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-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/af_inet.c3
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/datagram.c16
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c11
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/ip_output.c3
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/ipmr.c28
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c311
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c344
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/route.c21
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_input.c15
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c25
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_output.c18
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c2
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/udp.c6
13 files changed, 301 insertions, 502 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index f022e0e97dc..14ad21e2fd3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
build_ehash_secret();
+ if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/datagram.c b/net/ipv4/datagram.c
index 5f3dc1df04b..291b0821d1a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/datagram.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
-int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
+int __ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
sk_dst_reset(sk);
- lock_sock(sk);
-
oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(usin->sin_addr.s_addr)) {
@@ -81,9 +79,19 @@ int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
err = 0;
out:
- release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ip4_datagram_connect);
+
+int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
+{
+ int res;
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ res = __ip4_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ return res;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip4_datagram_connect);
/* Because UDP xmit path can manipulate sk_dst_cache without holding
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
index 4c1884fed54..04c7e461800 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp, struct sk_buff *skb)
ihl = ip_hdrlen(skb);
/* Determine the position of this fragment. */
- end = offset + skb->len - ihl;
+ end = offset + skb->len - skb_network_offset(skb) - ihl;
err = -EINVAL;
/* Is this the final fragment? */
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto err;
err = -ENOMEM;
- if (pskb_pull(skb, ihl) == NULL)
+ if (!pskb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + ihl))
goto err;
err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset);
@@ -627,6 +627,9 @@ static int ip_frag_reasm(struct ipq *qp, struct sk_buff *prev,
iph->frag_off = qp->q.max_size ? htons(IP_DF) : 0;
iph->tot_len = htons(len);
iph->tos |= ecn;
+
+ ip_send_check(iph);
+
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMOKS);
qp->q.fragments = NULL;
qp->q.fragments_tail = NULL;
@@ -653,6 +656,9 @@ int ip_defrag(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
net = skb->dev ? dev_net(skb->dev) : dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMREQDS);
+ if (!net->ipv4.frags.high_thresh)
+ goto fail;
+
/* Start by cleaning up the memory. */
ip_evictor(net);
@@ -669,6 +675,7 @@ int ip_defrag(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
return ret;
}
+fail:
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
index 47d236156f0..650873c3240 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ int __ip_local_out(struct sk_buff *skb)
iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
ip_send_check(iph);
+
+ skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
+
return nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, skb, NULL,
skb_dst(skb)->dev, dst_output);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
index 9fc74ec238d..91941b0b60a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm);
static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc,
int cmd);
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt);
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all);
static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt)
{
del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true);
kfree(mrt);
}
@@ -881,8 +881,10 @@ static struct mfc_cache *ipmr_cache_alloc(void)
{
struct mfc_cache *c = kmem_cache_zalloc(mrt_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (c)
+ if (c) {
+ c->mfc_un.res.last_assert = jiffies - MFC_ASSERT_THRESH - 1;
c->mfc_un.res.minvif = MAXVIFS;
+ }
return c;
}
@@ -1199,7 +1201,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt,
* Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc
*/
-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
+static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all)
{
int i;
LIST_HEAD(list);
@@ -1208,8 +1210,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
/* Shut down all active vif entries */
for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) {
- if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
- vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
+ if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC))
+ continue;
+ vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
@@ -1217,7 +1220,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt)
for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) {
- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)
+ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC))
continue;
list_del_rcu(&c->list);
mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE);
@@ -1252,7 +1255,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv4.devconf_all);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL);
- mroute_clean_tables(mrt);
+ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false);
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
@@ -1672,8 +1675,8 @@ static inline int ipmr_forward_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_options *opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
- IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
- IP_ADD_STATS_BH(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);
+ IP_INC_STATS(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
+ IP_ADD_STATS(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);
if (unlikely(opt->optlen))
ip_forward_options(skb);
@@ -1735,7 +1738,7 @@ static void ipmr_queue_xmit(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt,
* to blackhole.
*/
- IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
+ IP_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
ip_rt_put(rt);
goto out_free;
}
@@ -2187,7 +2190,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb,
int ipmr_get_route(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
- struct rtmsg *rtm, int nowait)
+ struct rtmsg *rtm, int nowait, u32 portid)
{
struct mfc_cache *cache;
struct mr_table *mrt;
@@ -2232,6 +2235,7 @@ int ipmr_get_route(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ NETLINK_CB(skb2).portid = portid;
skb_push(skb2, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
iph = ip_hdr(skb2);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index c8abe31961e..95a5f261fe8 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -350,11 +350,12 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
{
static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
- return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
+ memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
@@ -393,11 +394,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
- if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
+ if ((unconditional(e) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
- t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
- visited) {
+ t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
+ if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
+ return 0;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
@@ -452,6 +454,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
+ if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
+ return 0;
}
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
@@ -465,25 +469,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
return 1;
}
-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
-{
- const struct xt_entry_target *t;
-
- if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
- duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
- if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int check_target(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t = arpt_get_target(e);
@@ -513,10 +498,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
struct xt_target *target;
int ret;
- ret = check_entry(e, name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
t = arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
@@ -542,7 +523,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
- if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
+ if (!unconditional(e))
return false;
t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -561,9 +542,11 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
+ int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
- (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+ (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
+ (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -575,6 +558,14 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+ e->next_offset);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -583,9 +574,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
- pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
- "use the STANDARD target with "
- "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+ "use the STANDARD target with "
+ "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -675,10 +666,8 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,
}
}
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) {
- duprintf("Looping hook\n");
+ if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))
return -ELOOP;
- }
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
@@ -1071,6 +1060,9 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1111,56 +1103,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int i, curcpu;
struct xt_counters_info tmp;
struct xt_counters *paddc;
- unsigned int num_counters;
- const char *name;
- int size;
- void *ptmp;
struct xt_table *t;
const struct xt_table_info *private;
int ret = 0;
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
unsigned int addend;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
-
- if (compat) {
- ptmp = &compat_tmp;
- size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
- } else
-#endif
- {
- ptmp = &tmp;
- size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
- }
- if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
- return -EFAULT;
+ paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
+ if (IS_ERR(paddc))
+ return PTR_ERR(paddc);
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- if (compat) {
- num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
- name = compat_tmp.name;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
- name = tmp.name;
- }
-
- if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
- if (!paddc)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto free;
- }
-
- t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, name);
+ t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, tmp.name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
goto free;
@@ -1168,7 +1122,7 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
local_bh_disable();
private = t->private;
- if (private->number != num_counters) {
+ if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_up_free;
}
@@ -1194,6 +1148,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+struct compat_arpt_replace {
+ char name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
+ u32 valid_hooks;
+ u32 num_entries;
+ u32 size;
+ u32 hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
+ u32 underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
+ u32 num_counters;
+ compat_uptr_t counters;
+ struct compat_arpt_entry entries[0];
+};
+
static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1202,24 +1168,22 @@ static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
}
-static inline int
+static int
check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
- const unsigned char *limit,
- const unsigned int *hook_entries,
- const unsigned int *underflows,
- const char *name)
+ const unsigned char *limit)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
- int ret, off, h;
+ int ret, off;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
- (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+ (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
+ (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1231,8 +1195,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
- ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
+ if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+ e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1256,17 +1223,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
if (ret)
goto release_target;
- /* Check hooks & underflows */
- for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
- if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
- newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
- if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
- newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
- }
-
- /* Clear counters and comefrom */
- memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
- e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
release_target:
@@ -1275,18 +1231,17 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static int
+static void
compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
- unsigned int *size, const char *name,
+ unsigned int *size,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
struct arpt_entry *de;
unsigned int origsize;
- int ret, h;
+ int h;
- ret = 0;
origsize = *size;
de = (struct arpt_entry *)*dstptr;
memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct arpt_entry));
@@ -1307,144 +1262,81 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
}
- return ret;
}
-static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,
- unsigned int valid_hooks,
- struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
+static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
void **pentry0,
- unsigned int total_size,
- unsigned int number,
- unsigned int *hook_entries,
- unsigned int *underflows)
+ const struct compat_arpt_replace *compatr)
{
unsigned int i, j;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
struct compat_arpt_entry *iter0;
- struct arpt_entry *iter1;
+ struct arpt_replace repl;
unsigned int size;
int ret = 0;
info = *pinfo;
entry0 = *pentry0;
- size = total_size;
- info->number = number;
-
- /* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
- for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
- info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
- info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
- }
+ size = compatr->size;
+ info->number = compatr->num_entries;
duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
j = 0;
xt_compat_lock(NFPROTO_ARP);
- xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP, number);
+ xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP, compatr->num_entries);
/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+ xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
entry0,
- entry0 + total_size,
- hook_entries,
- underflows,
- name);
+ entry0 + compatr->size);
if (ret != 0)
goto out_unlock;
++j;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (j != number) {
+ if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
- j, number);
+ j, compatr->num_entries);
goto out_unlock;
}
- /* Check hooks all assigned */
- for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
- /* Only hooks which are valid */
- if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
- continue;
- if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
- i, hook_entries[i]);
- goto out_unlock;
- }
- if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
- i, underflows[i]);
- goto out_unlock;
- }
- }
-
ret = -ENOMEM;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
if (!newinfo)
goto out_unlock;
- newinfo->number = number;
+ newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
}
entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
pos = entry1;
- size = total_size;
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
- ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
- name, newinfo, entry1);
- if (ret != 0)
- break;
- }
+ size = compatr->size;
+ xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
+ compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+ newinfo, entry1);
+
+ /* all module references in entry0 are now gone */
+
xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
- if (ret)
- goto free_newinfo;
- ret = -ELOOP;
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
- goto free_newinfo;
+ memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
- i = 0;
- xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
- ret = check_target(iter1, name);
- if (ret != 0)
- break;
- ++i;
- if (strcmp(arpt_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
- XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
- ++newinfo->stacksize;
- }
- if (ret) {
- /*
- * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
- * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
- * entries need only release.
- */
- int skip = i;
- j -= i;
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
- if (skip-- > 0)
- continue;
- if (j-- == 0)
- break;
- compat_release_entry(iter0);
- }
- xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
- if (i-- == 0)
- break;
- cleanup_entry(iter1);
- }
- xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
- return ret;
+ for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+ repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
+ repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
}
- /* And one copy for every other CPU */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i)
- if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
- memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
+ repl.num_counters = 0;
+ repl.counters = NULL;
+ repl.size = newinfo->size;
+ ret = translate_table(newinfo, entry1, &repl);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_newinfo;
*pinfo = newinfo;
*pentry0 = entry1;
@@ -1453,31 +1345,18 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,
free_newinfo:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-out:
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+ return ret;
+out_unlock:
+ xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
+ xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
+ xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
compat_release_entry(iter0);
}
return ret;
-out_unlock:
- xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
- xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
- goto out;
}
-struct compat_arpt_replace {
- char name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
- u32 valid_hooks;
- u32 num_entries;
- u32 size;
- u32 hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
- u32 underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
- u32 num_counters;
- compat_uptr_t counters;
- struct compat_arpt_entry entries[0];
-};
-
static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
@@ -1495,6 +1374,9 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1508,10 +1390,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
goto free_newinfo;
}
- ret = translate_compat_table(tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
- &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
- tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
- tmp.underflow);
+ ret = translate_compat_table(&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_newinfo;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 651c10774d5..92c8f2727ee 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
/* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
/* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
{
static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
- return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+ memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
#undef FWINV
}
@@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
- if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+ if (unconditional(s) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
- t->verdict < 0 &&
- unconditional(&s->ip)) {
+ t->verdict < 0) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
@@ -467,11 +467,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
- if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+ if ((unconditional(e) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
- t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
- visited) {
+ t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -512,6 +511,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
+ if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
+ return 0;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
@@ -533,6 +534,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
+ if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
+ return 0;
}
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
@@ -560,27 +563,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
}
static int
-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
-{
- const struct xt_entry_target *t;
-
- if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
- duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
- e->next_offset)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
- if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
{
const struct ipt_ip *ip = par->entryinfo;
@@ -657,10 +639,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
- ret = check_entry(e, name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
j = 0;
mtpar.net = net;
mtpar.table = name;
@@ -704,7 +682,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
- if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
+ if (!unconditional(e))
return false;
t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -724,9 +702,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
+ int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
- (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+ (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
+ (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -738,6 +718,14 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+ e->next_offset);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -746,9 +734,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
- pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
- "use the STANDARD target with "
- "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+ "use the STANDARD target with "
+ "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -1258,6 +1246,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1299,56 +1290,18 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int i, curcpu;
struct xt_counters_info tmp;
struct xt_counters *paddc;
- unsigned int num_counters;
- const char *name;
- int size;
- void *ptmp;
struct xt_table *t;
const struct xt_table_info *private;
int ret = 0;
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct ipt_entry *iter;
unsigned int addend;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
-
- if (compat) {
- ptmp = &compat_tmp;
- size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
- } else
-#endif
- {
- ptmp = &tmp;
- size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
- }
-
- if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
- return -EFAULT;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- if (compat) {
- num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
- name = compat_tmp.name;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
- name = tmp.name;
- }
- if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
- if (!paddc)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto free;
- }
+ paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
+ if (IS_ERR(paddc))
+ return PTR_ERR(paddc);
- t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, name);
+ t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, tmp.name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
goto free;
@@ -1356,7 +1309,7 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
local_bh_disable();
private = t->private;
- if (private->number != num_counters) {
+ if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_up_free;
}
@@ -1435,7 +1388,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
static int
compat_find_calc_match(struct xt_entry_match *m,
- const char *name,
const struct ipt_ip *ip,
unsigned int hookmask,
int *size)
@@ -1471,21 +1423,19 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
- const unsigned char *limit,
- const unsigned int *hook_entries,
- const unsigned int *underflows,
- const char *name)
+ const unsigned char *limit)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
- int ret, off, h;
+ int ret, off;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
- (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+ (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
+ (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1497,8 +1447,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
- ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
+ if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
+ e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1506,8 +1459,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
- ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name,
- &e->ip, e->comefrom, &off);
+ ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, &e->ip, e->comefrom,
+ &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
@@ -1530,17 +1483,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
if (ret)
goto out;
- /* Check hooks & underflows */
- for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
- if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
- newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
- if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
- newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
- }
-
- /* Clear counters and comefrom */
- memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
- e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
@@ -1554,19 +1496,18 @@ release_matches:
return ret;
}
-static int
+static void
compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
- unsigned int *size, const char *name,
+ unsigned int *size,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
struct ipt_entry *de;
unsigned int origsize;
- int ret, h;
+ int h;
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
- ret = 0;
origsize = *size;
de = (struct ipt_entry *)*dstptr;
memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct ipt_entry));
@@ -1575,198 +1516,104 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
*dstptr += sizeof(struct ipt_entry);
*size += sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
- xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
- ret = xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
- if (ret != 0)
- return ret;
- }
+ xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e)
+ xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
+
de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = t->u.kernel.target;
xt_compat_target_from_user(t, dstptr, size);
de->next_offset = e->next_offset - (origsize - *size);
+
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->hook_entry[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] -= origsize - *size;
if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
}
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name)
-{
- struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
- struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
- unsigned int j;
- int ret = 0;
-
- j = 0;
- mtpar.net = net;
- mtpar.table = name;
- mtpar.entryinfo = &e->ip;
- mtpar.hook_mask = e->comefrom;
- mtpar.family = NFPROTO_IPV4;
- xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
- ret = check_match(ematch, &mtpar);
- if (ret != 0)
- goto cleanup_matches;
- ++j;
- }
-
- ret = check_target(e, net, name);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup_matches;
- return 0;
-
- cleanup_matches:
- xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
- if (j-- == 0)
- break;
- cleanup_match(ematch, net);
- }
- return ret;
}
static int
translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
- const char *name,
- unsigned int valid_hooks,
struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
void **pentry0,
- unsigned int total_size,
- unsigned int number,
- unsigned int *hook_entries,
- unsigned int *underflows)
+ const struct compat_ipt_replace *compatr)
{
unsigned int i, j;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
struct compat_ipt_entry *iter0;
- struct ipt_entry *iter1;
+ struct ipt_replace repl;
unsigned int size;
int ret;
info = *pinfo;
entry0 = *pentry0;
- size = total_size;
- info->number = number;
-
- /* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
- for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
- info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
- info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
- }
+ size = compatr->size;
+ info->number = compatr->num_entries;
duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
j = 0;
xt_compat_lock(AF_INET);
- xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, number);
+ xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, compatr->num_entries);
/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+ xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
entry0,
- entry0 + total_size,
- hook_entries,
- underflows,
- name);
+ entry0 + compatr->size);
if (ret != 0)
goto out_unlock;
++j;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (j != number) {
+ if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
- j, number);
+ j, compatr->num_entries);
goto out_unlock;
}
- /* Check hooks all assigned */
- for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
- /* Only hooks which are valid */
- if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
- continue;
- if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
- i, hook_entries[i]);
- goto out_unlock;
- }
- if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
- i, underflows[i]);
- goto out_unlock;
- }
- }
-
ret = -ENOMEM;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
if (!newinfo)
goto out_unlock;
- newinfo->number = number;
+ newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
- newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
- newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
+ newinfo->hook_entry[i] = compatr->hook_entry[i];
+ newinfo->underflow[i] = compatr->underflow[i];
}
entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
pos = entry1;
- size = total_size;
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
- ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
- name, newinfo, entry1);
- if (ret != 0)
- break;
- }
+ size = compatr->size;
+ xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
+ compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+ newinfo, entry1);
+
+ /* all module references in entry0 are now gone.
+ * entry1/newinfo contains a 64bit ruleset that looks exactly as
+ * generated by 64bit userspace.
+ *
+ * Call standard translate_table() to validate all hook_entrys,
+ * underflows, check for loops, etc.
+ */
xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
- if (ret)
- goto free_newinfo;
- ret = -ELOOP;
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
- goto free_newinfo;
+ memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
- i = 0;
- xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
- ret = compat_check_entry(iter1, net, name);
- if (ret != 0)
- break;
- ++i;
- if (strcmp(ipt_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
- XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
- ++newinfo->stacksize;
- }
- if (ret) {
- /*
- * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
- * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
- * entries need only release.
- */
- int skip = i;
- j -= i;
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
- if (skip-- > 0)
- continue;
- if (j-- == 0)
- break;
- compat_release_entry(iter0);
- }
- xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
- if (i-- == 0)
- break;
- cleanup_entry(iter1, net);
- }
- xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
- return ret;
+ for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+ repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
+ repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
}
- /* And one copy for every other CPU */
- for_each_possible_cpu(i)
- if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
- memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
+ repl.num_counters = 0;
+ repl.counters = NULL;
+ repl.size = newinfo->size;
+ ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, entry1, &repl);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_newinfo;
*pinfo = newinfo;
*pentry0 = entry1;
@@ -1775,17 +1622,16 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
free_newinfo:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-out:
- xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+ return ret;
+out_unlock:
+ xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
+ xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
+ xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
compat_release_entry(iter0);
}
return ret;
-out_unlock:
- xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
- xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
- goto out;
}
static int
@@ -1805,6 +1651,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1819,10 +1668,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
goto free_newinfo;
}
- ret = translate_compat_table(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
- &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
- tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
- tmp.underflow);
+ ret = translate_compat_table(net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_newinfo;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 52fceb025a7..70edc339f21 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -715,8 +715,10 @@ static void __ip_do_redirect(struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flow
goto reject_redirect;
}
- n = ipv4_neigh_lookup(&rt->dst, NULL, &new_gw);
- if (n) {
+ n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup(rt->dst.dev, new_gw);
+ if (!n)
+ n = neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &new_gw, rt->dst.dev);
+ if (!IS_ERR(n)) {
if (!(n->nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
neigh_event_send(n, NULL);
} else {
@@ -1885,6 +1887,18 @@ static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(const struct fib_result *res,
*/
if (fi && res->prefixlen < 4)
fi = NULL;
+ } else if ((type == RTN_LOCAL) && (orig_oif != 0) &&
+ (orig_oif != dev_out->ifindex)) {
+ /* For local routes that require a particular output interface
+ * we do not want to cache the result. Caching the result
+ * causes incorrect behaviour when there are multiple source
+ * addresses on the interface, the end result being that if the
+ * intended recipient is waiting on that interface for the
+ * packet he won't receive it because it will be delivered on
+ * the loopback interface and the IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifindex will
+ * be set to the loopback interface as well.
