conn->proxy_ssl[connindex]; + if(proxyssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(proxyssl->backend->handle)) + return TRUE; + } +#endif return FALSE; } @@ -3808,14 +4105,15 @@ static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn, int memlen; int rc; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; ERR_clear_error(); memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len; - rc = SSL_write(BACKEND->handle, mem, memlen); + rc = SSL_write(backend->handle, mem, memlen); if(rc <= 0) { - err = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, rc); + err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, rc); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: @@ -3826,18 +4124,33 @@ static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn, *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; return -1; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: - Curl_strerror(SOCKERRNO, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); - failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s", error_buffer); - *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; - return -1; + { + int sockerr = SOCKERRNO; + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + if(sslerror) + ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + else if(sockerr) + Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + else { + strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer)); + error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0'; + } + failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d", + error_buffer, sockerr); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + } case SSL_ERROR_SSL: /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */ sslerror = ERR_get_error(); if(ERR_GET_LIB(sslerror) == ERR_LIB_SSL && ERR_GET_REASON(sslerror) == SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET && - conn->ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete && - conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete) { + conn->ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + && conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete +#endif + ) { char ver[120]; Curl_ossl_version(ver, 120); failf(conn->data, "Error: %s does not support double SSL tunneling.", @@ -3870,14 +4183,15 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ ssize_t nread; int buffsize; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[num]; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; ERR_clear_error(); buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize; - nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(BACKEND->handle, buf, buffsize); + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize); if(nread <= 0) { /* failed SSL_read */ - int err = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, (int)nread); + int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ @@ -3894,11 +4208,6 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; return -1; - case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: - Curl_strerror(SOCKERRNO, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); - failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s", error_buffer); - *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - return -1; default: /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */ @@ -3907,14 +4216,44 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ if((nread < 0) || sslerror) { /* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the queue */ + int sockerr = SOCKERRNO; + if(sslerror) + ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + else if(sockerr && err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) + Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + else { + strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer)); + error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0'; + } failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d", - (sslerror ? - ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)) : - SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)), - SOCKERRNO); + error_buffer, sockerr); + *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + return -1; + } + /* For debug builds be a little stricter and error on any + SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. For example a server may have closed the connection + abruptly without a close_notify alert. For compatibility with older + peers we don't do this by default. #4624 + + We can use this to gauge how many users may be affected, and + if it goes ok eventually transition to allow in dev and release with + the newest OpenSSL: #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) */ +#ifdef DEBUGBUILD + if(err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { + int sockerr = SOCKERRNO; + if(sockerr) + Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + else { + msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), + "Connection closed abruptly"); + } + failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d" + " (Fatal because this is a curl debug build)", + error_buffer, sockerr); *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; return -1; } +#endif } } return nread; @@ -3922,13 +4261,35 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ static size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL +#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER +#if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070100fL + return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx", + OSSL_PACKAGE, + (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xf, + (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff, + (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff); +#else /* OpenSSL_version() first appeared in LibreSSL 2.7.1 */ + char *p; + int count; + const char *ver = OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION); + const char expected[] = OSSL_PACKAGE " "; /* ie "LibreSSL " */ + if(Curl_strncasecompare(ver, expected, sizeof(expected) - 1)) { + ver += sizeof(expected) - 1; + } + count = msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s", OSSL_PACKAGE, ver); + for(p = buffer; *p; ++p) { + if(ISSPACE(*p)) + *p = '_'; + } + return count; +#endif +#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) return msnprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE); #elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION) && defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING) return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s", OSSL_PACKAGE, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING)); #else - /* not BoringSSL and not using OpenSSL_version */ + /* not LibreSSL, BoringSSL and not using OpenSSL_version */ char sub[3]; unsigned long ssleay_value; @@ -4013,7 +4374,7 @@ static CURLcode Curl_ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */ unsigned int len = 0; (void) unused; - mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, tmp, tmplen); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, sha256sum, &len); @@ -4036,8 +4397,9 @@ static void *Curl_ossl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, CURLINFO info) { /* Legacy: CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION must return an SSL_CTX pointer. */ + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; return info == CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION ? - (void *)BACKEND->ctx : (void *)BACKEND->handle; + (void *)backend->ctx : (void *)backend->handle; } const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = { |