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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vtls/openssl.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/vtls/openssl.c183
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 95 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
index 8af23b783..a1baef9c3 100644
--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
-/* SET_EC_CURVES available under the same preconditions: see
+/* SET_EC_CURVES is available under the same preconditions: see
* https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_groups.html
*/
#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@
#endif
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
-/* up2date versions of OpenSSL maintain the default reasonably secure without
- * breaking compatibility, so it is better not to override the default by curl
+/* up2date versions of OpenSSL maintain reasonably secure defaults without
+ * breaking compatibility, so it is better not to override the defaults in curl
*/
#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION NULL
#else
@@ -227,6 +227,10 @@
#endif
#endif
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
+#define HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT 1
+#endif
+
struct ssl_backend_data {
struct Curl_easy *logger; /* transfer handle to pass trace logs to, only
using sockindex 0 */
@@ -435,18 +439,21 @@ static bool rand_enough(void)
static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
- char fname[256];
-
/* This might get called before it has been added to a multi handle */
if(data->multi && data->multi->ssl_seeded)
return CURLE_OK;
if(rand_enough()) {
- /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ will return here */
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ should return here */
if(data->multi)
data->multi->ssl_seeded = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT
+ /* with OpenSSL 1.1.0+, a failed RAND_status is a showstopper */
+ failf(data, "Insufficient randomness");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#else
#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
/* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
@@ -507,19 +514,23 @@ static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2);
} while(!rand_enough());
- /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
- fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
- RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
- if(fname[0]) {
- /* we got a file name to try */
- RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
- if(rand_enough())
- return CURLE_OK;
+ {
+ /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
+ char fname[256];
+ fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
+ RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
+ if(fname[0]) {
+ /* we got a file name to try */
+ RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(rand_enough())
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
}
infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!");
return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK :
- CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
+ CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
+#endif
}
#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
@@ -1192,7 +1203,7 @@ static int ossl_init(void)
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
#endif
- /* Lets get nice error messages */
+ /* Let's get nice error messages */
SSL_load_error_strings();
/* Init the global ciphers and digests */
@@ -1769,7 +1780,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
/* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
- UTF8 etc. */
+ UTF8, etc. */
if(i >= 0) {
ASN1_STRING *tmp =
@@ -2060,6 +2071,10 @@ static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
case SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return "Encrypted Extensions";
#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
+ case SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
+ return "Supplemental data";
+#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
case SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return "End of early data";
@@ -2158,7 +2173,7 @@ static void ossl_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
/* Log progress for interesting records only (like Handshake or Alert), skip
* all raw record headers (content_type == SSL3_RT_HEADER or ssl_ver == 0).
- * For TLS 1.3, skip notification of the decrypted inner Content Type.
+ * For TLS 1.3, skip notification of the decrypted inner Content-Type.
*/
if(ssl_ver
#ifdef SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
@@ -2299,7 +2314,7 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct connectdata *conn)
long curl_ssl_version_min = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
long curl_ssl_version_max;
- /* convert cURL min SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
+ /* convert curl min SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
@@ -2329,7 +2344,7 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct connectdata *conn)
We don't want to pass 0 to SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version as
it would enable all versions down to the lowest supported by
the library.
- So we skip this, and stay with the OS default
+ So we skip this, and stay with the library default
*/
if(curl_ssl_version_min != CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) {
if(!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_min)) {
@@ -2340,7 +2355,7 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct connectdata *conn)
/* ... then, TLS max version */
curl_ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
- /* convert cURL max SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
+ /* convert curl max SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
switch(curl_ssl_version_max) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_VERSION;
@@ -2489,6 +2504,7 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
bool incache;
+ bool added = FALSE;
void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
@@ -2507,9 +2523,11 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
if(!incache) {
if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
- 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) {
- /* the session has been put into the session cache */
- res = 1;
+ 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex, &added)) {
+ if(added) {
+ /* the session has been put into the session cache */
+ res = 1;
+ }
}
else
failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
@@ -2523,7 +2541,7 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
static CURLcode load_cacert_from_memory(SSL_CTX *ctx,
const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob)
{
- /* these need freed at the end */
+ /* these need to be freed at the end */
BIO *cbio = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf = NULL;
@@ -2658,8 +2676,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
- if(backend->ctx)
- SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
+ DEBUGASSERT(!backend->ctx);
backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
if(!backend->ctx) {
@@ -2681,23 +2698,23 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
}
#endif
- /* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various
+ /* OpenSSL contains code to work around lots of bugs and flaws in various
SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
implementations is desired."
- The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
+ The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8j. It's a flag to
disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
into the proper RFC5077 it seems: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
- libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
- the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your
+ libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. Also, sending
+ the session data is some overhead. I suggest that you just use your
proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
- If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to
+ If someone writes an application with libcurl and OpenSSL who wants to
enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
@@ -2733,7 +2750,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
- /* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we
+ /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability we
use the work-around */
if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast))
ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
@@ -2933,7 +2950,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) {
strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown");
}
- infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert %s\"\n", cert_name);
+ infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"", cert_name);
#endif
encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded;
@@ -3030,9 +3047,9 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
return result;
}
if(imported_native_ca)
- infof(data, "successfully imported windows ca store");
+ infof(data, "successfully imported Windows CA store");
else
- infof(data, "error importing windows ca store, continuing anyway");
+ infof(data, "error importing Windows CA store, continuing anyway");
}
#endif
@@ -3044,77 +3061,53 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
failf(data, "error importing CA certificate blob");
return result;
}
- /* Only warning if no certificate verification is required. */
+ /* Only warn if no certificate verification is required. */
infof(data, "error importing CA certificate blob, continuing anyway");
}
}
+ if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca && (ssl_cafile || ssl_capath)) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
/* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */
- {
- if(ssl_cafile) {
- if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) {
- if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
- /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
- /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */
- infof(data, "error setting certificate file, continuing anyway");
- }
- infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile);
+ if(ssl_cafile &&
+ !SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
- if(ssl_capath) {
- if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) {
- if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
- /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
- /* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */
- infof(data, "error setting certificate path, continuing anyway");
- }
- infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath);
+ if(ssl_capath &&
+ !SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
- }
#else
- if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) {
- /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
- the servers certificate. */
+ /* tell OpenSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify the
+ server's certificate. */
if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) {
- if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
- /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
- " CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
- ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
- ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
- /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification
- is required. */
- infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
- " continuing anyway:");
- }
- else {
- /* Everything is fine. */
- infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:");
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
+ " CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
+ ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
+ ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
+#endif
infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none");
infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
}
-#endif
#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
if(verifypeer &&
!ca_info_blob && !ssl_cafile && !ssl_capath && !imported_native_ca) {
/* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't
- work so use openssl's built in default as fallback */
+ work so use openssl's built-in default as fallback */
SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(backend->ctx);
}
#endif
if(ssl_crlfile) {
- /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
+ /* tell OpenSSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
* revocation */
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
X509_LOOKUP_file());
@@ -3124,7 +3117,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
/* Everything is fine. */
- infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:");
+ infof(data, "successfully loaded CRL file:");
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
@@ -3150,7 +3143,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
only, instead of needing the whole chain.
Due to OpenSSL bug https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5081 we
- cannot do partial chains with CRL check.
+ cannot do partial chains with a CRL check.
*/
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
@@ -3158,7 +3151,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
#endif
}
- /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
+ /* OpenSSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
* fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
* anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
* SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
@@ -3173,7 +3166,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
#endif
/* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the "new session"
- * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to avoid that OpenSSL creates
+ * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to prevent OpenSSL from creating
* an internal session cache.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(backend->ctx,
@@ -3192,7 +3185,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
}
}
- /* Lets make an SSL structure */
+ /* Let's make an SSL structure */
if(backend->handle)
SSL_free(backend->handle);
backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx);
@@ -3332,7 +3325,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data,
/* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
- /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes
+ /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and remove
the entry. */
errdetail = ERR_get_error();
@@ -3361,7 +3354,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data,
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
/* SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED is only available on
- OpenSSL version above v1.1.1, not Libre SSL nor BoringSSL */
+ OpenSSL version above v1.1.1, not LibreSSL nor BoringSSL */
else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
(reason == SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)) {
/* If client certificate is required, communicate the
@@ -3378,7 +3371,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data,
/* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
/* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
- * (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
+ * (RST connection, etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
* the SO_ERROR is also lost.
*/
if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) {
@@ -3401,7 +3394,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data,
}
}
else {
- /* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ /* we connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
/* Informational message */
@@ -3820,7 +3813,7 @@ static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert,
}
/*
- * Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
+ * Get the server cert, verify it and show it, etc., only call failf() if the
* 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
* purposes only!
*
@@ -4021,7 +4014,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data,
/*
* We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
* man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
- * verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert
+ * verify the peer, ignore faults and failures from the server cert
* operations.
*/
@@ -4059,7 +4052,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct Curl_easy *data,
const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
- /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+ /* no need to continue if time is already up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-06 21:19:32 +0000