+ */
+ fi = NULL;
}
fnhe = NULL;
@@ -2327,7 +2341,8 @@ static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src,
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, MC_FORWARDING)) {
int err = ipmr_get_route(net, skb,
fl4->saddr, fl4->daddr,
- r, nowait);
+ r, nowait, portid);
+
if (err <= 0) {
if (!nowait) {
if (err == 0)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 22fc869465e..cd4cfb144dd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
#include <net/dst.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
/* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
-int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
+int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
@@ -3289,12 +3290,19 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk)
static u32 challenge_timestamp;
static unsigned int challenge_count;
u32 now = jiffies / HZ;
+ u32 count;
if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
+ u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
+
challenge_timestamp = now;
- challenge_count = 0;
+ ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = half +
+ reciprocal_divide(prandom_u32(),
+ sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
}
- if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
+ count = ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count);
+ if (count > 0) {
+ ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = count - 1;
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
tcp_send_ack(sk);
}
@@ -5576,6 +5584,7 @@ discard:
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index d64453a8102..3ae0b261e81 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -824,7 +824,8 @@ static void tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
*/
tcp_v4_send_ack(skb, (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) ?
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 : tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt,
- tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, req->rcv_wnd,
+ tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt,
+ req->rcv_wnd >> inet_rsk(req)->rcv_wscale,
tcp_time_stamp,
req->ts_recent,
0,
@@ -1015,7 +1016,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr,
}
md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info,
- sock_owned_by_user(sk));
+ sock_owned_by_user(sk) ||
+ lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock));
if (!md5sig) {
md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp);
if (!md5sig)
@@ -1958,6 +1960,21 @@ bool tcp_prequeue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_prequeue);
+int tcp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
+ unsigned int eaten = skb->len;
+ int err;
+
+ err = sk_filter_trim_cap(sk, skb, th->doff * 4);
+ if (!err) {
+ eaten -= skb->len;
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq -= eaten;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_filter);
+
/*
* From tcp_input.c
*/
@@ -2020,8 +2037,10 @@ process:
goto discard_and_relse;
nf_reset(skb);
- if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
+ if (tcp_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
+ th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
+ iph = ip_hdr(skb);
skb->dev = NULL;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 5653febcb2a..86b9957cab9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(int __space, __u32 mss,
/* Set window scaling on max possible window
* See RFC1323 for an explanation of the limit to 14
*/
- space = max_t(u32, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2], sysctl_rmem_max);
+ space = max_t(u32, space, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2]);
+ space = max_t(u32, space, sysctl_rmem_max);
space = min_t(u32, space, *window_clamp);
while (space > 65535 && (*rcv_wscale) < 14) {
space >>= 1;
@@ -1751,12 +1752,14 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk)
len = 0;
tcp_for_write_queue_from_safe(skb, next, sk) {
copy = min_t(int, skb->len, probe_size - len);
- if (nskb->ip_summed)
+ if (nskb->ip_summed) {
skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, skb_put(nskb, copy), copy);
- else
- nskb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb, 0,
- skb_put(nskb, copy),
- copy, nskb->csum);
+ } else {
+ __wsum csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb, 0,
+ skb_put(nskb, copy),
+ copy, 0);
+ nskb->csum = csum_block_add(nskb->csum, csum, len);
+ }
if (skb->len <= copy) {
/* We've eaten all the data from this skb.
@@ -2325,7 +2328,8 @@ int __tcp_retransmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
* copying overhead: fragmentation, tunneling, mangling etc.
*/
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) >
- min(sk->sk_wmem_queued + (sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 2), sk->sk_sndbuf))
+ min_t(u32, sk->sk_wmem_queued + (sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 2),
+ sk->sk_sndbuf))
return -EAGAIN;
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->snd_una)) {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
index 05c3b6f0e8e..bf8321d6f2e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static u32 tcp_yeah_ssthresh(struct sock *sk) {
yeah->fast_count = 0;
yeah->reno_count = max(yeah->reno_count>>1, 2U);
- return tp->snd_cwnd - reduction;
+ return max_t(int, tp->snd_cwnd - reduction, 2);
}
static struct tcp_congestion_ops tcp_yeah __read_mostly = {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index b6bcdbec6ce..364076eb2c6 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ int udp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
+ bool checksum_valid = false;
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
@@ -1234,11 +1235,12 @@ try_again:
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
- if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
+ checksum_valid = !udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb);
+ if (!checksum_valid)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
- if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
+ if (checksum_valid || skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, copied);
else {
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-26 16:37:53 +0000